University of Wollongong

Research Online
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection
2017+

University of Wollongong Thesis Collections

2020

Living Longer Living Better Reforms: The (D)evolution of Accountability in
the Aged Care Sector
Linda Lorkovic
University of Wollongong
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1
University of Wollongong
Copyright Warning
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any
copyright material contained on this site.
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised,
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material.
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the
conversion of material into digital or electronic form.
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the University of Wollongong.

Recommended Citation
Lorkovic, Linda, Living Longer Living Better Reforms: The (D)evolution of Accountability in the Aged Care
Sector, Master of Accountancy - Research thesis, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance,
University of Wollongong, 2020. https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1/863

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Living Longer Living Better Reforms: The (D)evolution of
Accountability in the Aged Care Sector
Linda Lorkovic
This thesis is presented as part of the requirements for the conferral of the
degree:
Master of Accountancy - Research
Supervisors:
Dr Ciorstan Smark
Dr Parulian Silaen

The University of Wollongong
School of Accounting,
Economics and Finance

February 2020

This work © copyright by Linda Lorkovic, 2020. All Rights Reserved.
1

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the author or the University of Wollongong.

This research has been conducted with the support of an Australian Government
Research Training Program Scholarship.

2

Turnitin overall percentage report

4

Abstract
The Australian federal government has been experiencing increasing cost
pressures from Australian society to continue to fund the costs relating to elderly
care. However, due to the decline in the ratio of working people to elderly
Australians, there is an increasing risk that there will be insufficient funds to
support the elderly population by 2050. Consequently, there is a continuous
change in the balance of funding the aged care sector as the Australian
government’s policy evolves to shift accountability to elderly citizens by requiring
them to contribute more towards the financial costs of their care. Concerted
federal government policy efforts through the 2012 Living Longer, Living Better
Reforms are seeking to contain the growth of government expenditure on long
term care which realised significant changes in the aged care system which
commenced under the new regime from 1 July 2014.
This study will explore the extent that the Australian federal government is shifting
its accountability to aged care providers and Australian citizens through the
application of content analysis, discourse analysis and regulatory space theory.
This methodology will be used to explore how accounting is utilised by the
government as a tool of social construction. It enables the government to justify
its shift in focus to rational planning and efficiencies; decline in expenditure on
aged services; and the expectation that the elderly will contribute more towards
their costs of care. It is anticipated that the research findings will indicate that
public and financial accountability is being shifted from the Australian government
to Australian society.
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Glossary
Accommodation
Bonds

It is an amount that elderly people pay towards their accommodation in an aged
care home.

Community Aged
Care Package
(CACP)

Government funded community care programs which provide assistance to
people who have complex care needs but would like to continue living in their
own home.

Community Care

Care provided in the community allows people to age at home.

Community Care
Funding

Home Care packages which are subsidised by the federal and state
governments.

Extended Aged Care
at Home (EACH)

A government funded program which delivers the equivalent of nursing home
level care in the home.

Extended Aged Care
at Home Dementia
(EACHD)

A government funded program which delivers the equivalent of nursing home
level care in the home for frail older people with psychological symptoms and
behaviours associated with dementia.

Home and
Community Care
(HACC)

A government initiative that provides services to support older Australians and
their carers to be more independent at home and in the community, and to
reduce the potential or need for admission to residential care. HACC’s services
include personal care, domestic assistance, health care and nursing services,
provision of meals and other food services, transport, home modification and
maintenance, counselling, respite care, counselling and support.

Home Care

Support services provided in and around the home.

LLLB

Living Longer Living Better Reform package released by the Australian
Government in 2012.

Means Testing
Arrangements

The federal government assesses whether the care subsidy for a resident
should be reduced based on their assessable income.

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development

Personal Care

Includes assistance relating to bathing, toileting, eating, dressing, mobility,
incontinence management, community rehabilitation support, assistance in
obtaining health and therapy services.

Residential Care

Low level care provides accommodation and everyday services while high level
care consists of additional services including nursing care, palliative care,
medical management, therapy services and equipment to assist with mobility.

User fees/user pays
system

The practice of charging customers for aged care services and are charged in
such a way that the prices they pay reflect the costs of providing the services.

12

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1

Introduction

The Australian population is rapidly ageing particularly with the generation known
as the baby boomers who were born between 1946 and 1968 (Clare et al 1997;
KPMG 2013). The baby boomer bubble is expected to rapidly grow, given the
increasing existence of prevailing long term health care conditions. The
Productivity Commission (2011); KPMG (2013) and The Treasury (2015) note
that the greatest change facing the aged care industry in Australia is that the
Australian population aged 85 and over has been estimated to increase from
400,000 in 2010 to 1.8 million by 2054-2055. As a result, the demand for aged
care is expected to increase by providing support for people to live in their own
home (“Home Care”) along with the gradual shift to dedicated homes for the
elderly (“residential care”) as the elderlies’ support needs rise. Aged care in this
context refers principally to residential care (nursing homes and hostels) and
community services which are delivered in, or to, the homes of aged persons.

In order to address this challenging issue, the Australian government proposes
that reforms are required to develop a new cost effective aged care system which
will meet increased demand; provide greater consumer choice by providing
alternative care needs (KPMG 2013); providing opportunities for productivity
gains and higher quality care which will enhance the Government’s “policy
objectives for the caring of older Australians” (Productivity Commission 2011,
pxxvii).
13

The Living Longer Living Better (“LLLB”) reforms in Australia highlight a
unique issue, which will be examined in this research to assess the impact
on the Australian government, aged care providers and citizens as to
whether there has been a shift in accountability. This chapter presents an
overview of the study and consists of eight parts. Firstly, it provides a brief
introduction to the Australian aged care industry and a brief comparison with
the Australian and global aged care industry arrangements. Secondly, the
concepts of accountability and accounting will be used as a lens to address
the research question (which is ““How and to what extent is the Australian
government transferring its accountability to aged care providers and
Australian citizens?”) in relation to the aged care industry and their concepts
are outlined in the chapter. Thirdly, an overview of the Australian and global
aged care industry is provided. Fourthly, the objectives of this study are
explained, and the research question that will be used to address this study
is also outlined. The fifth aspect of this chapter includes an explanation of
the qualitative research method that will be used in this study, along with
the data collection and qualitative content analysis that will be used to
support the analysis of data collected for this study. The sixth aspect of this
chapter provides an explanation of the contributions and limitations of this
study. The seventh part of this chapter provides recommendations on future
research areas which relate to the Australian aged care industry. This
chapter concludes with an overview of each chapter that is contained in this
thesis.

14

1.2

Background of the study

Australia’s population growth is considered to be faster than in comparison to
other OECD countries. While Australia’s population is expected to grow by 60%
between now and 2050, Canada’s population is expected to grow by 40%; New
Zealand and Norway by 30%; and the USA and UK by 20% (Butler 2015). The
Western and Eastern European nations are projected to remain at similar levels
to today whilst Russia’s population is projected to shrink. Germany, where 20%
of its population is aged sixty five and over as its post war baby Boom was
relatively short and it did not experience Australia’s high post baby Boom birth
rates in the following decades. Consequently, it has been experiencing the effects
of a rapidly ageing population some years prior to Australia’s growing experience
and therefore Australia needs to anticipate the carrying of older Australians.
A significant feature of long term care funding arrangements in other OECD
nations is that they are linked closely with other health care and social security
funding arrangements (Howe 2010). Whilst many European nations have had
periodic changes to aged care funding, including the introduction of long term
care insurance, it has generally changed due to reform in other wider health care
related arrangements (Howe 2010). While Australia has the capacity to learn from
other nations and develop similar aged care systems, Australia’s system is
unique and has a number of different features which creates difficulties in
attempting to integrate elements of other nations’ system (Howe 2010).
Australia’s demographic is very different to European nations as they did not
experience the migration of post world war baby boomers (those born between
1946 and 1968, Clare et al 1997). Hence other nations do not face Australia’s
15

problem of experienced and projected rapidly increasing aged care costs.
Consequently, the Australian government is faced with restructuring the funding
model of the aged care system whilst equitably addressing the health care and
retirement needs for Australian citizens and social future system (Howe 2010).

1.3

Accountability and Australian Aged Care Industry

The concept of accountability is quite broad, and there are different ideas as the
types of accountability and who is accountable. Cameron (2004) defines
accountability as “being answerable for decisions or actions, often to prevent the
misuse of power” (p59). Dowdle (2017) suggests that public accountability also
applies to the government, which forms the basis of a relationship between two
individuals, the principal and the agent. The agent is required to demonstrate that
their actions meet the “demands, intentions and interests of the principal” (p199).
In this relationship, the principal is the public, and the government (as the agent),
acts on behalf of the principal.
The government raises taxpayer revenue and distributes these resources
towards services such as aged care services (Funnell & Cooper 1998). As aged
care costs are subsidised by the federal and state government, the concept of
public accountability applies as the government has an increased responsibility
to its citizens to ensure that these resources are equitably distributed (Funnell &
Cooper 1998). However, Australia’s aged care policy development during the last
twenty years has substantially shifted from a public enterprise towards a
privatised market model with an increased focus on efficiencies and reductions
in expenditure rather on effectiveness. Effectiveness relates to the adequate
application of the public’s resources through the provision services which meet
16

social needs (Funnell et al 2012), whilst efficiency relates to the careful use of the
public’s resources which is considered to be the most important concept of
accountability by the government (Funnell et al 2012). The growing use of
traditional accounting principles including income, expenses and empirical data
enables the government to calculate budgetary deficits and declare a risk of a
future “crisis of fiscal sustainability” (Bessant et al 2011, p143).
The concept of accounting, in this thesis, is a historical and spatial “specific set
of techniques” (Chahed 2014, p198) that assists the government to make the
actors and processes within the aged care industry, and individuals impacted by
the aged care industry “visible and governable” (Chahed 2014, p198) for the
purpose of meeting the government’s higher social order ideals and objectives.
Further, accounting is used as a social construction, and the government’s failure
to use the “generational accounting framework”1 (Bessant et al 2011, p143)
provides the government with the opportunity to emphasise its “dominant
ideology” (Smark 2006a, p342) to account for financial efficiency and budgetary
restraint. The use of accounting as a tool has significant influence in dollar
calculations which appear objective and become a dominant component of public
decision making. This social construction enables the government to shift its
focus to rational planning and efficiencies while the government’s historical
concepts of intergenerational equity, distributive fairness and justice are ignored

1

Generational accounting is an accounting method developed in Europe (and not adopted in Australia) to
calculate the government’s true budget constraints in relation to aged care funding. It is calculated by
determining the net tax payments by: taxes paid less transfers paid such as pension payments and income
support schemes. The final value is presented as a present value and “rest of life” (Bessant et al 2011, p151)
calculation for each group of people presently alive and born in the future (Bessant et al). Generational
accounting is more valuable than the traditional budget accounting method of cash flow deficits as it
recognises factors such as: future liabilities including “tax based retirement income schemes” (Bessant et al
2011, p151) and it takes a “long term view of budget making and reporting” (Raffelhuschen (2002, p76).
However the traditional accounting preoccupation with cash flows budgets only considers the short term
implications and is an unreliable method of fiscal sustainability (Raffelhuschen 2002).
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(Funnell & Cooper 1998; Bessant et al 2011).
The aged care system has shifted from being about the “availability of care
towards the ability to pay” (Gardner 1995, p164) by partly eliminating universal
access through increased means testing resulting in increased fees paid by the
elderly for aged care services provided in aged care homes or community care
(McCoppin 1995). This reduces the subsidies paid by the government to aged
care homes, whilst funding to community care services is increased to encourage
older Australians to stay at home longer as this is considered to be the cost
effective alternative to aged care. Historically the government has been the main
funder of aged care services however it is increasingly shifting the funding
responsibility to the elderly. Further, the government is also shifting its
accountability from the public sector to the private sector by encouraging the
elderly to remain in their home for longer whilst increasingly expecting the care
of the elderly to be a family responsibility at the expense of society (Minichiello
1995).
This context provides the motivation for the proposed research to study the
rationale for the Australian federal government’s reduction in funding to the aged
care sector. In doing so, particular focus is given to the transition from a socially
oriented, publicly funded sector to a privatised industry which is in stark contrast
to the notion that community and aged care is a public sector responsibility.
Further, this is a contemporary issue which affects all citizens and generations to
come, and it is anticipated that the research findings of this study will promote
and stimulate more research in the area of aged care within an accounting
context.
18

The term ‘long term care’ is defined by the OECD as “…a range of services
required by persons with a reduced degree of functional capacity, physical or
cognitive, and who are consequently dependent for an extended period of time
on help with basic activities of daily living” (Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development 2011, p1). Long term care consists of personal care
and clinical care. Personal care is commonly provided in conjunction with clinical
care (i.e. medical services including pain management, wound dressing,
administering medication and health monitoring), along with “prevention,
rehabilitation or services of palliative care” (Productivity Commission 2011, p5).
Long term care services can also be combined with lower-level care related to
assistance related to domestic duties or daily living activities. The Department of
Health and Ageing describes long term care as care for a chronic illness or
disability where hospital care is no longer considered to be appropriate. Hence in
Australia, long term care is generally called “aged care” (Productivity Commission
2011, p5). Aged care services are provided to older Australians who are aged 65
years and over (KPMG 2013), however, for planning purposes, the Government
utilises “70 as the minimum age” (Productivity Commission 2011, p7) for the
purposes of age eligibility to access the Age Pension and planning for residential
and community care places.

The World Health Organisation (2014a) emphasises that the social determinants
of health are “the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age,
including the health system. These circumstances are shaped by the distribution
of money, power and resources at global, national and local levels. The social
19

determinants of health are mostly responsible for health inequities which are the
“unfair and unavoidable differences in health status seen within and between
countries” (World Health Organisation 2014a). In 2008, the WHO’s response to
increasing concern about widening inequities resulted in recommendations on
how to reduce these inequities which included the following: to improve daily
living conditions; to tackle the inequitable distribution of power, money and
resources; to measure and understand the problem and assess the impact of
action (Marston et al 2014, p29). This includes reorienting the health sector
towards promoting health and reducing health inequities; to monitor progress and
increase accountability.

The Australian aged care industry is a key element of the Australian health
system, and its care costs are subsidised by the federal and state governments.
As such, the federal government is publicly accountable to the Australian citizens
as it has a heightened responsibility to meet their expectations regarding the
provision and funding of aged care services. The government’s traditional focus
surrounding accountability is to ensure compliance with legislation, government
policies, and meeting the needs of the Australian public. However, its focus has
expanded to incorporate the elements of the new public management doctrine
(Shaoul et al 2012; Steane 2008; Hoque & Moll 2001; Hood 1995), including the
adoption of private market practices which includes placing increased importance
on financial results and performance management. Focusing on final results and
performance management represents efficiency as the optimal utilisation of
public funds (including taxpayers’ money); and the effectiveness of the
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achievement of policy outcomes (Department of Finance 2013; Funnell et al
2012; Funnell & Cooper 1998).

The aged care industry is facing an increasing demand for the provision and types
of aged care services in the future. The overarching consequence is the need for
significant funding increases to ensure sustainability and viability of this public
sector. Additionally, the government’s primary focus on the provision of effective
services has shifted to eliminating waste of public resources; reduction of public
expenditure with increased savings of taxpayers' money. The costs to provide
care services for each older Australian (whether they remain in their home and
receive community services or reside in an aged care facility) are quantified in
financial terms. However, the increased reliance on quantified measurement of
the older Australian does not enable the assessment of the success of the
government’s level of effectiveness in achieving public aims and meeting the
social needs of older Australians.

The change in style from accountability to the incorporation of the elements of
new public management contradicts the government’s traditional focus of
equitable values to an increased focus on efficiency values. Measuring and
reporting on older Australians in quantitative and financial terms has resulted in
the shifting of responsibilities towards the older Australians and the aged care
industry.

1.4

Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to explore the Australian federal government’s change in
public accountability with the incorporation of aspects of new public management.
21

The government’s focus is on increasing efficiencies (rather than service delivery)
and “contain future spending on aged care” (The Treasury 2015, p129) while
increasing contributions paid by the elderly towards their care. The result is that
the LLLB reforms require elderly people to contribute more towards the costs of
their care through the user pays policy. As such findings from this research will
indicate that there has been a shift in public and financial accountability under the
Westminster system which will include the application of a number of aspects of
the new public management model to the aged care industry.

1.5

Research Question

The key issue in this study is to address the topic of accountability and
determining “who is accountable to whom and for what” (Cameron 2004, p56).
Australia’s aged care policies and the associated system are more complex in
comparison to other nations including Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Japan
which rely on a publicly funded system where there is little need for contributions
from elderly citizens. Under this “universal system” (Productivity Commission
2011, pD.4), there is a focus on the need for aged care services rather than the
ability to pay. In contrast, nations such as the UK and US maintain a “safety net”
(Productivity Commission 2011, p.4), requiring most of their elderly citizens to
pay for their own care. Australia’s aged care system is mixed and more complex
as it contains elements of the universal system and means testing arrangements
where a significant share of costs may be borne by users of aged care services.
Australia’s demographic is also very different to European nations as they did not
experience the migration of the baby boomers post World War II (Productivity
Commission Submission 355, 2010c). Hence they do not face Australia’s
22

problem of experienced and projected rapidly increasing aged care costs. As
such, the Australian government is faced with the continuous restructuring of
funding the aged care system while equitably addressing the health care and
retirement needs for Australian citizens and social future system (Productivity
Commission Submission 355, 2010c). Hence due to the differences in Australia’s
aged care system; the unique aged care experience (in comparison to other
Western nations) and its shift towards an increasingly privatised safety net
system is the reason for Australia being the nation of focus for this study. Based
on these arguments and the research objectives, this study will address the
following question: “How and to what extent is the Australian government
transferring its accountability to aged care providers and Australian citizens?”

1.6 Research Method
There are two types of research methods which are qualitative and quantitative.
The quantitative research process involves adopting a systematic approach and
techniques incorporating precise, objective, measurable and quantitative data
and numerical analysis. In contrast, qualitative research methods are not based
on measuring and reporting findings which are quantified. It allows the
interpretation of the collected text, which is used to describe its symbolic meaning
and how it relates to the social situation being explored. Thus, this study uses
qualitative research methods and uses accounting as a concept to link to the data
collected. The collected data will then be analysed using qualitative content
analysis.
Content analysis has traditionally been considered to be a quantitative research
method. This is a method of analysing the content of text that is utilised for
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communication and can be in written, spoken or visual formats (Cole 1988;
Krippendorff 2013). The content that is analysed includes words, symbols,
themes, pictures or any communicated message contained within the text
(Krippendorff 2013). The reading of text is a qualitative method, even when
particular characteristics of a text are subsequently converted into numbers and
statistics (Krippendorff 2013). In addition, the word frequency within text is
considered to be an indicator of importance as it assumes that groups of words
or common words “reveal underlying themes” (Duriau et al 2007, p6). These
reoccurring key words can be interpreted as an association occurring between
the fundamental concepts that will be explored (Huff 1990; Weber 1990). The
interpretation of collected data and “focus on human communication” (DowneWamboldt 1992, p313) enables the researcher to recognise whose voice is being
heard and why; and how their voices may influence and act as a catalyst for social
change. Thus, this study will apply the general principles strategy as noted by
Duriau (2007), and a qualitative content analysis framework as suggested by
Krippendorff (2013).

1.7 Data Collection
The types of data utilised for this research was obtained from the following
sources: government publications and media releases including government
legislation and public submissions to the government regarding changes in aged
care policies; legislation including the Aged Care Act 1997 and other legislation
related to the aged care industry; and reports and statistical information from The
Treasury, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Productivity Commission,
Department of Health and Ageing, Aged Care Reform Implementation Council,
Aged Care Financing Authority and KPMG.
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1.8 Data Analysis
This study will use data collected from government sources (such as government
website) and will be analysed using qualitative content analysis. Qualitative
content analysis will be applied to the collected text that has been used for
communication purposes. The collected data will be analysed, grouped and
categorised into concepts and themes. Content analysis will be applied to
examine the relationship between concepts and themes. This combination
enables this study to gain an understanding of the data, to address the
importance of this study and the research question. As such data collected from
government sources will be analysed in this manner. This study will also utilise
regulatory space theory (as outlined in Chapter 5) to explore whose interests are
being served in the policy making process through the quantification of elderly
citizens as a rational method of financial management. Further, this theory will
also reveal how the shift in public policy development is utilised as a mechanism
to legitimise the government’s decisions and actions.

1.9 Contribution and Limitation of this Study
While existing accounting literature has examined the issue of accountability and
new public management, this thesis will make a primary contribution to the
accounting literature with a specific focus on the transition to new public
management within an aged care context. The findings from the research will
indicate that through the LLLB reforms, there has been a shift in accountability
where accounting practices are utilised as a form of social control and to enhance
efficiencies within the Australian government.
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The secondary contribution of this study is to look through the lens of new public
management through an under researched area of aged care in Australia. The
Australian government’s increased focus on financial accountability indicates that
decisions made are based on costs rather than the benefits where access to aged
services should be based on need. As a consequence, it is increasingly becoming
a service available to elderly citizens who can most afford it.

1.10 Future Research
The Living Longer Living Better reforms were announced in 2012 and were fully
implemented on 1 July 2014. In this study, it will not be possible to assess the full
implications of these reforms to aged care providers and Australian citizens for a
number of years. As such, this study will be relying on estimates reports prepared
by the Productivity Commission and KPMG Australia to assess the projected
implications of these reforms and early findings of the implications since the
reforms were implemented (between 2009 and 2016). Further research could
also be conducted to assess the social and financial implications to the
government, aged care providers and Australian citizens since the changes to
the aged care policy were implemented.

1.11 Structure of the Thesis
Once this research is carried out after the introductory chapter, the remaining
chapters of the thesis will be organised in the following manner: Chapter 2 will
present background details and development of the Australian aged care
industry, including the definition of aged care and structure of aged care services;
and the Living Longer Living Better reforms which introduces the discussion topic
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of accountability and new public management. Chapter 3 explores the role of
accountability in Australia and within the Australian aged care sector. It will
elaborate on the accountability concept and provide the definition of
accountability which will be used in this thesis. Chapter 4 explores the purpose
of accounting in the development of social policies and its implications to the
Australian aged care sector.
Chapter 5 will consist of the literature review and will elaborate on the relevant
theory applicable to aged care policy development, including regulatory space
theory. Chapter 6 will define the research framework, the appropriate theoretical
underpinnings, methodology and methods to be utilised in the study. It will
elaborate on content analysis which is the technique adopted to analyse the text
contained in the sample of submissions which were submitted to the Productivity
Commission. Chapter 7 will provide the data analysis of the collected data, while
the Final Chapter will provide an overview of the chapters and the conclusion of
the study.

1.12 Conclusion
This chapter provides an introduction to the topic that will be analysed in this
study which relates to the Living Longer Living Better (“LLLB”) aged care reforms
in Australia. This topic will be examined to assess the impact on the Australian
government, aged care providers and citizens as to whether there has been a
shift in accountability. This chapter provided an introduction to the Australian and
global aged care industry; explained the concepts of accounting, accountability
and the research methodology that will be utilised in this study. This research
methodology will be used to address the objectives and research question, which
was also outlined in this chapter.
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The evolution of the aged care industry in Australia and the six key political eras
of the Australian government are explained in Chapter 2. The importance of this
discussion is that it explains how each political era was influential in relation to
the changes in the Australian aged care industry. These developments guided
the government to develop a more efficient and cost effective system which
resulted in the Living Longer, Living Better aged care reforms which occurred in
2012. This chapter also incorporates the concept of new public management and
how this concept has been used by the government to shift its accountability in
managing the Australian aged care industry to the Australian public.
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Chapter 2 Background of the Study

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the evolution of aged care in Australia, and it focuses on
the six political eras of the Australian government (from 1939 to 2018). The
discussion demonstrates the importance of the ruling governments in relation to
how they influenced the changes to the Australian aged care industry. Finally, the
Australian federal government announced the Living Longer, Living Better
Reforms which came into effect on 1 July 2012. The purpose of the reforms was
to develop a more efficient and cost effective aged care system which includes
increasing expectations of the elderly to contribute towards the costs of their own
care. The government’s concerns regarding the growing costs to sustain this
industry has further motivated it to continue the push to adopt private market
practices and shift its accountability to the public at the expense of meeting social
goals. As such, the government is adopting the concept of new public
management which shifts the focus from providing effective public services to a
privately managed and efficient service. Consequently, aged care services, which
was traditionally a social good, was accessible to everyone, and now increasingly
it is becoming a private good accessible to those who can afford such services.
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2.2 Historical Development of the Aged Care Industry in Australia
2.2.1 The Post World War II Menzies Era (1939 to 1966)2
This study follows the development of the Australian Aged Care Industry from the
end of World War II to 2012. It commences with the Post World War II Menzies
era (1939 to 1966), which is significant as it was the regime that first recognised
the need to provide social support to older Australians which was to be funded
by the Australian government. Prior to the Menzies era, care services required
by the elderly were provided by Australian churches. They provided homes to
independent older couples who were church members, and these later became
the prototype for providing community support to older people. These churches
demonstrated to the public and governments that aged welfare accommodation
and services was a valuable sector as their church based homes were the first
institutions which offered charitable services external to the family (CEPAR 2014;
Kendig & Duckett 2001). The significance of this is that the Menzies regime
started to recognise the important role that churches provided in supporting
families and their elderly relatives who required specialised forms of care. During
this period, the government identified the increasing need to provide social
welfare towards the elderly citizens and began to supplement the support
provided by the churches with the introduction of a national policy designed to
assist the growing Australian older population.

2

Robert Gordon Menzies was the Australian Prime Minister from 1939 to 1941 and from 1949 to 1966
(National Archives of Australia 2017). Harold Hold was the Prime Minister from 1966 to 1967 which was
shortlived after he disappeared from the ocean in Victoria. John Gorton replaced Harold Holt in 1968 and
was Prime Minister until 1971. William McMahon displaced John Gorton as the Liberal Party Leader and
became Prime Minister in 1971 until Gough Whitlam was elected as the Prime Minister under the Labor
Government (National Archives of Australia 2017).
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During this Menzies government post war era, the national response to meet the
needs of older people was limited to the responsibility of the Australian States to
provide health and welfare services. For the first time, significant government
involvement occurred with the introduction of the Aged Persons Homes Act
(1954) which enabled the provision of grants to churches and the voluntary sector
(Kendig & Duckett 2001, p6) regarding the aged care housing initiative to build
more nursing homes. This represents the commencement of the Commonwealth
government’s direct involvement in the capital funding of aged care. Although
these were quick political decisions which did not anticipate future consequences
of a growing elderly and financially dependent population, it established the
funding model of public expenditure in the provision of care services to this
growing demographic. Refer to Table 2.1 for a summary of the aged care industry
during this era.

Another major development was the emergence of public funding of care services
which commenced with the Menzies government introducing in 1962 the first
nursing home benefits and government subsidies offered for nursing home fees
(Parliament of Australia 2018; Parliament of Australia 2003; NATSEM 2014;
Healy 2002). This encouraged the development and sustainability of the nursing
home industry, which consists mostly of private, for-profit providers (Howe 1990).
Initially, this was a successful health policy as long term care of older people was
shifted out of hospitals and into nursing homes, particularly since the Menzies
government’s 1962 introduction of the 20 shillings ($2) per day nursing home
benefit per patient in approved nursing homes. Nursing homes were still operated
by churches, voluntary not for profit organisations and State Governments with
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growth occurring in the private sector (Parliament of Australia 2018). Rapid
growth in this industry occurred between 1962 and 1972 as this decision was
anticipated to assist 15,000 older people who were living in nursing homes to
subsidise their fees. Further the introduction of the nursing home benefit had an
immediate effect on growth in this industry (in the five years between 1963 and
1968) with the number of new nursing homes built increased by 220 homes.3
Growth occurred mainly in the private sector with 51% of new nursing homes
being built by private organisations; 27% by not for profit organisations and 22%
by State Governments (Australian Parliament House 2020). The number of new
beds added to existing homes also increased by 12,348 new beds (Parliament of
Australia 2018). Consequently, the disadvantage of this rapid growth was that it
produced two decades of nursing home growth, over institutionalisation of older
people to residential care homes and a provider-led aged care industry which
was diverting away from community services (Howe 2002)4. This led to persistent
problems within the state and federal governments who were concerned with
pressures from rising costs of long stay older patients and increased gaps in
hospital care (Kendig & Duckett 2001).

While more care became available, it was concentrated in the private residential
sector and ignored the churches and voluntary sector. This increased the power
of private provider interest groups and public expectations grew to believe that
this sector was the solution to address aged care needs. The disparities across

3

This period also overlaps with the next political period of the Holt, Gorton and McMahon
Governments (1966 to 1972) as the growth in nursing homes continued from 1954 until further
changes were made by these successive governments.
4
Community services refers to care provided in the community which allows people to age at
home.

32

States also resulted in increasing gaps in care quality, costs and access to aged
care services. The gap widened for access to aged care services for older people
with limited financial resources and those in areas with low age care resources
(Kendig & Duckett 2001; Howe 2002). The neglect of policy cooperation between
the States resulted in gaps in consistency regarding accountability, regulation
and care quality between these levels of government. Home care and voluntary
services continued to be provided and were funded through State grants;
however, this was a fragmented system with little program direction and controls.
These voluntary types of organisations did not have the political strength or
support to improve community services hence different health and welfare
approaches continued under legislative direction from the Commonwealth
government (Kendig & Duckett 2001). Public demand continued to escalate, and
it was increasingly questioned as to whether Community Services had a role to
play in what was considered to be a family responsibility in the care of older
people.

The Menzies government performed a significant part in the history of the
Australian aged care experience as it was the first government to establish the
modern day aged care system in Australia. It introduced the subsidy system
where the recipients of aged care services are subsidised by the Commonwealth
government. However, this early government decision is also significant as it has
future consequences which continue to create dilemmas in solving the issue of
funding the aged care industry including the following matters: the continued
expectation that the provision of aged care services is the responsibility of the
religious and not for profit sectors as the government does not have the financial
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capacity. It was also a politically motivated move to not tamper with the churches
which are considered experts in this field. In addition the long-lasting structures
of unequal access to aged care where people who could afford to contribute
towards their aged costs were privileged to access public subsidies, which
historically was unavailable to those who did not have financial means.

Further the provision of funds, and consequently power, is directed to the
voluntary providers rather than to the older people5. Moreover, the provision of
federal funding for service delivery rather than state funding consequently
increases federal power. While state governments are responsible for managing
and providing health, housing and other public services integral to aged care,
separate health and welfare policies are developed where each policy targets
different segments of the community. This has created different public
expectations; however, these policies ought to be integrated to develop and
implement a consistent aged care policy (Kendig & Duckett 2001). The Menzies
government’s aim was to assist the growing older population; however, it also
created the growing demand for nursing homes which substantially increased
government expenditure on these services. As a result, the Holt, Gorton and
McMahon governments (1966 to 1972) attempted to address this problem as
discussed in the next section.

5

On 1 August 2013 choice was given to those who receive Home Care Packages under the Consumer Directed Care
initiative. This provides greater choice to the care services recipient regarding the types of services they receive; the
provider of the services; and they can control the funds spent across a range of services and care available (Lane &
Whittaker 2014). However residential aged care facilities continue to receive their subsidies directly from the
government (the elderly still have the right to choose their service provider however they don't have control over
funds payable to the provider).
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Table 2.1 Summary of Aged Care Industry 1939-1966
Total Government expenditure
Aged Care

Services Provided

Service

on aged care as a percentage of
GDP (1939-1966)

Provider
Churches

and

Care homes including accommodation and

charitable

services.

The Commonwealth government

0.1%

organisations

provided operational and capital funding to

(Productivity Commission

churches to enable them to continue operating.

submission 482, 2010d)

2.2.2 The Holt, Gorton and McMahon Governments (1966 to 1972)6
In 1966, four years after the introduction of the first nursing home benefit, the Holt
Government announced that it would extend the Aged Persons Homes Act 1954
by providing a government subsidy towards the capital costs of nursing home
beds (Parliament of Australia 2018). Prior to 1966 homes that were built primarily
for the aged and sick aged persons (such as nursing homes), were not eligible
for the construction subsidy until the changes were introduced by the Holt
government. As the aged care industry was still quite young and inexperienced,
the Menzies and Holt governments failed to consider or plan for the aged care
industry over the long term. This trend continued with the Gorton government,
who did not have a long term plan particularly for the provision of residential aged
care in Australia (Parliament of Australia 2018).

6

Harold Hold was the Prime Minister from 1966 to 1967 which was shortlived after he disappeared from
the ocean in Victoria. John Gorton replaced Harold Holt in 1968 and was Prime Minister until 1971. William
McMahon displaced John Gorton as the Liberal Party Leader and became Prime Minister in 1971 until
Gough Whitlam was elected as the Prime Minister under the Labor Government (National Archives of
Australia 2017).
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As the elderly population was growing, and new problems were presented in
terms of increasing costs to support the industry and accommodation shortages,
the Gorton government tried to resolve them through a series of random changes
such as changes to the subsidies each time a new problem was presented
(Parliament of Australia 2018). However, the first modern day reforms in the
industry occurred in 1972 with the McMahon government changing the aged care
policy to reduce the number of admissions and subsidies paid to nursing homes.
Hence the McMahon administration introduced the new subsidy paid for home
based community care in an attempt to encourage the elderly to remain at home
for longer and utilise home care services (Parliament of Australia 2018). At the
same time, the federal government’s expenditure on subsidies for nursing homes
was three times higher than expenditure for the federal government’s subsidies
for patients entering hospitals. Further, in 1972, the aged care industry which was
traditionally serviced by the not for profit organisations had shifted with a growth
in the number of private nursing homes, which now dominated 54% of the
industry (with 27% owned by voluntary not for profit organisations and 19%
owned by State Governments) (Parliament of Australia 2018).

The concern for the shortage of accommodation for the elderly, which was raised
in the 1940s and was addressed by the Menzies government, was now replaced
by new concerns in the 1970s. As a result of the McMahon government’s
haphazard decisions, new problems were caused by spiralling costs due to the
uncontrolled growth of the nursing home accommodation sector which was fully
subsidised by the federal government. By 1971, the New South Wales Council
on the Ageing claimed that there were 8,000 admissions to nursing homes that
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should not have occurred, which resulted in excessive fees being charged to the
government. It became accepted by the federal government that approximately
25% of admissions to nursing homes did not need to occur as they were not
admitted based on medical reasons such as illness. In 1972, this represented
approximately 9,000 of 36,000 people residing in nursing homes were resulted in
an unnecessary additional federal government expenditure of $17.5 million per
year in nursing home benefits (Parliament of Australia 2018). Refer to Table 2.2
for a summary of the aged care industry during this era.

The preceding three governments attempted to restrain the increasing
government expenditure with the first introduction of subsidies paid for recipients
of care services in their home (which occurred in 1972). This was an attempt to
encourage the elderly to remain in their home rather than reside in nursing
homes. However, as the industry was new and inexperienced, the elderly were
reluctant to remain at home with the preference for nursing home care.
Consequently demand for nursing homes continued to increase. The changes
that the governments made addressed their short term plans rather than for long
term fiscal sustainability and restrain on government expenditure. Following this
era, the Whitlam and Fraser governments (1972 to 1983) sought to make further
improvements to the industry.
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Table 2.2 Summary of Aged Care Industry 1966-1972
Total Government
Aged Care Service

Services Provided

expenditure on aged

Provider

care as a percentage
of GDP (1966-1972)

Churches, charitable

Nursing homes and home based community care

organisations,

services.

not for profit and

provided operational and capital funding to service

(Productivity

privately owned

providers to enable them to continue operating, and

Commission submission

organisations

to encourage more people to utilise home care

482, 2010d)

The

Commonwealth

government

0.1% to 0.2%

services.

2.2.3 The Whitlam and Fraser Governments (1972 to 1983)7
The Whitlam government immediately recognised the emerging threat of the
nursing homes, which were operated by private organisations. This regime
wanted to maintain the aged care industry in the hands of the experienced public
sector and attempted to provide more subsidies to voluntary organisations such
as charities and churches. The brief Whitlam era government in the 1970s
heralded improvements to policy developments relating to older people.
Numerous reports and reviews were commissioned since the early 1970s due to
growing demand for financial resources and lack of appropriate standards or
“control mechanisms” (Clare et al 1997, p23) to monitor the growing aged care
sector. It was identified that the industry was lacking in standards in areas such
as provision of quality care; the lack of admission assessments performed and
the failure to match services to patients’ needs; the lack of co-ordinated programs
and a concentration on institutionalisation (De Bellis 2006). It also believed that

7

Gough Whitman was the Australian Prime Minister from 1972 to 1975; and Malcolm Fraser was the
Prime Minister between 1975 and 1983 (National Archives of Australia 2017).
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private nursing homes were keeping patients in intensive care unnecessarily in
order to qualify for the higher nursing home benefit, which meant that they
received higher subsidies at an excessive cost to the government (Parliament of
Australia 2018). Further, it was estimated that 25% of patients in nursing homes
could receive appropriate care in their home if appropriate care services were
made available which meant that an excessive number of elderly were receiving
nursing home care in place of community services received at home. During this
period there was an overlap in care provided in nursing homes, hostel
accommodation and independent living (De Bellis 2006). This meant that nursing
homes and nursing care was provided to those who actually didn’t require it. At
this point, the accommodation focus on the elderly had begun to change in
direction to deinstitutionalise the elderly and admission to nursing homes was
provided to those who required nursing care. Focus began to increase on
residential need for the elderly rather than an individual’s need for long term daily
nursing care. This problem continued to be an issue in the nursing home system
for many years to come and will be further discussed later in this chapter.

Based on the above issues the changes that were made included: increases to
capital funding and equitable access for residential care; needs based allocation
for residents in hostels; and increased capital funding to nursing home providers
in the voluntary, not for profit sector (Parliament of Australia 2018; Clare et al
1997). This highlights that the Whitlam government was successful in reducing
growth in nursing home beds and resulted in a sharp reversal in the trend towards
utilising hostel accommodation. This was achieved in a relatively short period of
two years and curbed excessive expenditure on subsidies for nursing home beds.
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The Whitlam government further pursued its strategy of encouraging alternatives
to admissions of older persons to nursing homes. Recognising the growing threat
of privately run nursing homes, in an attempt to shift the balance of the provision
of nursing beds by the private sector to the voluntary (not for profit) organisations,
it firstly made more funds available to community groups providing home care
services bypassing the States Grants (Home Care) Act 1973 in September 1973.
The government also announced that voluntary organisations would be able to
obtain capital subsidies to purchase private nursing homes that were available
for sale or build new nursing homes. The purpose of this scheme was to
financially assist and sustain the voluntary industry rather than encourage growth
in nursing homes. This opportunity was welcomed by the voluntary sector;
however, this scheme was unexpectedly unsuccessful. Many of the voluntary
organisations such as churches and charitable organisations were already
producing deficits instead of surpluses on their operating costs, and were hesitant
to enter in these new venture projects.

The Whitlam government addressed the reluctance of charitable and voluntary
nursing organisations to enter into new nursing home projects bypassing the
Nursing Homes Assistance Act 1974. The purpose of this Act was to assist the
voluntary organisations who were operating at a deficit and would receive
financial assistance through the deficit financing system. Through this scheme,
the government succeeded in its plan to encourage the voluntary sector to
operate more nursing home beds. Between the years of 1976 and 1983, there
was a growth of 54% of the number of beds that were operated by these voluntary
organisations, and 75% of these organisations had entered into the deficit
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financing scheme (Parliament of Australia 2018). This period was characterised
by an increase of 6,800 nursing home beds with an average growth of
approximately 1,100 beds per year (Parliament of Australia 2018). However,
there was a new emerging problem which was that these homes were not
providing nursing home care to the financially needy. When the McLeay
Committee performed their review of the aged care industry eight years later, it
came to the conclusion that many of the deficit financed nursing homes were now
providing services tailored to the middle class. As such, there were growing
inequities amongst the elderly population in their ability to access aged care
services, and this challenge has since continued to plague succeeding
governments. Refer to Table 2.3 for a summary of the aged care industry during
this era.

In contrast to the Whitlam government, for the first time, the Fraser government
changed its direction and was planning for the long term future for Australia. It
was the pioneer for adopting the private market approach where its focus was on
cost containment and reduction in government expenditure, rather than providing
quality aged care services. Following the election of the Fraser government in
late 1975, it introduced for the first time a marked shift in the goals of social policy
where the predominant focus was to achieve economic goals such as the size of
the budget deficit, CPI increases and reductions in public expenditure (Kendig &
Duckett 2001). Health policy, including the aged care policy, no longer meant that
the focus was innovation within the aged care industry, rather an amalgamation
of the aged care policy with health care policy (Duckett 2000) was the instrument
to achieve the new economic objectives.
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During December 1975, a significant change in direction towards the aged care
industry resulted in an increased commitment towards restraint and reduction of
public expenditure. Funding for projects to build new nursing homes that were
approved in 1974 was now suspended as the government was now aiming for
financial restraint in its budget. The government commissioned a number of
reports to investigate the costs of health care, particularly with respect to aged
care. These reports expressed concern at the lack of co-ordination and ad-hoc
nature of many of the new changes which were implemented in aged care over
the last ten years. In order to further reduce Commonwealth expenditure on the
elderly, the National Health Acts Amendment Act 1977 was passed in September
1977 which required private health insurance providers to meet some of the costs
of nursing home care. Health insurance providers were now obliged to pay a
benefit equivalent to the Commonwealth nursing home subsidy to those nursing
home patients who held private health insurance with those organisations
(Parliament of Australia 2018).

In 1981 the Auditor General found that many nursing homes continued to claim
the subsidies from the Commonwealth government for the patients insured with
private health organisations as it was simpler and quicker than it was in
comparison to making a claim with the private health insurance companies. This
resulted in the Commonwealth government paying approximately an additional
unnecessary $25 million to nursing home organisations that should have been
paid by the private health insurance organisations. In 1981 it was identified that
approximately 8% of the elderly population was absorbing approximately 90% of
expenditure on aged care services (Parliament of Australia 2018). Based on this
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the federal government acknowledged that this scheme failed and in 1981 it
amended the National Health Act 1953 to ratify that the Commonwealth
government would again be solely responsible for paying nursing home benefits
(Parliament of Australia 2018).

Throughout the Fraser era, the aim was to restrict expenditure on aged care
services by implementing new policies which required health insurance
organisations to pay for the costs of aged care services for the elderly who held
private insurance. This policy was disastrous and resulted in excessive
government expenditure as explained above and required a new change in policy
as regards to how to fund the continued growth in this sector. The government
agreed to hold further enquiries into restraining government expenditure on aged
care services which will be further explored in the next section.

Table 2.3 Summary of Aged Care Industry 1972-1983
Total Government
Aged Care

Services Provided

Service Provider

expenditure on aged
care as a percentage
of GDP (1972-1983)

Churches,

Nursing homes and home based community care

charitable

services. Nursing home care was predominantly

organisations,

provided. The Commonwealth government provided

(Productivity

not for profit and

capital funding to service providers to enable them to

Commission submission

privately owned

continue operating and build more nursing homes. It

482, 2010d)

organisations

also provided funding to home based community care

0.2% to 0.4%

service providers to encourage more people to utilise
home care services instead of nursing home care.
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2.2.4 The Hawke and Keating Governments (1983 to 1996)8
The Hawke and Keating governments (1983 to 1996) implemented sweeping
reforms which introduced the new home and community care systems, and an
early mechanism which required the elderly to be medically assessed prior to
entering into a nursing home (known today as the “ACAT” system which is further
explained in the next section). The introduction of a more rigid structure enabled
the government to focus on reducing its expenditure, while for the first time,
requiring the elderly to also now contribute towards the costs of their care
services. As such, this rapid change shows the progression from a public aged
care system to a privatised market model of a subset of the health care system.

The return of the Labor party in 1983 under the Hawke and Keating governments
meant that, for the first time, the national government seriously considered aged
care reform. During the 1980s, there was increasing political involvement of local
communities in the development of health and aged care policies. Frustration was
increasing in the aged care profession as the existing health and community
services were inadequate as Australia continued to have a mixed welfare
economy with little aged care regulation and a preference towards nursing home
care rather than community or home care (Howe 1998). The federal government
initiated a series of urgent reviews and enquiries in the early 1980s following
alarming cost implications of the rapidly growing older population and rapid
residential care costs (Howe 1998). Significant structural and economic reforms
in aged care commenced following the 1982 McLeay Report9. This was a

Robert James Lee (“Bob”) Hawke was the Australian Prime Minister from 1983 to 1991. Paul Keating
was the Treasurer under the Hawke government from 1983 to 1993, and was Prime Minister from 1991 to
1996 (National Archives of Australia 2017).
9
In 1980 the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure conducted an
8
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government review which established that the rate of admissions of older
Australians to nursing homes was one of the highest in the world and required to
find an appropriate balance between home care for the aged, nursing home care
and community based services (Courtney et al 1997; Howe 2002). By the time
the Hawke Government came into power in 1983, it was identified that 90% of
Commonwealth funding for aged care services was going to the residential
sector, and 90% of these funds were utilised to subsidise elderly patients in
nursing homes (Parliament of Australia 2018). This meant that $1.46 billion was
spent on nursing home care in 1982-1983 in comparison to $36.4 million on home
care services (Archive 2020).

Based on these findings, the Commonwealth health and welfare departments
shared a common interest in, and commitment to, aged care reform. Following
the recommendations received in the McLeay Report, the national aged care
policy was redeveloped and influenced by the perception that the growth of
community care could be financed by reigning in expenditure on the residential
care sector (Howe 2002; Kendig & Duckett 2001). In addition, the government
projected that the increase in the population aged 65 years and over would
increase from 10% of the overall population in 1985 to 17% of the overall

Inquiry into Home Care and Accommodation for the Aged and they established a sub-committee to
conduct the enquiry. The sub committee was formed with Mr. L McLeay as chairman and the committee
conducted public hearings and consultations during 1981 and 1982. The Report was entitled the ‘In A
Home or At Home’ report and is otherwise known as the McLeay Report, was tabled on 28 October 1982
(Parliament of Australia 1984). The report recommended reforms to nursing home funding to control
growth and expenditure, expansion of community based services and the introduction of standardised
assessment procedures prior to the admission of a resident to a nursing home. The Committee also found
that the Government’s policies of budgetary restraint and restrictions on expenditure to home and
community care services and increases to subsidies to nursing homes were a failure (Department of the
Parliamentary Library 1993). It was considered that this was costing the Government significantly more
than to increase its focus on improving the quality and services provided in the home and community
(Department of the Parliamentary Library 1993). The findings and recommendations contained in the
McLeay Report were a major influence on the Labor government’s aged care policies when it was elected
in 1983 (Department of the Parliamentary Library 1993).
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population by 2025. This encouraged the Hawke government to introduce in 1986
the first set of a wide range of reforms to the aged care industry which were the
first since the industry was established by the Menzies government (Parliament
of Australia 2018).

Based on the changing national policies that occurred, the consequence was that
there was the shifting of community aged care funding responsibilities from the
federal government towards the State governments. This included a “freeze”
(Courtney et al 1997, p236) on additional capital funding of nursing homes for
which the government would no longer subsidise projects for the building or
acquisition of new nursing homes; and revising the funding model to promote
accountability and uniformity within the aged care sector (Courtney et al 1997).

However, there were rising consumer needs as the Government faced escalating
fiscal restraints and shifting accountability10 where the focus was moving towards
efficiencies in government expenditure. Hence from 1985, community services
were funded under the Home and Community Care Act 1985 which consolidated
funds into a joint programme between the Commonwealth and the States and the
aged care policy continued to be developed by the federal government. However,
this was the government’s policy shift away from the more costly nursing home
care to focusing on supporting people to remain living in their home. This would
reduce the number of people moving into nursing homes or hostels and increase
the more cost effective services provided in the home (Courtney et al 1997). The

10

Accountability as defined in Chapter 3 as “ensures that those who have authority over public resources
provide an account for the use of those resources in terms of compliance, efficiency and
effectiveness…involves the fundamental (sic) of honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and careful,
effective application of resources” (Sinclair 1995, p221).
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Commonwealth then reduced nursing home care spending and shifted the extra
funds from these savings to community services in an attempt to grow the
community services sector (and reduce expenditure on nursing home aged care
services) (Howe 2002; Howe 1998; Howe 1997).

Funding gaps were reduced with a significant decision by the government to
change the funding method where the Commonwealth took greater account of
the types of residents being care for and developed a five category system
(Courtney et al 1997). Under this funding model fixed unit prices were charged
for accommodation and service delivery, nursing and care costs were assessed
on a per person basis which was dependent on the resident’s dependency levels
(Howe 2002). These assessments were performed by the Aged Care
Assessment Teams (“ACAT”), and their approval was required prior to admission
into residential care. This restricted the inappropriate admissions into residential
care and increased referrals towards community services (Howe 2002).

Funding was now directed towards the provision of “lower cost care” (Courtney
et al 1997, p236) for people identified as requiring low care needs or lower
dependency levels. The allocation of nursing home places on a needs basis
resulted in a decrease in capital funding which was then directed towards funding
other special needs groups. The implementation of quality outcomes standards,
monitoring and care quality standards improved the quality of accommodation
substantially for vulnerable residents (Howe 2002; Gibson 1998). New quality
standards which were implemented were aimed at providing high quality care and
quality of life for nursing home residents. There were 31 outcome standards
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which were also introduced in 1987 and were classed under 7 major objectives
including: health care; social independence; freedom of choice; homelike
environment; privacy and dignity; variety of experience and safety (Australian
Parliament House 2020).

The change in trends in aged care funding models was significantly influenced
by the system of adopting private enterprise mechanisms. Economic rationalism
has been the primary focus for social reform (Clare et al 1997), and there has
been a gradual shift towards containing public expenditure on health and welfare
aged care related services. This new paradigm meant that the government’s
focus shifted to providing financial incentives to reduce spending on nursing
homes where ten times as much funding was provided on nursing home care
services in comparison to community services (Healy 1990). The Commonwealth
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services in 1991 noted that the
changes in the previous five years indicate that “gains can be achieved in
economic efficiency and in appropriateness of care” (p9).

Following consultation with the aged care industry in 1991, the government
introduced unpopular recommendations suggesting the need for “market based
reforms” (Kendig & Duckett 2001, p12). The adoption of the use of market
rationalism was first introduced in 1991, where there were concerns raised about
the need for fee control in an effort to further restrict expenditure on the aged care
industry. Additionally, for the first time, the government enacted the ruling that all
nursing home residents would now be paying no more than 87.5% of their
combined pension and rent assistance allowance towards their nursing home
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fees. This applied to males aged 65 years and over and females aged 62 year
and over (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2020). The Hawke and
Keating government implemented government initiated changes and reforms to
the aged care industry. New frameworks were implemented for the purposes of
restricting expenditure by the Commonwealth government in the aged care
industry; to shift some funding responsibilities to the elderly where they were
required to pay for some of their care costs, and for the implementation of quality
standards to ensure consistent levels of care were provided across all nursing
homes and hostels. These significant reforms also formed a basis upon which
further improvements could be made in the future in the aged care industry. Refer
to Table 2.4 for a summary of the aged care industry during this era.

Whilst only the Fraser government recognised the need for planning for the
future, the Hawke-Keating governments did not consider that there were growing
and diverse needs for an older population that was continuing to grow. However,
the Howard-Costello government (1996 to 2007) would recognise the looming
mass retirement of the older population. This regime was a great advocate of the
private sector and supported the growth of residential aged care homes which
were operated by private organisations. In addition, this government began to
support the private market approach adopted in the UK which resulted in the first
system being implemented where elderly Australians who were asset rich were
now required to contribute towards the costs of their care. The changes made
during this regime will be further discussed in the next section.
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Table 2.4 Summary of Aged Care Industry 1983-1996
Total Government
Aged Care

Services Provided

Service Provider

expenditure on aged care
as a percentage of GDP
(1983-1996)

Churches,

Nursing homes and home based community care

not for profit and

services. State governments were now responsible

privately owned

to fund community care services.

(Productivity

organisations

The Commonwealth government increased funding

submission 482, 2010d)

0.4% to 0.55%
Commission

to community services to encourage growth in this
area.

2.2.5 The Howard-Costello Government (1996 to 2007)11
In 1996, under the newly elected Howard-Costello government, growing
concerns of the consequences of an ageing population, including the
approaching mass retirement of the baby boomer population, were presented to
the public as a national crisis (Kendig & Duckett 2001; Healy 2002; Hughes
2011). The government relied on the projections of worst-case scenarios to
highlight the public costs of caring for older people and the consequent negative
impacts on economic growth (Kendig & Duckett 2001). These factors were used
to justify significant cuts in public expenditure and presented as immediate
recommendations for aged care program changes to address the impact of an
ageing Australia in twenty years’ time (Fine & Chalmers 2000).
Some authors (Fine & Chalmers 2000; Howe 2002; Howe 1998; Howe 1997)
indicated that a significant change to aged care policy was to reverse existing

11

John Howard was the Australian Prime Minister from 1996 to 2007. Peter Costello was the Treasurer to
the Howard government from 1996 to 2007. He is the longest serving Treasurer in Australia’s history
(National Archives of Australia 2017).
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public funding to those admitted to nursing homes and requiring potential
residents to contribute towards the costs of the care they received. A
recommendation was made by the National Commission of Audit (“NCA”) (which
was established in 1996 shortly after the election of the Howard government), in
which their report projected increases in the older population which would require
extensive increases in Commonwealth expenditure to support this demographic
unless “radical reforms” (Palmer & Short 2010, p120) were introduced. The NCA
suggested that the move towards the market based model of service provision
and the introduction of the “user pays system of financing” (Fine & Chalmers
2000, p6). This mechanism required the elderly to contribute towards their care
costs, which anticipated an increase in funds received from users (and decreased
government expenditure) and to a shift of the funding responsibilities away from
the government (Fine & Chalmers 2000).

The NCA also recommended the government should change funding
arrangements so that those who could afford to contribute towards the costs of
their care ought to do so. This could be achieved by two methods: by introducing
means testing for nursing home benefits; or by finding a way in which those who
are income poor but asset rich. This would enable the government to recover the
cost of their nursing home benefits from their estates which contained significant
assets (Palmer & Short 2010; Fine & Chalmers 2000). Further recommendations
based on the Gregory reports indicated that the patient classification system
required improvements in the funding mechanism to provide greater efficiencies
in expenditure on patients and in the manner that the income was utilised by aged
care homes (Palmer & Short 2010).
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These recommendations compounded the problems in the shift of accountability
from the government to the users of aged care services. The use of market
mechanisms and the move towards a neoliberal economy enabled the
government to raise revenue to pay for the provision of aged care services or for
other purposes; it also reduced political pressure to reduce government
expenditure, and to reduce financial and economic pressures on the states to
limit expenditure (Fine & Chalmers 2000). The NCA and Council of Australian
Government proposed to combine Commonwealth and State funding for aged
care and to transfer service delivery responsibility to the States within a new
range of national care guidelines (Duckett et al 1995). The purpose of this
proposal was to address the continuing and compounding problems associated
with cost shifting. This was the start of the devolution of the aged care sector, and
this achievement was consistent with the government’s policy and a goal of the
new government. It also highlighted the increasing politicisation of aged care
policy and the new “Ageing in Place” (Kendig & Duckett 2001, p13) agenda was
a political move to appeal directly to older voters. This included the pledge for
increased income support and aged care reforms that vowed to allow wider
choice, improved care quality and security (Angus 2000). The necessary means
to improve the industry were promoted as requiring the move towards a market
based system; an increase in user payments and more industry self-regulation
(Kendig & Duckett 2001; Fine & Chalmers 2000).

The 1996-1997 Commonwealth budget signalled a significant shift in aged care
policy by restraining government expenditure and introducing the requirement for
older Australians with the capacity to pay to contribute towards the costs of their
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care (Howe 2002, p102). These “cost containment policies” (Howe 2002, p102)
were applied mostly in the residential care segment of the aged care industry
however changes since then also require the elderly to contribute towards
community care costs (refer below for further discussion regarding the Living
Longer Living Better Reforms). Consequently, in 1997 the Government enacted
the Aged Care Act 1997 as the significant component of the “Aged Care
Structural Reform Strategy” (Kendig & Duckett 2001, p13). According to Palmer
& Short (2010) and Kendig & Duckett (2001), the significant changes which
occurred during these reforms included the introduction of an accommodation
bond which was calculated on a means tested basis for people aged 65 years
and over who were entering nursing homes (means testing and user charges
previously applied only to welfare services). This charge was payable by people
with assets over $23,500 (which was approximately one third the value of the
average home) which resulted in the forced sale of the family home (Healy 2002).
Therefore, people who had assets over $23,500 were required to contribute
towards their daily care costs and sell their family home in order to pay the
accommodation bond.

Further, part-pensioners and self-funded retirees were able to be charged up to
$63.30 (an increase from the previous $21 per day) per day in daily residential
fees, and this money was used by the Government to offset its subsidies payable
to aged care providers and represented significant savings in expenditure. This
new fee, combined with the accommodation bond, would have provided
approximately 50% of the cost of nursing home care for residents (Healy 2002).
In early 1998 income tested care fees were also introduced for hostel and nursing
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home residents, and the fees were equivalent to the Age Pension (Healy 2002).
Hence for receivers of the full pension (aged 65 year and over), this meant that
their age pension was transferred to pay for their services (the maximum daily
fee payable was 85% of their annual single basis age pension), while others were
required to contribute more towards the costs of their care. In essence, all
residents were now required to contribute towards their fees and also pay a
means-tested accommodation bond (Healy 2002).

Initially, there was intense public and political support for these changes. The
provider groups strongly supported the changes on the basis that it would bring
them more revenue and fewer restrictions. However, the charitable sector
opposed the changes, particularly with respect to the inequalities in the new
accommodation bond arrangements. Opposition grew due to two concerns
surrounding the Australian values: firstly, nursing home care is considered as
providing health care services rather than providing welfare accommodation
hence user charges (and accommodation bonds charges) are inappropriate; and
secondly, the family home is perceived as “inviolate” (Kendig & Duckett 2001,
p14) and the requirement to sell the family home to pay for nursing home care is
perceived

as an

inequitable

attack on

older

people

and

enhances

intergenerational inequity (i.e. children lose their inheritance and future wealth)
(Healy 2002).

In the late 1990s, the growing retiring baby boomer population was impacting on
the government’s decision making policies relating to aged care. This was
reflected in the government decisions and the Howard-Costello government’s
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“Treasury Department’s first Intergenerational Report in the 2002-2003 Federal
Budget papers” (Hughes 2011, p527). The significance of this document, and
subsequent three Intergenerational Reports, is that for the first time population
ageing and aged care policy were at the forefront of Australian’s economic policy
(Hughes 2011). Finally, there was dual recognition that an ageing population and
aged care policy is a social and economic issue which impacts both social and
economic policies. Refer to Table 2.5 for a summary of the aged care industry
during this era.

Overall there are three motives which influenced the direction of change within
the Australian aged care sector under the Howard-Costello government. The first
is the requirement to contain the costs of care to the elderly (whether in
institutions or in the home). The second is the desire of the elderly to remain at
home and to be integrated within the community. Thirdly the continuing
differences between the social welfare and economic philosophies of the political
parties influence their decision to commit to the contemporary “casemix funding
models”12 (Courtney et al 1997, p231). Further, the increased charges for nursing
home residents and community care services recipients are implemented for
those who can afford to pay. The increasing role of the private-for-profit-sector is
also claimed as addressing the future demands of the aged care industry (Palmer
& Short 2010). As explored in this section, this is the first time that the deevolution of the aged care industry as a public institution has occurred as it is now
adopting private market practices. The Rudd-Gillard government continued to

12

Aged care service providers are funded based on the activities that they undertake, and the level of care
each care services recipient is assessed as requiring. Providers receive increased funding for frail and sick
care services recipients, and receive less funding for care services recipients who are more independent.
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adopt the private market approach which has been ratified by the Abbott and
Turnbull governments and will be further explored in the next section.

Table 2.5 Summary of Aged Care Industry 1996-2007
Total Government
Aged Care

Services Provided

expenditure on aged

Service Provider

care as a percentage
of GDP (1996-2007)

Churches,

Nursing homes and home based community care

charitable

services. State governments were now responsible to

organisations,

fund community care services.

not for profit and

The

privately owned

subsidise places in nursing homes. Government

organisations

introduces means testing and additional costs for asset

Commonwealth

government

0.55% to 0.7%
(Productivity

continues

to

Commission submission
482, 2010d)

rich elderly residing in nursing homes. All residents are
now required to contribute towards fees.

2.2.6 The Rudd-Gillard Labor Government and Abbott-Turnbull Liberal
Government (2007 to 2018)13
Although the government structure has changed between 2007 and 2019, the
structure of the aged care sector remains relatively unchanged. The next section
explains the modern aged structure of the Australian aged care sector and will
then proceed to explore how the structure is changing under the continued Living
Longer, Living Better reforms. It also explores how the governments are

13

Kevin Rudd was Australia’s Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010 under the Labor Party; and for 11 weeks
in 2013. Julie Gillard was Australia’s Prime Minister from 2010 to 2013 when she was defeated in a
leadership challenge ballot in 2013 by Kevin Rudd who became Prime Minister for the second time
(National Archives of Australia 2018). Tony Abbott was elected as Prime Minister in 2013 and Abbott was
defeated in a leadership ballot by Malcolm Turnbull in September 2015. Malcolm Turnbull was sworn in a
Prime Minister in September 2015 and continued to act as Prime Minister in 2018 (National Archives of
Australia 2018).
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continuing to progress with the Hawke-Keating governments’ rationale of
reducing the number of elderly people entering into residential care. Efforts are
still continuing with the current government to encourage the elderly to remain in
their homes longer and rely more on community care services and assistance
from their families.

The present system of the delivery of aged care services is provided by a
combination of public (government owned) organisations and privately owned
organisations. The private sector dominates the provision of residential aged care
services and owns the majority of residential aged care facilities (approximately
60%); approximately 30% by the not for profit sector and the remainder by the
state government (KPMG 2013; Howe 2002). Community services is a term often
used to describe services provided by the government, non-government and
private sector agencies to meet social needs which includes aged care services
(Marston and McDonald 2014, p89). This area of welfare or care is the largest
segment of care as it is provided in the community and allows people to age in
their homes whilst they receive care tailored to their specific needs (Gray &
Heinsch 2009). It is vital that support is provided in the community as it
encourages and supports “social re-engagement” (Gray & Heinsch 2009, p109)
of the elderly demographic that is at risk of social exclusion as they become frailer
and less active.

Prior to the Rudd-Gillard government’s amendments in 2012 to the aged care
industry structure (which were entitled: Living Longer Living Better Reforms),
community care was delivered through the following packages: Home and
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Community Care (HACC); Community Aged Care Package (CACP); Extended
Aged Care at Home (EACH); and Extended Aged Care at Home Dementia
(EACHD). These programs were initiatives that provided services to support older
Australians and their carers to remain independent at home and in the
community, and to reduce their potential or unnecessary admission into a
residential home (Kendig & Duckett 2001). These various programs also provided
community care for people with increasing health care needs and required low to
more complex levels of the residential type of care as they continued to reside in
their own home (Gray & Heinsch 2009). They also acted as a substitute for
residential care, reducing the government’s costs to provide infrastructure and
permanent care (Gray & Heinsch 2009; Courtney et al 1997). In the long term,
this was also designed to reduce expenditure by the government as the provision
of home and community care services is less costly than the provision of
residential aged care services. Although the community programs are the
government’s preferred method in aged care services as they are cheaper in
terms of government outlays, this method fails to consider that this method is
more costly when societal costs in total are considered. This is due to the hidden
costs associated with private housing and unpaid care services usually provided
by family and friends.

Residential care consists of nursing homes which are referred to as residential
aged care facilities (RACFs), where nursing care and aged care accommodation
is required (Gray & Heinsch 2009). These are divided between high care (being
care for the frail) and low care residents or beds and generally, reside in the same
nursing home. Due to the growing elderly epidemic, there are “continuing upward
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cost pressures” (Howe 2002, p102) as the levels and required improvements in
quality of nursing home care rises. As such, the general goal of aged care policy
is to move the balance of care towards the lower cost services such as community
services (Howe 2002, p102). The effect of this goal is to contain the high cost
services and public expenditure on aged care services (refer to Figure A.1,
Appendix).

Under the Rudd government in 2007 the second Intergenerational Report
(released in 2007); and the Productivity Commission’s 2005 Economic
Implications on an Ageing Australia Report, emphasised that timely action was
required to address the consequences of rapid demographic change which could
avoid future need for “big bang” (Productivity Commission 2014, p3) policy
interventions. The main ideology for reform was due to the expected pressures
from an ageing population which was supported by projected increases in the
number of very old people; increasing incidences of age related illnesses;
increasing number of people with dementia; the need for more care and care
workers; and the decline in the number of informal carers (Hughes 2011;
Productivity Commission 2011).

Overall the Rudd Government claimed that, combined with the state and territory
governments, it must find funding sufficient to cover additional expenditure
resulting in greater demands on federally collected taxes (Productivity
Commission 2014). The main sources of these pressures over the next 50 years
are likely to be from increasing financial obligations for publicly funded health
care, aged care and retirement (Productivity Commission 2014, p11). The
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pressures on health care costs rise with age as more services are used
increasingly with age, e.g. in 2010-2011, the cost of drugs under the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme per person aged 75 or more years was nearly
50 times greater than the cost per person aged 19 years or under (Productivity
Commission 2014, p12).

Further, in 2011-2012, total aged care funding was approximately $14.9 billion,
and the federal government contributed approximately $11.3 billion towards this
industry (KPMG 2013). In the same year, the government expended $8.7 billion
on residential aged care, $1.1 billion on community care packages and $1.5
billion on the Home and Community Care program. Since 2007-2008 the
community care funding has increased by 13%, which reflects the government’s
decision (and power) to focus on delivering aged care services in the community
by increasing the supply of community care packages available (KPMG 2013).
As a result of the above concerns, on 20 April 2012, the federal government under
the Rudd leadership released the Living Longer Living Better (“LLLB”) aged care
reform package which resulted in amendments to the Aged Care Act 1997. This
was in response to the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older Australians
(2011) final report and the Productivity Commission’s initial Caring for Older
Australians Issues Paper (2010a), which recognised the need to reform the aged
care system due to growing concerns and needs of consumers, industry and
government, and to improve the system to provide an increased number of aged
care solutions to a growing market (KPMG 2013).

As such, the aged care reforms are progressively being implemented over three
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stages throughout a ten year period commencing from 2012-2013 to 2021-2022
(Department of Social Services 2014). According to KPMG (2013), the major
changes under the first stage of the LLLB reforms which occurred during 20122014 are: basic daily fees continue to be charged to the resident of a facility which
is a contribution towards the daily living costs including meals and laundry
services. The fee is based on 85% of the single rate of the basic Age Pension
and also applies to members of a couple aged 65 years and over (My Aged Care
2016a). Further, the majority of aged care facilities are now privately owned
however, they are predominantly funded by the Aged Care Funding Instrument
(“ACFI”). ACFI classifications were introduced to provide funding that better
suited the residents’ care needs. Previously there were 64 possible classifications
to determine the level of funding needed per resident. As a result of the LLLB
reforms, these classifications have been changed to four classifications as: Nil,
Low, Medium and High (My Aged Care 2016a). The level of care needs required
by the entering resident is impacted by the subsidy levels as it is generally
insufficient to cover the full cost of providing accommodation, meals, personal
care and laundry assistance. Therefore the resident will now need to supplement
subsidies paid by the government by paying additional daily care fees and the
amount is determined by the means tested care fee (Lane & Whittaker 2014).

The federal government also changed the way that the user co-contributions are
calculated for older Australians entering residential care on or after 1 July 2014,
which includes a new combined income and assets test (KPMG 2013). Under the
previous arrangement, the care subsidy for residents was based only on their
assessable income. The federal government will now assess whether the
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resident’s care subsidy should be reduced and is now based on their assessable
income and means testable assets (this previously only included assessable
income) (Lane & Whittaker 2014). Assessable income will include the Age
Pension and other forms of ordinary income. Assessable assets will include the
resident’s share of their home, properties and any other valuable property that
they or their partner partly or fully own (My Aged Care 2016b). However, the value
of their principal place of residence was capped at $159,631 from 20 September
2016 (My Aged Care 2016b) and is increased for indexation over time.

Thus the higher the income tested fee that a resident must pay will reduce the
level of government funding that the facility receives which is calculated on a
dollar for dollar basis (e.g. if the facility was eligible to receive $70 per day in
government funding for the resident, and the resident was liable to pay a means
tested care fee of $30 per day, the amount of the government contribution would
reduce to $40 per day) (Lane & Whittaker 2014). There will also be an indexed
cap of $25,000 of the total amount of residential care fees payable in one year,
and a lifetime indexed cap of $60,00 (Lane & Whittaker 2014). Once the resident
reaches the cap, their care fees will be reduced to a zero balance (KPMG 2013).
However, the resident will still need to pay for their accommodation, basic daily
care fees and extra services fees (Lane & Whittaker 2014).

On 1 August 2013 the Home Care Packages (“HCP”) replaced the former HACC,
CACP, EACH and EACHD programs (Lane & Whittaker 2014) as part of the
Commonwealth Home Support Program. New recipients of HCP’s transitioned to
the package provided to them on a Consumer Directed Care (“CDC”) basis.
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Consumer Directed Care provides greater choice to the care services recipient
regarding the types of services they receive; the provider of the services; and
they can control the funds spent across a range of services and care available
(Lane & Whittaker 2014). Under the previous arrangement, providers were able
to charge care recipients a care fee set at 50% of income above their basic Age
Pension. However, the government did not adjust the amount it contributed
towards the care recipient’s care costs irrespective of how much the care
recipient was paying (KPMG 2013). Under the LLLB reforms, the amount of
subsidies payable to the elderly will be reduced for part pensioners and selffunded retirees. Full rate pensioners are excluded from paying an income tested
care fee and is now based on the income test (Department of Social Services
2014; KPMG 2013).

Additionally, since 1 July 2014, residents have the option of paying a refundable
lump sum (called a Refundable Accommodation Deposit or “RAD”), a daily
charge (called a Daily Accommodation Payment or “DAP”) or a combination of
the two charges (My Aged Care 2016b). These fees are promoted by the
Australian Government as charges to residents of aged care facilities that act as
contributions towards of costs of their care and are required to be paid if they can
afford to meet this fee (My Aged Care 2016b) or “how much they can afford”
(Aged Care Crisis 2015). In stark contrast, the fees are to pay for actual
accommodation and not care. Aged care facilities generate the majority of their
profits through accommodation bonds and accommodation fees as these are
used to pay for the buildings, furniture, equipment, gardens and other physical
capital or facilities utilised by the care facility (CPSA 2014). The current average
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RAD bond is $365,000 and is usually financed through the sale of the care
recipient’s home (CPSA 2014). The balance of the RAD (the balance is the
amount remaining following the deduction of additional service fees charged to
the resident during their stay at the aged care facility), is refunded to the resident
or their estate once they depart from the facility (Lane & Whittaker 2014).

Residents who enter into a low care facility are now required to pay a daily care
fee, means tested fee and accommodation bond (this is the RAD or lump sum
paid on entry to the facility and can instead be a periodic payment). Residents
who require high care are required to pay a daily care fee, means tested fee and
accommodation charge (they are not permitted to be charged a RAD however
they are charged a daily accommodation fee which is based on the assets test)
(My Aged Care 2016b; Lane & Whittaker 2014). Residents who require low care
or high care services and choose to receive extra services must pay the daily
care fee, means tested fee, extra service fee and accommodation bond (this bond
is charged regardless whether they require high care or low care) (Lane &
Whittaker 2014). This demonstrates the level of complexity that the aged care
system has evolved and increases the inequities amongst the elderly where they
are required to contribute more towards the costs of their care based on their
levels of wealth, and fails to consider their lifetime contribution towards society
during their younger years.

The new Gillard Labor government continued with former Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd’s quest to progress with the new aged care reforms. As such, the above
LLLB financing reforms came into effect on 1 July 2014, and the major changes
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relate to accommodation bonds, means testing arrangements and community
care funding. The main purpose of these reforms was to redesign the aged care
system to encourage older Australians to stay at home for as long as possible
(rather than moving to an aged care facility). The legacy of the Rudd
government’s reforms was to also introduce for the first time the use of “consumer
directed” (Butler 2015, p158) packages which gives older Australians more
choice and control over the services that they receive rather than be told as the
system was formerly provided (Butler 2015). This change is mainly reflected in
the emphasis towards the increased use of home care packages (formerly known
as community care packages), which were increased by approximately two thirds
and also enabled the older Australian to decide where and how much they could
spend on home care services (Butler 2015). Although there are increases in fees
and greater financial responsibility for older Australians, it is assumed that this
will raise consumer expectation of service and improvements in care quality
(KPMG 2013).

During 2013 there was a change of government which resulted in Tony Abbott
being elected as the new Prime Minister under the Liberal Party, and Malcolm
Turnbull became the new Prime Minister for the Liberal Party in 2016. Despite
these changes, they continued to support the reforms that were implemented by
the Labor government in 2012 and these LLLB reforms are still continuing.
Between the years 2014-2016, the aim of the Abbott-Turnbull governments was
to significantly improve aged care access and quality for consumers and to
strengthen the sustainability of the aged care system. During the preceding five
year period during 2012-2017, independent reviews were performed each year
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to identify and develop the aged care reforms over the remaining five year period
(Department of Social Services 2014). The purpose of the five year review was
to identify the impacts of the reform on the new aged care system. As such,
further improvements and changes will be developed in conjunction with the aged
care sector between 2016 and 2022 (Department of Social Services 2014).
Improvements and changes are still being reviewed and are outside of the scope
of this research. However it would be beneficial to explore the changes that will
be made in the future following these reviews. Thus, the overall goal following
these reviews is to develop an affordable and sustainable long term aged care
system which will result in a decrease in government expenditure with increased
financial contributions by the recipients of aged care services as shown in Figure
A.2 (refer to Appendix). Refer to Table 2.6 for a summary of the aged care
industry during this era.

The Rudd and Gillard governments identified the urgent need to significantly
reform the Australian aged care system to manage the rising elderly population
over the next thirty years. This resulted in an increase in funding for community
services where it is now encouraged that older people remain in their home for
longer, and transfer to residential care as their needs grow.
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Table 2.6 Summary of Aged Care Industry 2007- 2018
Total Government
Aged Care

Services Provided

expenditure on aged

Service Provider

care as a percentage
of GDP (2007-2018)

Churches,

Nursing homes and home based community care

charitable

services. State governments were now responsible to

0.7% to 1.1%

organisations,

fund community care services.

(Productivity

not for profit and

The

privately owned

subsidise places in nursing homes. Government

organisations

introduces means testing and additional costs for asset

Commonwealth

government

continues

to

Commission 2016)

rich elderly residing in nursing homes. All residents are
now required to contribute towards fees.

2.3 Conclusion
This chapter explored the development of the aged care industry in Australia,
which commenced in the 1900s during the post - World War II era. Since the
2000s, there has been a growing belief that continual government funding is the
solution to address the growing aged care needs. The government is facing
increasing cost pressures due to the rising older population and upward financial
pressures to continue to fund aged care services in order to sustain the industry’s
demand. The solution was to reform the aged care system with the
implementation of the Living Longer Living Better Reforms which commenced on
1 July 2012. The overall purpose of these reforms is to increase efficiencies within
the sector and to enforce a market based system that is consumer driven, and
government regulation is relaxed.
The concept of accountability and the adoption of the market model principles of
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new public management will be discussed in Chapter 3. These concepts
influence the government’s decision regarding aged care policy. Chapter 3 further
explores how the government legitimises its decision to shift its accountability to
the public sector by containing its expenditure within the aged care industry by
reducing its aged care subsidies and requires the elderly to pay more for their
care costs — thus reinforcing the government’s narrowed corporate and private
view of the funding and provision of aged care services.
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Chapter 3 – Accountability
“Increased longevity is an indicator of social and economic progress which brings
a more balanced aged structure to the population. However in policy debates in
Australia, particularly in relation to debates about health financing, this success
is met with constant pessimistic and dire predictions about the skyrocketing costs
of health and aged care” (Coory 2004, p581).

3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the concept of accountability which acts as a sociological
function to provide reasoning for an organisation or individual’s behaviour, and to
justify what they have or have not achieved. More specifically, the government is
answerable to society for decisions or actions to prevent the misuse of power and
to demonstrate that society’s resources have been used to effectively achieve
social goals. In Australia, the concept of accountability recognises an obligation
to provide answers for the actions of the Australian government to the Australian
public as the government acts on behalf of the public. As such the definition of
accountability that will be used in this thesis is: accountability “…ensures that
those who have authority over public resources provide an account for the use of
those resources in terms of compliance, efficiency and effectiveness…involves
the fundamental (sic) of honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and careful,
effective application of resources” (Sinclair 1995, p221).Hence this chapter also
explores how the Living Longer Living Better aged care reforms (as explored in
Chapter 2), are influenced by the principles of new public management which is
a modern concept of accountability that adopts the privatised market model
principles. It also incorporates a heightened focus on efficiency improvements
which are dependent upon the presence of accounting systems. However,
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conflict of interest arises between the goals of the government and society when
the pursuit of efficiencies and increased cost cutting measures facilitate the
exclusion of equitable matters such as the qualitative nature of performance and
the provision of effective aged care services. In order to fully understand these
issues, the key stakeholders and their accountability relationships are also
described in this chapter.

3.2 The Accountability Concept
According to Mulgan (2001), the core notion of accountability is “the obligation to
answer to a superior for one’s actions and to accept appropriate remedies
including sanctions” (p90). Further Bovens (2005) explains that this original
concept was further extended fifty years ago as it focused on providing formal
accounts to superior authorities. Behn (2001) suggests that presently in a public
agency environment, there is “360 degree accountability” (p199), where each
individual is now accountable to everyone included in this environment. In
addition, accountability incorporates the notion of transparency, openness and
honesty of the government in accordance with fixed rules (Hood 2007).
Prior to the development of the new public management concept, accountability
was formalised in the 1980s through the democratic political systems. This meant
that there was a shift in legal and political attention to elected ministers and
officials who were assumed to be accountable. It also meant that accountability
further developed to incorporate financial accountability which focused on
financial accounting information. Finally, a further shift entailed the incorporation
of a sense of responsibility towards the public rather than just focusing on
accounting mechanisms (Roberts 1991). Pollitt and Hupe (2011) conclude that in
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the past two decades, new forms of management, increasing technologies and
privatisation of publicly owned assets has changed the way that governments
operate; and also commands a need for new mechanisms upon which
governments are now held accountable for what they have done and their
intended future actions. The following section presents a number of accountability
definitions that exist in various literatures with a concluding definition presented
as appropriate for the purposes of this study.
Bovens (2010) describes two schools of thought with respect to the definition of
accountability: American scholars focus on accountability as a normative concept
that focuses on accountability being a set of standards used to evaluate actual
behaviour of public officials, which is based on the virtues of the public officials.
As such, it is a virtues and ethics based principle that is a “positive quality of
organisations or officials” (Bovens 2010, p948). In contrast, Australia, Canadian,
British and European scholars suggest a narrower form of accountability which
focuses on it as a “social mechanism” (Bovens 2010, p948). It is an
institutionalised or arranged format “in which an agent can be held to account by
another agent or institution” (Bovens 2010, p948). Hence the focus in this
instance is not in the behaviour of the public agents, rather the manner in which
the aforementioned institutional arrangements function.
The concept of accountability involves determining who is held responsible for
behaviour and performance. It also requires considering the context of to whom
and for what an organisation is accountable (Young 2002; Mulgan 2001). In
addition, accountability in the public sector also emphasises the importance of
trustworthiness and value creation of its public officials. Accountability can be part
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of the moral concept known as a virtue, and it can be regarded as a mechanism.
As a virtue, Dubnick (2005); Gregory (1995) and Fry (1995) distinguish
accountability as an internal dimension that is encouraged by an inner self felt
responsibility. It can also be a subjective feeling that is derived from a sense of
obligation in which there is a felt responsibility for the person’s behaviour and that
“management genuinely wants to and chooses to account” (Dhanani and
Connolly 2015, p615). Sinclair (1995) shares this perspective and suggests that
accountability is “shaped by social norms or aspirations” (p221) for the purpose
of achieving social order. How society perceives accountability is further defined
by Day and Klein (1987) as a general consensus about what is considered as
“good conduct and acceptable performance” (p64). Therefore accountability is
also shaped by a socially shared agreement about how it ought to manifest.
Accountability as a virtue is distinguished between the traditional concept of
responsiveness, responsibility and answerable. In order for a person to be held
accountable for certain events or actions means that there is a certain expectation
about what that person and organisation ought to be “able and obliged to explain,
justify and take responsibility for” (Messner 2009, p918). This shows that whilst
accountability often concerns shareholders, in this case, there are also demands
for greater public accountability which has been framed more widely to include
stakeholders such as future generations, employees and customers. As such, it
is implied that providing an account based on one’s behaviour also includes
behaving responsibly, with morals and virtue (Messner 2009). This shows how
accountability serves as a moral basis in which public agents may behave in an
ethical and responsible manner whilst managing the government, community
organisation or bureaucracy. Therefore the defining elements of accountability as
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a virtue incorporate transparency, responsibility and responsiveness which are
umbrella concepts that are often difficult to measure. Bovens (2010) also adds
that standards of accountability will also vary according to perspectives, political
systems and public organisations which mean that it is difficult to determine a
single definition or standard for public accountability as a virtue.
As a mechanism, accountability relates to the social function in which it
incorporates the provision of an account of the reason for conduct. It retains the
“core idea” (Mulgan 2000, p556) of accountability and incorporates the social
function by providing accounts through a “reporting or informing function” (Palmer
2013, p218). This includes the provision of information as to how an individual’s
responsibilities have been performed (Mulgan 1997).

It includes providing

“reasons for one’s behaviour, to explain and justify what one did or did not do”
(Messner 2009, p920). Within the accounting paradigm, this means that annual
reports, financial statements and financial information are perceived as essential
to provide an account to stakeholder groups and for management (or the agent
acting on behalf of the principal) to discharge its accountability (Mack & Ryan
2007; Kilcullen et al 2009; Connolly & Hyndman 2004; Tower 1993). Further, by
providing such accounts also helps to prevent conflicts which may arise between
“action and expectation” (Messner 2009, p920) between the stakeholders
involved. Thus as a social function and mechanism accountability consists of the
following additional elements: “giving an explanation to stakeholders; providing
further information when required; reviewing, and where required, revising,
systems or practices to meet the expectations of stakeholders; and granting
redress of imposing sanctions” (Funnell et al 2012, p59).
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Accountability as a mechanism contains the following characteristics: firstly an
account is given to an external party to whom the entity is accountable. Secondly,
it also requires social interaction through a form of communication which
suggests that the information is presented in an understandable and comparable
format by the accountor. This means that the accountable entity provides
answers whilst the account holder assesses these responses to determine
whether the outcome has been achieved against the targeted outcome. The
accountable entity also assesses what has been achieved by the accountor and
whether it meets the needs of the account holder. The account holder then has
the authoritative right to pose further questions and to demand further answers.
Based on these responses, the account holder may then impose sanctions such
as rewards or penalties to be imposed if the targeted outcomes are met or not
met.
However, it also provides the opportunity to correct any problems that may have
occurred by enabling new processes to be implemented. Ultimately there is the
obligation to give answers, explanations and justifications with the goal of
achieving an agreed outcome (Mulgan 2001). Since the public sector operates
on a wider scale and impacts a variety of stakeholders, the characteristics of
accountability have a greater significance than the private sector. The private
sector impacts on a narrow range of organisations and individuals, although the
same accountability concepts apply to both the public and private sector.
However, the importance is greater in the public sector due to its broader social
reach.
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Based on the above discussion, accountability can be categorised in two ways:
a broader concept where it is seen as a personal and organisational virtue (which
focuses on the ethical or good behaviour of the agents). Secondly, the narrower
concept focuses on the social relations and mechanisms which require the
provision of information about conduct to the forum (or the public). It also
incorporates the possibility of a debate and further questioning of the agent and
providing answers, with a final judgement being passed by the forum (or the
public) (Bovens 2010).
Thynne and Goldring (1987) describe accountability in the public sector,
accountability as a relationship between a person or an institution “which or who
is in a position to enforce their responsibility by calling them to account for what
they (and/or their subordinates) have or have not done” (p8). This also suggests
that they are subject to an “institution’s or a person’s oversight, direction or
request that they provide information on their action or justify it before a review
authority” (Thynne & Goldring 1987, p8). This definition demonstrates that in a
public setting, the accountor must provide an account in an understandable and
comparable prescribed format. This allows that account holder to make their
assessment between the targeted outcomes and the actual outcomes achieved
by the accountor (Bovens 2010). The government’s rigid structure of bureaucratic
accountability is a central feature in the Australian democratic system (Sinclair
1995). It ensures that those who have authority over public resources have
provided an account for the use of these resources. The account is based on the
terms “compliance, efficiency and effectiveness” (Sinclair 1995, p221). Therefore
public accountability involves the fundamental elements of “honesty, openness,
adequate disclosure and careful, effective application of resources” (Sinclair
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1995, p221). Thus, public accountability requires the accountor to report on their
outcomes by explaining their achievements, and enables the account-holder to
identify which outcomes have not been met by explaining what they have not
achieved. It is also a compulsory action to provide an account as to how the public
resources have been utilised and whether they have been appropriately utilised
to meet social goals. In essence, the account holder is assessing the conduct of
the agent acting on behalf of the principal (Bovens 2010).
Public accountability is the “normative standard of political and social life”
(Dubnick 2008, p1), which consists of six key elements: greater transparency and
openness regarding the democratic management of resources or inputs); areas
of authority that have been abused can be questioned and judged (the focus is
on achieving outcomes); pressure and oversight on performance promotes
appropriate behaviour of public officials (the focus is on adhering to processes);
and quality of government services provided are improved where the focus is on
achieving outcomes (Pollitt & Hupe 2011, p649; Bovens 2010). Finally, account
giving is conducted in public where it is provided openly and is easily accessible
to citizens (Dubnick 2005, Bovens 2003).
The benefits of public accountability as a mechanism include democratic control;
improves the integrity of governance of public systems and safeguards against
corruption, and improves performance or maintains and enhances the
government’s legitimacy (Pollitt & Hupe 2011). There are also disadvantages to
public accountability which includes a rigid structure of rules and standards; the
implementation of excessive procedures; scandal and holding agents as
scapegoats (Bovens 2005). This means that government agencies have the
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ability to hide what has not been achieved in order to enhance their image and
protect their political power. Due to this principal agency relationship14,
asymmetric information (where the government possesses more material
information and provides only part of this information to the public), may be given
by the government to the public in such a manner where the public is not aware
of what has actually happened (Bovens 2010). As such they cannot effectively
be involved in the public decision making process as the government provides
information that is beneficial to themselves and their government.
The positive aspect of public accountability is that it consists of a strong system
of democracy which allows citizens to determine whether political leadership has
responded to their interests by assessing “what they have done with the authority
and resources with which they have been entrusted” (Pollitt 2003, p84). This
shows that there is the right of authority, where the account holder (in this case it
is society) can suggest and impose sanctions upon those being held to account.
They must provide answers and reason, as well as accept the consequences.
Roberts (1991) also supports this view and emphasises that having such features
in the accountability system enables the development of a relationship of mutual
understanding. It also encourages loyalty and a sense of obligation which is
reciprocated by all parties involved; along with a sense of individuality and mutual
dependency. As such, the accountor and account holder are able to
simultaneously acknowledge and articulate these interdependencies. This
creates a sense of felt responsibility and desire to work towards achieving

14

Typically in the principal –agent relationship in the aged care industry the primary ageing is the government, whilst
the primary principal is the public. However due to the complex arrangements in the Australian aged care sector there
are multiple principal –agent relationships which is discussed further in section 3.6 Accountability and New Public
Management.
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common social goals. Thus public accountability is “a form of governance that
depends on the dynamic social interactions and mechanisms created within of
such a moral community” (Dubnick 2011, p7).
In public accountability, it is imperative to know: who is accountable; for what they
are accountable and to whom they are accountable (Bovens 2010; Bovens 2003;
and Mulgan 2001). There is the feeling of an obligation of responsibility towards
the account holder, which is an additional requirement as suggested by various
authorities (such as Dhanani and Connolly 2014; Messner 2009 and Sinclair
1995). Bovens (2010) adds a further requirement and suggests that the actor is
obliged, or feels obliged, to inform the account-holders about their conduct. From
the above discussion, there are three components of accountability as whom,
what and why and these will be elaborated below.

The first aspect of the accountability realm is who is accountable? This relates to
the individual or collective level being accountable as the community as a whole,
an institution or an organisation (such as an organisation of a government
agency, policy makers, an official or a civil servant) (Bovens 2006; Mulgan 2001).
However, the accountability forum (which is the account holder), may be a specific
person such as a minister or a superior, or a collective group such as parliament
and a court. According to Bovens (2006), the “virtual entity” (p9) is the general
public which is also the account holder. This suggests that public organisations
(including the general public) are involved in policy making and implementing
procedures to ensure that the agreed social goals and outcomes are achieved.
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Bovens (2006) also addresses the additional concept as to why the actor feels
obliged to provide an account. He suggests that it depends on the relationship
between the accountor and the account holder; and why the accountor has an
obligation to provide the account. This depends on the classification or nature of
the obligation, and there are three classifications based on the nature of the
obligations, which are: vertical, horizontal or diagonal accountability. In this study,
vertical accountability relates to the forum having significant authority to impose
sanctions on an actor (Ebrahim 2010). The relationship between the accountor
and the account holder is the principal agent relationship, in which the agent is
obliged and feels obliged to provide an account on the tasks assigned to them to
complete. Horizontal accountability relates to public servants providing an
account to customers and citizens (Bracci 2014). Giving account to various
stakeholders occurs on a voluntary basis without any intervention by the principal.
The obligation felt by agencies and to publicly account for themselves are moral
in nature, and not based on legal requirements (Bovens 2003).

In contrast, diagonal accountability requires the compulsory provision of accounts
to another public organisation that has been assigned by a principal. The principal
is either a parliament or a minister to supervise or monitor the agent’s conduct
(Bovens 2003). Based on the above discussion, vertical accountability is the most
applicable as in the public sector the government and public officers are held
responsible by the citizens as they are entrusted with the public’s monies and
how they are spent. Further, the public officers see themselves as being
accountable to the general public, through a personal sense and in a legal sense
(Mulgan 2001).
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In the Australian aged care sector, the federal and state governments, regulatory
government agencies and health ministers are accountable to the public to
ensure that adequate funding and aged care services are provided. Providers of
aged care services who receive government funding are also accountable to
federal and state governments and government regulatory bodies. In this respect,
they are accountable as to how the funds are spent and whether they have been
utilised in a manner to achieve the specified outcomes as agreed by the
government. The aged care service providers and governments are accountable
to society to ensure that taxpayers’ funds are appropriately spent, and aged care
services are provided in an effective manner that meets society’s needs. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the government’s regime since the 1930s included being
accountable to fund aged care services to all elderly persons in the community.
This shows that the government fully adopted the collective notion of
accountability. However since the Howard government shifted to the modern
version of accountability in the 2000s, it now requires society and the aged care
industry to be more accountable and responsible to fund and manage its own
aged care services.

The second aspect in the accountability realm is for what are they accountable?
There are three types of activities or tasks for which an organisation or individual
is held accountable: legal compliance and financial reporting; the organisation’s
general direction or performance; and the treatment of individuals and members
of the public (Mulgan 2001). With respect to the public sector, this relates to
handling public funds, and that appropriate institutions are publicly accountable
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for how these funds are spent. How these funds are spent is recorded in financial
reports which are audited and made publicly available for the account-holders to
make their judgement. Those who are held to account for their actions (eg as an
individual or collective) are expected to act “in the public interest” (Mulgan 2001,
p93). This includes acting to meet collective and conflicting goals which include
the collective interests of the public as a whole. They are also accountable for the
treatment of individual customers that have direct dealings with the public, such
as Centrelink, Department of Health and Ageing and Australian Taxation Office
(Mulgan 2001). These agencies and community sector organisations are held
accountable as to how they behave towards individuals who seek their help.

In the aged care industry, the government is accountable to the elderly to ensure
that quality aged care services are provided by the services providers by
regulating and monitoring their activities. Service providers need to provide
services to meet the needs of the elderly in accordance with regulation. The
Department of Health and Aged Care Quality Agency are responsible to the
elderly to ensure that service providers provide quality care that meets the needs
of the elderly, and in accordance with the regulations. They are also responsible
to report the findings of their monitoring activities to the government to ensure
that care services are provided in accordance with regulation.

The third aspect in the accountability realm is to who are organisations as a whole
and individual members accountable? With respect to legal compliance and
financial reporting in the public sector, the primary initiator and recipient of
accountability is the general public (Mulgan 2001). The members of the general
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public have an interest in the protection of public assets and ensuring the integrity
of expenditure of public funds. The public are also custodians of the government
and its agencies, which means that the government and its agencies are
responsible to the public for their general direction and performance. The
government agencies, community and private sector organisations that provide
aged care services to the public are accountable to the individual client or
customer, particularly when the service is unsatisfactory or does not meet their
needs (Mulgan 2001). These organisations provide welfare services to the public,
and the type of welfare that is required to be provided is assessed based on
whether the services have been delivered in a manner as agreed. The effective
delivery of welfare services requires a “willingness to listen to their clients’ needs
and to be responsive to their needs” (Mulgan 2001, p100). Thus the government
sector is accountable to the public through formalised rules whilst the community
sector incorporates more nurturing values which are more “personal and
spontaneous” (Mulgan 2001, p100). Individual clients present themselves to
receive individual care services, such as the elderly citizens who present
themselves to aged care service providers which provide services to the elderly
within the community or in aged care residences. The government develops rules
relating to the standards of care to be provided. These are then communicated to
government agencies and service providers. Government agencies regulate the
service providers, and they report to the public on whether appropriate services
were provided (this includes the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency;
Department of Health and the Aged Care Complaints Commissioner). When the
elderly’s needs have not been met, they have to explain to the public why they
have not achieved these outcomes.
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3.3 Accountability in the Aged Care Industry in Australia
The Australian aged care system consists of political and social aspects, which
requires the Australian government to be accountable to Australian citizens given
that it is based on a social relation of the Australian government providing
taxpayers’ funding to support the elderly population. As such, the definition of
accountability as a mechanism and its concepts will be utilised in this study. It will
focus on the mechanism of the accountability system used by the Australian
government during the era of the Australian aged care reforms in 2011, as
discussed in Chapter Two. Accountability as a virtue will not be utilised in this
study, although it is important, it focuses more on the responsibility and ethics of
the accountable actors, and their actions are assessed. As the aged care system
is incorporated in the health system and care costs are subsidised by the federal
and state governments, public accountability therefore is a concept that applies
to the aged care sector as the government has increased responsibility to its
citizens. The government utilises taxpayers’ funds to subsidise the aged care
industry, it must ensure that the funds are utilised in an effective manner to meet
the collective needs of society and government policies. Hence to be accountable
requires an obligation to provide an answer for one’s actions and decisions when
authority to act on behalf of the individual or body of people (i.e. the principal) is
transferred to another party (i.e. the agent) (Funnell et al 2012). It also requires
explanations as to how the government’s funds have spent and justification is
required as to why they have been spent in a particular manner. Therefore in
answering to the public sector requires moving beyond answering questions and
also requires: determining goals; reporting on results and the consequences
when the outcomes are right or wrong; and sanctions or rewards when
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appropriate (Funnell et al 2012).
Employing the definition of accountability as a mechanism enables the
assessment of public accountability to identify how the Australian government is
shifting its accountability to the Australian citizen by incorporating the public in
the decision making process. It also demonstrates how the Australian federal
government is trying to improve its image by arguing that it is striving to maintain
efficiencies by improving the processes in which public funds are spent. Further,
the federal government has traditionally postulated that it aims to provide effective
aged care services; however, this position has shifted with an attitude of provision
of efficient aged care services. As such, the federal government’s attitude has
altered by adopting private market practices which focus on efficiencies of the
use of public resources rather than the provision of effective public services.
Following the change of government in 2007 from a Liberal to Labor government
the socio-political ideology had changed: where the Australian public was
acknowledged as a party to whom accountability reports should be provided by
the Australian federal government; the shift in government’s perception by
predominantly focusing on efficiencies of utilisation of public resources rather
than provision of effective aged care services; along with the inclusion of the
Australian public in the decision making process in relation to the Australian
Living Longer, Living Better reforms.
The very nature and significance of accountability’s role in public accountability
is central to the Australian democratic system. It will be considered in such a
manner to deal with the research question to be addressed in this thesis. Based
on this the definition that will be adopted in this thesis is: Accountability
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“…ensures that those who have authority over public resources provide an
account for the use of those resources in terms of compliance, efficiency and
effectiveness…involves the fundamental (sic) of honesty, openness, adequate
disclosure and careful, effective application of resources” (Sinclair 1995, p221).

3.4 Actors and their Role in the Aged Care Industry in Australia
The main funder of the aged care industry is the Australian federal government.
The Australian Federal government’s policy objectives and rationale for its
involvement in aged care are due to: ensuring equitable access to appropriate
care, protecting vulnerable Australian citizens and “the correction of market
failures such as gaps in the provision of information” (Productivity Commission
2011, pxxvii). Hence the Australian Government has the principal role for “aged
care planning, funding and regulation, and for supporting informal carers”
(Productivity Commission 2011, pxxvii). Combined with the Australian state and
territory governments, they pay subsidies to aged care service providers utilising
federally collected taxes. As they have the power to direct the allocation of future
funding, the federal government is responsible to evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of public expenditure on aged care services. It is also accountable
to the parliament and to the public to explain how public funds are spent and
whether the expenditure has met the collective needs to society. The government
also reports to the Productivity Commission, which is the voice of the federal
government as it assesses the future needs of the elderly. The Commission also
assesses whether the government can continue to meet the increasing financial
obligations of the aged care industry. The Commission suggests that its main
objective in public policy is to “improve the wellbeing of the community as a
whole” (Productivity Commission 2011, pxxvii), whilst at the same time it needs
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to take into account the effect of this policy on current and future taxpayers who
fund aged care subsidies.
The Commonwealth Treasury and Department of Finance and Deregulation are
two of the federal government’s central agencies responsible for planning,
regulating and controlling the government’s finances. The Treasury’s mission is
to “improve the wellbeing” of Australians (The Treasury 2016a) by providing
advice to the Government regarding matters including: budgetary policies;
taxation advice; public debt management and regulation of financial markets
(Funnell et al 2012). The Treasury’s objectives include: effective use of public
resources; to budget and effectively prioritise expenditure, and to make effective
and efficient use of resources and containing expenditure below budgeted
spending (The Treasury 2016b). As such, these government bodies are also
accountable to the public for effective management of the public’s resources and
to assure the public that they are working towards achieving these social goals.
There are three additional main government agencies which are responsible for
monitoring and enforcing regulation and compliance in relation to the provision of
aged care services. The agencies are: Australian Aged Care Quality Agency;
Department of Health and the Aged Care Complaints Commissioner. The
Australian Aged Care Quality Agency is an independent body responsible to
accredit Australian aged care homes in order for them to receive Australian
Commonwealth Government funded subsidies. It conducts quality reviews of
home care services; and provides compliance monitoring, information and
training to aged care service providers. The Agency is required to advise the
Secretary of the Department of Health about aged care service providers that do
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not provide services which meet the requirements of the Quality Agency
Principles 2013, and it works with the community to provide quality care for older
Australians (Australian Aged Care Quality Agency 2017). The Department of
Health is responsible for ensuring that aged care service providers are compliant
with the Aged Care Act 1997. Aged care service providers who wish to receive
Government subsidies must also be approved by the Department of Health as
suitable for providing aged care services (Parliament of Australia 2017;
Parliament of Australia 2003; Department of Health 2016a). The approved
providers are accountable for the quality of care that they provide; and also have
responsibilities towards the recipients of aged care services. They must ensure
that their behaviour and quality of services provided meet the requirements of the
Aged Care Act 1997. The Department of Health is responsible for issuing notices
of non-compliance or imposing sanctions to providers that fail to meet the
legislated responsibilities of the Act (Parliament of Australia 2017; Department of
Health 2016a).
The Aged Care Complaints Commissioner handles complaints regarding aged
care services, and Australian Government funded service providers which
include residential and home care service providers (Parliament of Australia
2017). The Commissioner has the power to determine the appropriate course of
action to resolve complaints in order for the complainant and service provider to
reach an agreement; they may also direct the service provider to make changes,
and may refer the service provider to the Department of Health for appropriate
action regarding instances of non-compliance (Parliament of Australia 2017;
Department of Health 2016b). These agencies work together to assist in
promoting laws and regulations in relation to the aged care industry. They are
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advocates to the elderly and provide support and advice regarding aged care
matters. They also lobby for the rights of the elderly, along with promoting the
interests of the government through the provision of effective aged care services.
However, as these organisations are funded by the government, they may not
necessarily be perceived as acting in the best interests of the community as they
must also consider the interests of the government which has the power to direct
the distribution of social funding.
The general public and communities incorporate the elderly and their carers as
the key stakeholders in the aged care industry. The general public are the main
funders of aged care services as the government utilises the taxes that are
collected from the working population. As such, the public has authority to voice
its concerns to the government as to the manner in which public funds are
allocated to provide social services. The public also has the power to voice their
concerns regarding the quality of aged care services received and the increase
in funds that they are required to contribute. The elderly are the recipients of aged
care services, and they also contribute financially towards the costs of receiving
aged care services. Both the public and the communities monitor the quality of
aged care services provided and the types of community services provided and
future aged care services that are required. They are advocates to support the
rights of the elderly during public consultations regarding the future direction of
the aged care industry. However, both the public and recipients of aged care
services also have the power to exit the aged care industry. The public has the
power to withdraw its support to fund this industry, and the recipients of aged care
services also have the power to cease relying on the services provided by aged
care providers. Due to their authority and power, it is anticipated that the Living
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Longer, Living Better reforms will increase competition between aged care
service providers, increase care quality and innovations in the types of services
provided. The federal government’s agenda has also shifted to provide older
Australians with the capacity to choose their own aged care services and the
aged care service providers.
The aged care service providers are central to the aged care industry as they are
the recipients of funding from the government (through collection of the working
population’s taxes) and care fees received from recipients of aged care services.
As the majority of their funding is received from the federal government and the
public, they are accountable to the government and the public to provide quality
care services and effectively manage public funding in the aged care industry.
The federal and state governments are the accountor to the general public as it
utilises the public’s taxation revenue to provide funding to the aged care industry.
The governments and regulators are also stakeholders to the aged care service
providers given that they provide them with funding and oversee their activities to
ensure they provide quality care services. In summary, the aged care industry
comprises of the key stakeholders who are: the federal and state governments;
the public and communities; the regulators and aged care service providers. They
collaborate to effectively meet the goal of developing an affordable and
sustainable long term aged care system.

3.5 Accountability in the Aged Care Industry
The accountability relationships in the aged care sector can be simplified into
three categories: funders; sector regulators; and the general public (such as
recipients of aged care services and communities (Palmer 2013).
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Figure 3.1: Below is a concept map of the accountability relationship between
the key actors in the Australian aged care industry and is modelled as follows:

Federal & State Governments
(provide funds to aged care service providers)
Government Agencies

Elderly Australians

- Productivity
Commission
- Treasury
Regulators

- Department of Health
- Aged Care Quality
Agency
- Aged Care Complaints
Commissioner

Federal & State
Governments
(provide funds to aged
care service providers)

General Public
(taxpayers
provide funds)

Community
and Families

Aged Care Service Providers
Residential , Home and Community Care services
provided to the elderly (community and family rely on
their services to support elderly)

Government agencies monitor and report behaviour

Legend:
Indicates the direction of accountability:

As described above, accountability in the public sector is more ambiguous, which
is further compounded by the conflicting expectations as to who is accountable.
It is understood that the principal in the accountability relationship is the general
public as they provide resources to the government through the form of taxation
revenues that are collected (Funnell et al 2012). This indicates that they are a
source of funding towards sustaining the aged care industry. However, between
the public sector managers and the taxpayers are intermediary principals,
including the Parliament, ministers and departmental services. To the
government’s benefit, these interjected relationships “dilute the strength” (Funnell
et al 2012, p123) of the relationships and accountabilities between the public
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servants and taxpayers.
Upward or relational accountability resides with the actors operating within the
aged care industry as they are answerable to the government for its actions
(Parker 2013; Christensen & Ebrahim 2006; Sinclair 1995). Hence operators of
aged care facilities and private and not for profit providers of community care
services are held accountable from above. Thus the government is the ultimate
responsible party as it maintains the funding to support the industry from which it
derives its funding. Therefore upward accountability relates to the “funders and
sector regulators for the acquittal of funds” (Parker 2013, p220; Ebrahim 2005;
Najam 1996) as the government provides public funding to service providers in
order to finance the provision of aged care services. Further, public funding is
derived from the collection of taxation revenue from the general public. The
government is also responsible to the general public to account for the
effectiveness of the use of public reserves. The Australian constitution also
places the responsibility of developing national health care policy on the federal
government. It is also responsible for subsidising public hospitals and aged care
services; for funding of medical services and pharmaceuticals under the
Medicare scheme (Smith 2012). Based on this, state and territory governments
are responsible for providing public health services, including dental care,
hospital and aged care services.
Downward relationships more often feel a greater level of responsibility and a
more informal means is used to achieve accountability (Christensen & Ebrahim
2006; Ebrahim 2005). Downward accountability generally applies to clients,
recipients of services and communities affected by social programmes (Palmer
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2013; Kreander et al 2009; Najam 1996). In the aged care industry, the elderly
receive aged care services. The families of the elderly also rely on these services
to provide them with relief from caring for their elderly family member. The
community are also clients as they rely on the service providers and the elderly
to request their services. These actors are described as discretionary as they
possess legitimate interests while legally have minimal rights over the aged care
service provider’s actions (Hall et al 2015; Barman 2007; Kilby 2006). They do
not possess power or urgency; hence there is no pressure on aged care service
providers to engage in an active relationship with these stakeholders unless they
choose to do so (Mitchell et al 1997). As there is less pressure, the service
providers may feel that they are morally accountable to its clients to provide
quality services. However, the risk is that the accountability relationship will be
favoured towards the “most powerful constituents” (Palmer 2013, p222) such as
the government as they rely on the government to provide funding to them. The
funders (such as the government) are also accountable to the community as they
utilise taxpayer’s resources to pay subsidies to the aged care service providers
(on behalf of the elderly), or they are paid directly to the elderly recipients of aged
care services to contribute towards the costs of community services. Thus, the
government is responsible to report to the taxpayers regarding the manner in
which the resources are spent and whether they have achieved society’s goals.
Further, as the aged care industry is semi funded by the government and is
considered part of the public sector, it is controlled by the government through its
development of age related policies. The government provides the aged care
industry with public funding to the benefit of society. Overall society is considered
as an equity holder in the aged care industry (rather than direct ownership of the
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industry); hence the aged care industry is accountable to Parliament and society.
As the federal government utilises public funding to sustain the aged care
industry, the federal government is also accountable to the public in relation to
the manner in which the public funds are spent and whether they have been
utilised in accordance with the shared outcomes as agreed by the government
and society.
As such aged care service providers are accountable to report to the government
and the public to demonstrate that quality care services are provided in an
efficient and effective manner, whilst meeting the collective needs of the elderly.
However, as providers of aged care services, they are also involved in the
lobbying process regarding the development of regulation and care quality
standards within the aged care industry. As they are heavily regulated they have
an interest to ensure that their own needs are also met which includes generating
profits each year and having the ability to expand and improve their aged care
services; along with providing quality care services to the elderly; and meeting
future, increasing demands of the types of care provided.
The regulators are also accountable to the community as the taxpayer’s
resources are also used to sustain regulatory agencies (such as the Aged Care
Quality Agency), whose task is to ensure that the aged care service providers are
compliant with the Aged Care Act requirements and other aged care relevant
legislation. Their role is to also ensure that the rights of the vulnerable elderly are
protected, and penalties are imposed for breach of their rights. Thus, regulators
are responsible to report to the taxpayers and the community regarding the
manner in which the resources are spent and whether they have achieved the
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social goals of protecting the vulnerable elderly.

The Living Longer, Living Better aged care reforms have been a platform for the
government to further its interests as these are based on matching federal funding
to the number and types of services performed at hospitals and aged care
services provided in residential facilities and in the community. It was anticipated
that the reforms would introduce accountability into the health care sector
particularly as there has been an increase in inefficiencies within these sectors
due to the cost shifting that has occurred between federal and state governments
and industries (refer to Chapter 4 for further discussion) (Smith 2012).

3.6 Accountability and New Public Management
In this discussion, there is a requirement to clarify the three institutions that are
involved in the aged care industry in order to avoid confusion. The three
institutions are the not-for-profit sector (“NFP”), for-profit sector and the public
sector. The NFP and for-profit sectors relate to the carriage of services for by
aged care facilities and community services providers which are contracted by
the federal and state governments to provide these services. In an NFP
organisation the profits are reinvested into the organisation to provide further
services and facilities to enable it to advance its aims and mission. On the other
hand, the profits of a for profit organisation are distributed to its owners. In
contrast, a public sector organisation is funded by the government and may also
be managed by the government.
The Australian system of government is the Westminster system, which requires
that ministers act in the public interest and demands public accountability,
transparency and integrity (Cameron 2004). Traditionally the public management
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doctrine was maintained separately to the private sector where the emphasis in
public management was public accountability. The government has typically
focused on compliance however, it is now broadened due to the incorporation of
new public management with heightened focus on results and performance
management (Funnell et al 2012).
The concept of new public management involves reducing or removing the
differences between the public and private sectors (Hood 1995) and
encompasses the doctrine that both sectors should be managed on the same
basis. As such, new public management is a new type of accountability in the
public sector. The emphasis has shifted from the concern for accountability for
inputs and adherence of formalised procedures to the infusion of elements of the
private market resulting in an emphasis on resource allocation and financial
reform (Hoque & Moll 2001; Hood 1995). The use of this dominant ideology
replaces public delivery of services and public funding with “private mechanisms”
(Aulich 2011, p199). The focus has shifted from accountability regarding
processes, equitable distribution of wealth and access to public services to
focusing on outcomes and outputs which are measured in quantitative and
financial terms (Parker & Gould 1999; Hood 1991). The end result is a “greater
devolution of powers and responsibilities” (Kent 2003, p11) towards the
Australian elderly population and the aged care industry. The increased focus on
the use of private sector principles has blinded the Australian government and
overshadowed the notion of “publicness” (Aulich 2011, p199) where the key focus
ought to be on the outcomes of services that are provided and funded with public
funds.
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New public management consists of seven elements as described by Hood
(1995): firstly there is a shift towards disaggregating public organisations into
separately managed units described as separate cost centres with greater
responsibility towards resource decisions and individual budgets. Secondly, there
is also a shift towards greater competition between public sector organisations
and between organisations within the public and private sectors. Thirdly, there is
more widespread adoption within the public sector of management practices
which are derived from the private corporate sector. The fourth element includes
shifting towards a greater emphasis on more disciplined use of resources and
searching for alternative and less costly ways to deliver public services. The fifth
element includes more involvement by senior management, exercising
unrestrained power to demonstrate that they play a visible and active role in the
public sector. The sixth element focuses on moving towards more defined and
measurable standards for the performance of public sector organisations in terms
of range, level and content of services to be provided rather than enhancing trust,
professionalism and expertise throughout the public sector. Finally, the goal is to
control public sector organisations according to predetermined output measures
based on financial outputs (with an increased focus on items such as revenues
and costs), rather than collaborating on a daily basis (to monitor the achievement
of outcomes) which was central to a traditional bureaucratic function.
Under the mantra of new public management, there is an increased concentration
of power in fewer hands. The greater use of non-government agencies to provide
services requires a “rebalance of responsibility” (Steane 2008, p460) relating to
funding which has resulted in a more centralist trend towards shifting the powers
of decision making and funding to the Commonwealth government. This includes
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the government’s decision to outsource aged care services to the for-profit and
not-for-profit organisations along with the continued rise in private providers in
aged care.15 This enables the government to encourage competition between the
for-profit and not-for-profit service providers. It is also less costly for the
government to outsource the provision of aged care services to external
organisations whilst it increases their savings in expenditure on public services.
Such an arrangement allows the Commonwealth to define and control the funds
that it allocates to public services such as aged care and health services. As
such, in the public sector realm Sinclair (1995) emphasises that the focus now is
on being “answerable for producing outputs or the use of resources to achieve
certain ends” (p222). This means that the actions performed should result in
agreed outcomes which have been specified. These actions are performed
through formalised controls over the processes or inputs required to achieve the
specified outcomes. As such, the values embedded in this notion of accountability
are efficiency and cost effectiveness which is reinforced through parliamentary
fiscal budgets. The new public management doctrine has now been adopted by
the federal government to efficiently manage the aged care system and has
adopted the following key elements including: private market practices and
efficiency. The next section will further address these aspects.

The private market sector measures goal achievements and conducts
performance assessments by focusing mostly on economic efficiency. The

15

Historically aged care services were provided by charities and voluntary organisations which also operated their own care
facilities. Due to the increasing elderly demographic, nursing homes were established and managed by the voluntary sector or the
government. Since the 2010s there has been an increase in the number of for-profit providers who own residential aged care
facilities resulting in an increase from approximately 30% to 40% (with not-for-profit providers account for 56% of residential aged
care facilities. Only 4% are now government owned compared to 10% of government ownership in 2012) (Australian Parliament
House 2020; KPMG 2013).
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government’s adoption of the market’s measures of economic efficiency
overlooks the concept of effectiveness as it is incomparable to suggest and
assume that the public sector has the capacity to manage its resources as
efficiently as the private sector market (Hood 1995). Both the public and private
sectors function under contrasting levels of “transparency, consultation and
accountability” (Funnell et al 2012, p60); and the public sector performance and
effectiveness measures are more complex. Thus, the process of identifying and
precisely measuring the relationships between inputs (e.g. resources or cost
required to provide aged care services) and outputs (effective use of public
resources such as use of taxpayers’ revenue to fund aged care services); and
assessing aged care programmes’ and policies’ outcomes are also more
unstructured and fluid in the public sector. It includes the assessment of the
government’s efficiency in the delivery of public services which is a combination
of “social and economic efficiencies” (Funnell et al 2012, p61). This includes
ensuring that all citizens have access to health and aged care services which
have been delivered at a relatively efficient cost to the taxpayer.

The government is directly accountable and is required to provide responses to
multiple stakeholders, including the “public, lobby groups, community groups and
individuals” (Parker & Gould 1999, p121). Essentially the government has a
principal agent relationship with citizens as the ultimate principal (Shaoul et al
2012). This means that the public sector is accountable to citizens who require
that there are good quality outcomes for service users, particularly those people
who are more vulnerable and require public services the most (Shaoul et al 2012).
The government is also responsible for financial accountability which relates to
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fiduciary or management responsibilities that are created through a trusting
relationship between the government and the public. Therefore the government
has the privilege of raising taxpayer revenue and distributing these resources
“honestly, wisely and fairly” (Funnell & Cooper 1998, p32).
As the government utilises taxpayers’ resources, financial reports are required to
be prepared and presented to the Parliament to ensure that the government’s
accountability is met. This is also explained in the Commonwealth’s Joint
Committee of Public Accounts’ objectives which states that its objective is: to
provide financial information for determining and predicting future cash flows and
requirements of resources; to provide financial information for planning and
budgeting and to monitor performance in terms of fiduciary and legal
requirements. It also aims to provide information that is useful for evaluating
managerial performance; determining the costs of programs and functions which
enables comparative analysis between time periods. Further, it evaluates the
efficiency and economy of its programs and to evaluate the effectiveness of
achieving the government’s goals and objectives (Funnell et al 2012). This shows
that the Commonwealth has broadened its view on accountability as the
implications are that the government is answerable to the Parliament and to the
community. Further, the scope of accountability had shifted from compliance,
justice, effectiveness and efficiency to a heightened emphasis on efficiency.
Finally, the most contentious (and primary) element of accountability is
effectiveness where society’s collective needs and policy outcomes are goals
which have been achieved. The government is established to meet social needs
and depends on the relations with “interdependent agents” (Funnell et al 2012,
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p63) such as providers of aged care services to continue receiving the public’s
support and to continue to serve social expectations. Hence the policies,
procedures and mechanisms that the government has developed enables the
provision of expected aged care services and to achieve society’s needs.
Therefore the government must provide the aged care services that are
demanded, and in an effective manner, meaning that effectiveness is the
government’s utmost level of accountability.
However, to achieve this policy outcome requires significant funding and as a
consequence, the primary focus has shifted from focusing on providing effective
services to eliminating waste and saving the taxpayers’ money (Plowden 1994;
Funnell & Cooper 1998). As a result there are growing government demands for
performance measurements relating to inputs from aged care service providers.
The inputs that are used to provide effective aged care services (e.g. cost to
provide care per resident in aged care facility per day) are quantified and
generally in financial terms however outcomes are measured in qualitative terms
(e.g. ease of access to aged care services; quality of care provided; quality of
care assessment needs process). Thus reliance on quantification of outcomes
does not “capture the essence” (Funnell et al 2012, p64) of the success of the
government’s policies and the level of effectiveness regarding expenditure
utilising public funds. The incorporation of qualitative analysis of the success of
outcomes removes the simplistic focus on numerical results and emphasises that
the government must operate at a higher level of accountability. Further these
results are also subject to being audited by the auditor-general and close public
scrutiny.
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Further, summary figures and key ratios such as the total amount of public funds
spent on aged care services may not necessarily portray the reality of the success
of government action as the government has the incentive to manipulate to results
in order to portray a favourable outcome that marries with its position and motives.
The Commonwealth government’s broader policy approach towards ageing in the
last fifteen years increasingly saw the use of the 2002, 2010 and 2015
Intergenerational Reports (The Treasury 2017) combined with the Treasury’s
analysis of the economic and financial impacts of ageing to combine these areas
of aged care policies. As such, the Commonwealth government is responsible for
managing the financial budget and budgetary impact of ageing. However, this is
against the government’s traditional policy of achieving effective social outcomes.
The policy making process is insufficient to focus on the aged care process solely
through the “Treasury lens” (Butler 2015, p50) and requires a broader approach
taking factors into consideration that are beyond the costs of the aged pension
and aged care services. This reliance on economic rationalism and the formal
calculation of efficiencies purely in monetary terms fundamentally defeats the
purpose of the social collective which ought to be the “preservation and
improvement of the welfare” (Rawls 1995, p73) of the country’s citizens.

This creates a conflict of interest between the goals of the government and the
public. The public generally desires the government to operate in an efficient and
effective manner and to provide the services promised and expected. Thus the
aim of meeting collective needs is not solely to be efficient to the detriment of
reduced services and quality of services. Kent (2003) suggests that traditionally
taxpayers question the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector.
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Taxpayers, community and interest groups raise concerns with respect to
requiring more information on how governments spend public financial resources.
In particular, these concerns have enabled the government to justify its increasing
focus in shifting towards the government eliminating waste (or cost cutting) and
operating efficiently and economically. In order to legitimise the government’s
decisions, the Department of Finance (2013) emphasises that its focus is on
achieving outcomes and cost effectiveness, and it adopts business type
measures to assess its performance. This enables the pursuit of quantifiable,
functional relationships which can be readily measured to interpret efficiencies
and discounts the qualitative nature of performance and effectiveness (Funnell et
al 2012).
Consequently this facilitates the exclusion of the consideration of the provision of
appropriate and quality of care services when measuring the effectiveness of
policies and programs. Ultimately the success or failure of a government is
dependent upon the social impacts of its economic policies. Based on this public
accountability incorporates the degree of achievement of policy outcomes and
government programs for the government and the public (effectiveness); whether
performance or results represents optimal utilisation of public funds and
resources (efficiency); and an appropriate amount of money was used to achieve
the pursued policy outcomes (economy) (Department of Finance 2013; Funnell
et al 2012; Funnell & Cooper 1998).16 Therefore, the measure of accountability

16

There are academic papers suggesting that public administrations are in a post new public management
environment. Colak (2019) notes that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the application of new
public management reforms have resulted in “welfare maximisation” (p526). Therefore the trend now is to
adopt a new way of thinking by re-adapting the former concept of viewing from wider social problems as
an economic activity; transform the perception of the citizen as a “passive consumer” (Colak 2019, p526)
to a joint producer; focus on transparency of governance rather than efficiency and outputs in terms of
accountability and focusing on long term outcomes. Thus Colak (2019) suggests that there is a
“hybridisation” (p531) of public administration reforms. However Pflueger (2020) asserts that new public
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ought to include good health, quality of care and life instead of focusing on
efficiencies and profitability. The existing methodology of accountability is
inappropriate and will be further reviewed in Chapter 7 as part of the review of
the submissions received by the Productivity Commission in response to the
proposed Living Longer, Living Better aged care industry reforms.

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter explores the concept of accountability in the aged care industry in
Australia. It explains the difference between accountability as a virtue and as a
mechanism. This requires those who have authority over public resources to
provide an account of their use of these resources and to justify whether they
have been managed effectively. This chapter also explains the current adoption
of new public management by the Australian government in the aged care
industry. It is considered by the government as a tool to enhance the efficient
management of public resources by adopting private sector practices.
The use of new public management in conjunction with accounting techniques
enables the attribution of financial values and rationality. This enables the visibility
of social cases such as shifting accountabilities within the aged care sector
(Hanninen 1995; Miller 1990; Covaleski & Dirsmith 1988). Accounting succeeds
as a technology in making a case, such as the aged care problem, a visible public
issue by translating people into calculated objects of rationality. The acceptability
of accounts, budgets and reports creates a financial mentality which is composed
of time and profitability of the costs of providing aged care services (Miller 1991).

management has been “reincarnated” (p103) to incorporate the aspects of quality and quality improvement
and is still being utilised in the public sector. Further evidence also suggests that the new public
management principles continue to be applied in the public sector in Australia (Wathne 2020; Williamson
et al 2020; Chowdhury & Shil 2019; Lingard 2019).
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This simple minded and “single minded dedication” (Funnell et al 2012, p153) of
the federal government to place economic rationalism using accountancy tools at
the forefront shows how the government’s accountability is shifting and will be
further explored in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4 The Role of Accounting in the Australian Aged Care
Industry
“The relevance of accounting, its force and tenacity resides in its ability to
mask the existing power network” (Covaleski & Dirsmith 1988, p104). In
addition the malleability of numbers, understood as a calculative regime
between actors, agencies and institutions also provides technologies for
exerting action and ultimately influence society (Miller 1991).

4.1 Introduction
The concept of accountability was discussed in Chapter 3 and relates to giving
explanations to stakeholders; providing further information where required; and
reviewing, revising systems or practices to meet the expectations of stakeholders.
The Australian government is required to ensure that public resources are
carefully and effectively managed. Thus, it is essential that the government
funded aged care services are provided in an effective manner to the recipients
of aged care services. However, the government’s traditional enforcement of the
provision of effective services has shifted towards a heightened focus on the
provision of efficient services due to the adoption of new public management.
This concept removes the division of managing public resources separately to
the management of the private sector. The focus has shifted away from
processes and equitable distribution of social wealth and access to public
services towards an increased focus on outcomes and outputs which are
measured in numerical and financial terms.
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This chapter will discuss the practice of accounting in relation to managing Aged
Care services in Australia. These modes of accounting have the ability to
recognise the required information; capture and interpret it in a manner that is
readily available to use and understood by management or the government. The
management accounting function emphasises cost accounting procedures which
incorporate “incurred or budgeted” (Funnell et al. 2012, p160) costs; the recording
and calculation of costs and cash expenditure to incorporate this information into
reports which appraise the relationships between resources used and the outputs
achieved. The use of such accounting systems enables the government to
achieve its narrow aims of fiduciary accountability and to provide assurance of
the use of public resources; increase control of the aged care sector and to
legitimate its decision to shift its accountability to the elderly and their family.

4.2 The Accounting Calculus
Accounting is traditionally perceived as a “measurement-communication
process” (Gaffikin 2008, p38) which includes applying numbers to properties; and
acknowledging events or properties from a numerical perspective (Gaffikin 2008).
This includes reporting methods such as financial reporting which discloses
numerical representations of current and future economic or financial
commitments, and economic events or use of economic resources of an entity
(which includes governments) (Gaffikin 2008). Sterling (1970) suggested that the
role of accounting is to “measure something” (p454) and to communicate the
findings of that measurement. Further, Christensen and Demski (2003) note that
accounting is a “formal financial measurement system” (p4) which reports
measured items on the balance sheet; and inflows and outflows on the income
statement. Hence from both perspectives accounting is considered to be utilised
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to measure values and informative events which are required to enable
information or content to be conveyed to the users of the information or to the
audience who may be affected by this information.
Accounting is also considered to be an “administrative and political” (Mennicken
et al. 2008, p5) practice. The administrative practice incorporates recording and
bookkeeping transactions and events. However, it is also shaped by political
agendas which influence economic life (Mennicken et al. 2008). Accounting
practices used within the aged care sector include budgeting, resource planning
and reporting changes which emphasises the importance of “what is done and
what is valued” (Neu 2006, p395). It is, without doubt, costly to provide aged care
services, however, accounting enables the inscription of some costs whereas
other costs or values are ignored, hidden or “silenced” (Smark 2006a, p341;
Robson 1992).
The majority of aged care costs are subsidised by the federal and state
government, and the concept of public accountability applies as the government
has an increased responsibility to its citizens to ensure that these resources are
equitably distributed (Funnell & Cooper 1998). However, Australia’s aged care
policy development during the last twenty years has substantially shifted from a
public enterprise towards a privatised market model with an increased focus on
efficiencies and reductions in expenditure. The growing use of traditional
accounting principles including income, expenses and empirical data enables the
government to calculate budgetary deficits and declare a risk of a future “crisis of
fiscal sustainability” (Bessant et al. 2011, p143). However, the social and
economic realities do not exist independently of all of the financial representations
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created by the accounting calculus (McKernan 2007).
Further, accounting is used as a social construction, and the government’s failure
to use the “generational accounting framework” (Bessant et al 2011, p143)
provides the government with the opportunity to emphasise its “dominant
ideology” (Smark 2006a, p342) in that the older population is an “increasing and
unacceptable burden” (Courtney et al. 1997, p231) which marginalises them from
the rest of the Australian population. This social construction enables the
government to shift its focus to rational planning and efficiencies whilst the
government’s historical concepts of intergenerational equity, distributive fairness
and justice are ignored (Funnell & Cooper 1998; Bessant et al. 2011). A study
conducted by Kendig et al (2019) during the seven year period between 2009
and 2017 identified that older people in Australia are receiving less than their “fair
share of government benefits” (p2695). Approximately 65% and 48% of
respondents (Baby Boomer and retirees respectively17), noted that they were
receiving less than they were entitled. Further comparisons between younger
and older age cohorts (retirees; the Baby Boomer generation; and Generations
X and Y18) identified that the older age cohort as a group are more disadvantaged
relative to the overall Australian population (only 30% of respondents felt that
retirees had better opportunities than younger cohorts). Kendig et al’s (2019)
findings do not provide support for the government’s propositions that benefits to
older people should be reduced in order to meet budget targets or distribute more
to younger groups. Further, 75% of the respondents in their study perceived that
there is very little or no intergenerational conflict or inequity. This suggests that

17
18

Retirees are born before 1946; Baby Boomer Generation are born between 1946-1964 (Kendig et al 2019).
Generation X are born between 1965 and 1980; Generation Y are born after 1980 (Kendig et al 2019).
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the government’s strategy of raising intergenerational equity arguments as a
rationale for cutting social expenditure has had limited social impact. The
government’s arguments for expenditure restraint as explained in their
Intergenerational Reports (refer to Chapter 4 for further discussion) do not appear
to be consistent with the findings of their study with overall limited public concern
for intergenerational inequity or conflict.
Why are accounting and quantification of data and use of other numerical
information so important in aged care decision making process? Such information
is “influential” (Smark 2006a, p344) due to its ease of use in decision making and
the ability to use numbers to justify and solidify decisions (Macintosh 1994). When
social problems involve more complex decision making, the calculation and
rational value judgement acts as a readily available substitute, due to its apparent
objective and impersonal nature regardless of the extent to which the sums are
unrepresentative of the true nature of reality (Smark 2006a; Maunders & Burritt
1991; Gorz 1988). As the government presents social problems solely in
monetary terms, the solutions are also presented on a calculated monetary basis
as the dominant aspect of public decision making. This assists the government
in its emphasis on the need for budgetary restraints and increased financial
efficiency.
Accounting also plays an important role as a means of control in restructuring
social relationships through the use of the government’s financial budgets as a
means of constraining or altering behaviour (Richardson 1987). This includes
imposing additional means testing of residents entering aged care facilities and
increases in fees paid which may alarm older Australians and would encourage
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them to remain in the home for longer (Refer to Chapter 2 for further
explanation of the means testing and changes to aged care fees). This would
save the government money in having to pay subsidies to the elderly in aged care
facilities and contains expenditure within the aged care sector. Further, Smark
(2006c) and Richardson (1987) suggest that the use of accounting in the public
sector serves three purposes: it enables heightened focus on government
efficiencies; the language of accounting is used as rhetoric to enable certain
social issues to be highlighted while others remain obscure, and it is used as a
tool to justify actions taken to solve social issues and to approve or penalise these
actions with reference to accounting.

4.3 Intergenerational (In)Equity
Intergenerational equity refers to maintaining living standards in the future and is
calculated as the cost of public expenditures which should be distributed in the
future where there is an even spread of the benefits that arise from the public
expenditures (Coombs & Dollery 2004). Thus taxpayers ought to contribute
towards public expenditure without subsidising or being subsidised by other
taxpayers in future time periods. This approach enables simultaneous taxation
and benefits which arise from public expenditure. However, the trend now is to
imitate the ideology of capital markets and finding the most efficient manner in
which resources are allocated. Non quantitative criteria including effectiveness
and equity are given less attention where the main concern surrounds “unit cost
reduction” (McCoppin 1995, p95) which enables the government to justify the
decline in expenditure on social programs including aged care services.
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4.4 Generational Accounting vs Budget Accounting
Generational accounting is an accounting method developed in Europe (and not
adopted in Australia) to calculate the government’s true budget constraints in
relation to future government expenditure, including aged care funding. It
indicates the net taxes that the current generation will be expected to pay now
and the expenditure imposed on future generations (where the future values are
converted to present value terms) (Coombs & Dollery 2004; Auerbach et al. 1994;
Auerbach et al. 1991). The importance of this accounting method is that it shows
the government the magnitude of the budgetary burden of existing policies on
future generations; whether the current fiscal policy without major sacrifices on
expenditure could impact on current or future generations or government
purchases; whether alternate policies could be developed to produce a
“generational balance” (Kotlikoff & Raffelhuschen 1999, p161) where the current
and future generations face the same budgetary burdens when adjusted for
inflation.
Government budgets which adopt the generational accounts method calculate
the net tax payments as: taxes that individuals from each age cohort are expected
to pay over the course of their lifetime (Kotlikoff & Raffelhuschen 1999), less
transfers paid such as pension payments and income support schemes. This is
then presented as a net present value calculation for each generation of people
presently alive and to be born in the future which will show their collective
contribution towards supplementing government expenditure (Bessant et al.
2011; Raffelhuschen 1999: Kotlikoff & Raffelhsuchen 1999). This method of
accounting then calculates the residual amount, which is required to balance the
government’s budget restraint. This residual amount is calculated by adding all
111

of the current and future generations’ net payments and subtracting the net debt
(or adding back the net wealth) (Bessant et al. 2011; Raffelhuschen 1999). This
calculation determines the fiscal gap (or budgetary constraint) which highlights
the demands on future budgets in order to determine a sustainable fiscal policy.
Fiscal sustainability refers to maintaining a balanced budget over the “very long
term” (Coombs & Dollery 2004, p466). The traditional budget balance approach
as adopted by the Australian government considers that all current expenditure
is financed by current taxes, and any public debt is imposed upon future
generations. This approach can be measured in cash or accrual terms, and both
are utilised by the Australian government (Coombs & Dollery 2004, p466). As
such, these are the government’s future bills that are unpayable by the
government and must eventually be paid by future generations (Auerbach et al.
1994). Thus the true debt levels are assumed to be financed by the net tax
payments collected from future generations. How this burden will actually be
distributed in the future is unknown as it will depend on future government
policies. In Europe, the adoption of the generational accounting method treats all
“non-age specific” (Bessant et al. 2011, p151) government expenditure as
distributed equally over a life cycle while collective government consumption is
also allocated uniformly to all generations which reduces their net tax burden
(Bessant et al. 2011; Raffelhuschen 1999).
Generational accounting is more valuable than the traditional budget accounting
method of cash flow deficits as it recognises factors such as future liabilities
including “tax based retirement income schemes” (Bessant et al. 2011, p151) and
it takes a “long term view of budget making and reporting” (Raffelhuschen, 2002,
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p76). It shows that intergenerational balance and a sustainable budget can be
achieved by reducing the financial burden facing the present generation rather
than attempting to reduce the burden for future generations (Kotlikoff &
Raffelhuschen 1999). This can be achieved by making financial and budgetary
adjustments on those who are born in the future. This is significant as it indicates
the need for policy adjustments to be made today to achieve a generational
balance which does not impose these adjustments solely on future generations.
Unfortunately, the ability to avoid difficult policy decisions by manipulating the
reported deficits has not escaped the Australia federal government.

4.5 The Budgetary Impact of Ageing
As noted by Christine, aged sixty three: “the surge in population of Baby
Boomers has been known for years by the government. Now they’re
blaming us for being old and being a burden. They forget we paid tax.”
(Butler 2015, p97)
Butler (2015) suggests that the Australian demographic will remain fairly
consistent by the 2050s, and the purchasing power of individuals is expected to
double by this period. However, the Treasury and Commonwealth Government
comment on the substantial implications on government expenditure and
budgetary pressure in the areas of the costs of aged care, health care and the
aged pension (Butler 2015). It assumes that it will maintain its existing revenue
base despite the changes projected in the population profile and which will impact
on the types of revenues streams collected by the government. The Treasury’s
projections over the impacts on government revenues and expenditure in the four
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Intergenerational Reports19 issued between 2002 and 2015 (The Treasury 2015)
have projections which vary significantly, emphasising the difficulty in predicting
the financial impact over many years.
The key areas in government expenditure include defence; the National Disability
Insurance Scheme; education and training; support payments to individuals;
payments to the aged; and health while the increase in aged care expenditure is
projected to be the largest (The Treasury 2015) (refer to Table 4.1 for the
government’s projections in Age Pension expenditure between 2041-2055. The
2015 Intergenerational Report projects that spending will increase by 90% over
forty years, with the population aged 85 years and over will grow by more than
400 percent (The Treasury 2015). The highest estimate of the increase in public
health costs due to the impact of ageing is approximately 25% over the next forty
years, which is represents only 2.1 per cent of the GDP (refer to Table 4.2 for the
Government’s actual and budgeted expenditure for aged care between 2001 to
2055). This assumption is based on the Government’s plans to increase future
pension reductions; increase the eligibility for the Aged Pension to seventy years
which was a policy that was not previously adopted by the government; and rely
on the Commonwealth Government’s projections of future health care spending
rather than those contained in the 2015 Intergenerational Report (Butler 2015;

19

The Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 requires that the Commonwealth Treasury publish an
Intergenerational Report at least once every five years (Coombs & Dollery 2004) which focuses its
attention on the demographic changes over the long term (which includes the increasing ageing
population). This report assesses the current Government’s sustainability regarding its policies and
changes to the Australian population size and demographic impacts on economic growth, the public’s
financial resources and workforce over the next forty years (The Treasury 2017). The report provides
projections into the future regarding the “population, participation and productivity” (The Treasury 2017),
and estimates the impacts on the nation’s standard of living and public policies. It also estimates the
challenges and opportunities that the nation will face in the future. As such the Government is required to
produce an Intergenerational Report at least every five years and to date such reports were produced in:
2002, 2007, 2010 and 2015 (The Treasury 2017).
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The Treasury 2015).
By 2049-2050 the number of people eligible to receive the Age Pension is
projected to increase by 150% (the Government’s current policy considers the
eligible age is 65 and will rise to 67 from 1 July 2023, reaching 70 by 1 July 2035),
significantly increasing the proportion of the population eligible for the Age
Pension (The Treasury 2015). An increased proportion of retired people will
receive compulsory superannuation for longer periods of their working lives and
will most likely have higher retirement balances. This means that there will be a
decline in reliance on Age Pension payments. By reducing the proportion of
retired people receiving a full Age Pension, compulsory superannuation ought to
lessen significantly the fiscal pressures on the government over the next four
decades. Further, other factors such as: the Age Pension is means tested; longer
workforce participation; increasing the superannuation preservation age and the
increased value of individual’s superannuation balances and private assets and
income will also relieve government pressure of expenditure.
Whilst the government considers the projected increase in spending on the Age
Pension as “substantial” (The Treasury 2015), it is still quite low compared to
other OECD countries. Comparative to other countries, Australia is in a better
position as the Age Pension is means tested and the payment amounts are aimed
at alleviating poverty amongst the elderly. Other OECD countries pay age
pensions which are based on pre-retirement individual earnings which increases
fiscal pressure as the elderly populations rise.
At this rate, the impact of the demographic change on Commonwealth spending
as predicted above in forty years’ time is likely to be almost zero even if the Age
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Pension remains at existing levels. Hence the overall commentary regarding the
impact of ageing on the budget is “hysteria” (Butler 2015, p87). There is little basis
to suggest that the ageing population will be a burden on the budget and on future
generations of taxpayers. Hence there is insufficient justification for this shift in
accountability in increasing the financial responsibility to the elderly.
Table 4.1 The Government’s Actual and Projected Age Pension Expenditure
(2002-2055)
Intergenerational
Report

2002

Actual Age

Budgeted Age

Pension as a

Pension as a

percentage of

percentage of

GDP

GDP

2001-2002: 2.9%

2041-2042: 4.6%

Actual and Budgeted Age
Pension per person in $

2002-2003: $1,274
2041-2041: $3,488

2007

2006-2007: 2.5%

2046-2047: 4.4%

2006-2007: $1,231
2046-2047: $3,942

2010

2008-2009: 2.4%

2049-2050: 3.9%

2009-2010: $1,500
2049-2050: $3,950

2015

2014-2015: 2.9%

2054-2055: 3.6%

Only total amount provided:
$165 billion

(Data from Intergenerational Reports: 2002, 2007, 2010, 2015) (The Treasury 2015)
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Table 4.2 Australian Government’s Actual and Budgeted Expenditure in
Aged Care (2002 to 2055)
Intergenerational

Actual Aged Care

Budgeted Aged

Report

Expenditure

Care Expenditure

(Year of

Based on GDP

Based on GDP

Actual and Budgeted Aged Care
Expenditure Based on $20

Publication)
2002

2001-2002: 0.7%

2041-2042: 1.8%

Not provided

2007

2006-2007: 0.8%

2046-2047 2%

Residential Care Actual:
2006-2007: $278 per person
Community Care Actual:
2006-2007: $100 per person
Total: $378 per person
Residential Care Budgeted:
2046-2047: $1,378 per person
Community Care Budgeted:
2046-2047: $391 per person
Total: $1,769 per person

2010

2009-2010: 0.8%

2049-2050: 1.8%

Residential Care Actual:
2009-2010: $340 per person
Community Care Actual:
2009-2010: $120 per person
Total: $460 per person
Residential Care Budgeted:
2049-2050: $1,440 per person
Community Care Budgeted:
2049-2050: $390 per person
Total: $1,840 per person

20

The 2002 Intergenerational Report (The Treasury 2015) did not provide a breakdown of actual and
budgeted dollar expenditure on aged care. The 2007 and 2010 Intergenerational Reports provided a
breakdown of actual and budgeted dollar expenditure for residential and community care per person. The
2015 Intergenerational Report only provided the total actual and budgeted dollar expenditure for aged care
person and excluded a breakdown of the actual and budgeted dollar expenditure for residential and
community care per person.
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2015

2014-2015: 0.9%

Proposed Policy21:

Residential and Community Care

2054-2055: 1.7%

Actual:

Previous Policy:

Total 2014-2015: $620 per person

2054-2055: 2.1%

Residential and Community Care
Budgeted:
Total 2054-2055: $2,000 per person

(Data from Intergenerational Reports: 2002, 2007, 2010, 2015) (The Treasury 2015)

4.6 Accounting and the Australian Population
The shift in Australia’s age profile over the next fifty years will have a profound
impact on the nation’s economy. However, the difficulty is forecasting the shape
and extent of this impact which is not as simple and catastrophic as
commentators and the government suggest. Australia’s public balance sheet is
in a relatively positive position despite the government’s stimulus spending
designed to reduce the impact of the Global Financial Crisis resulted in the federal
budget generating a deficit in the late 2000s (Butler 2015). The major decline in
commodity prices and a reduction in consumer spending in Australia since the
2000s resulted in the federal government’s write down of government revenue
which further prevented a return to surplus to date. However, Australia’s
government debt remains several times lower than the average determined by
the OECD and other countries such as Canada, Japan and the United States
(Butler 2015; The Treasury 2015).
The analysis of population ageing focuses on three main accounting transactions:

21

The 2015 Intergenerational Report (The Treasury 2015) provides two budgets for expenditure on aged
care. The first is based on the “Proposed Policy” which is based on expenditure, revenue and fiscal
aggregates on the basis of an announced policy and assumes that all outstanding measures are
implemented. The second is based on the “Previous Policy” which reflects the budget measures that are
still pending legislation or implementation, including elements to the Government’s reforms to health,
income support and education. It also incorporates expenditure, revenue and fiscal aggregates but adjusts
projections to account for the pending measures.
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wages paid in return for working; the payment of taxes which is collected by the
government and the receipt of services and payments (generally known as
transfers) which are government funded (The Treasury 2015; Butler 2015). The
government’s general assumption is that older people will be dependent on the
workforce to fund their retirement and aged care services. The working population
is assumed to be the “lifters” (Butler 2015, p64) and aged between 15-64 years
whilst the “leaners” (Butler 2015, p64) are aged 65 years and older which is a
fairly simplistic approach adopted by the government.
The formula used by the Treasury in its projections in the 2010 and 2015
Intergenerational Reports is based on the notion that in 1970 there were 7.5
Australians of working age who could support one person aged 65 and over;
today there are less than five while this will decrease to 2.5 by 2050 (The Treasury
2015). This is the basis used to formulate public policy and is an inadequate
assumption based on the anticipated behaviour of certain age cohorts, and the
use of accounting principles affords a narrow approach in calculating revenues
and expenditure to justify its impacts on economic activity. Refer to Table 4.3 for
the historical and projected government’s taxation revenue which is projected to
cover the Australian population aged 65 years and over.
The Intergenerational Reports from 2010 and 2015 (The Treasury 2015) explain
that ageing pressures will reduce fiscal sustainability (which is the gap between
expenditure and revenue that needs to be closed to address the fiscal pressures
of the ageing population). Although revenue from 2018-2019 is budgeted to
exceed spending by 1.6% of the GDP, ageing and health pressures are projected
to result in a gradual deterioration in government finances. The Government
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noted in its 2010 Intergenerational report (The Treasury 2015) that the
government’s fiscal strategy of retraining expenditure growth to 2% in 2015-2016
is expected to return the budget to surplus, along with a more gradual pace of
ageing than previously projected (The Treasury 2015).
Table 4.3 Taxation Revenue 1970 to 2050
Year

Proportion

of

Working

Age

Income tax revenue as a

People per Aged Person over 65

percentage of GDP

1970 – 2000

7.5

21.9%

2001 – 2010

5

23.9%

2011 – 2050

2.7

23.9%

(Data from Intergenerational Reports: 2002, 2007, 2010, 2015) (The Treasury 2015)

The government considers fiscal sustainability as its ability to manage its finances
so that it can meet its present and future spending commitments. The goal is to
ensure that future generations of taxpayers do not face an “unmanageable bill”
(The Treasury 2015) for government services provided to the current generation.
The objective is to stabilise government net debt and improve its net worth. The
government bases its fiscal sustainability assessment on net financial worth
rather than net debt as this includes “government borrowing, superannuation and
all financial assets” (The Treasury 2015), whilst net worth more broadly
incorporates non-financial assets. Due to the increasing ageing population, net
financial worth is projected to peak at 11% of GDP in 2032-2033 and will gradually
deteriorate to -12% of GDP by 2049-2050. Net worth is also projected to decrease
at the same time to -6% of GDP by 2049-2050 (The Treasury 2015).
Based on the above data, the use of management accounting practice enables
the division of organisational and social time by dividing the segments of life into
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accounting periods, generating management reports, preparing budgets and
performance

reviews

(Roberts

&

Scapens

1985).

Organisations

and

governments who enter this organisational space are subject to the system of
accountability which enables the reproduction of meaning, legitimation and
power. The language of accounting enables the categorisation of events and
transactions which enables the government and the public to make sense of past
events; predict future outcomes; plan and assess processes and activities
(Roberts & Scapens 1985).
This type of accounting practice enables the measurement, accumulation, and
reporting of information such as public expenditure. Such a methodology assists
the government in decision making regarding the efficient allocation of public
resources through the process of “planning, controlling and organising” (Funnell
et al. 2012, p162) of the provision and funding of aged care services. Further
benefits are derived from the utilisation of management accounting techniques
which stem from the long term period concept. In the long term, the costs which
are required to achieve the government’s goals will change over time. This is in
contrast to the short term period where costs generally do not change, and the
government cannot readily change the nature and scale of activities. However,
the long term horizon enables greater flexibility and greater judgement to be used
due to the decrease in cost constraints; hence these decisions more readily
reflect the government’s long term goals.
Assuming that the Australian demographic will remain fairly consistent by the
2050s, the purchasing power of individuals is expected to double by this period.
However, the Treasury and Commonwealth Government comment on the
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substantial implications on government expenditure and budgetary pressure in
the areas of the costs of aged care, health care and the aged pension (Butler
2015). It assumes that it will maintain its existing revenue base despite the
changes projected in the population profile and which will impact on the types of
revenues streams collected by the government. The Treasury’s projections over
the

impacts

on

government

revenues

and

expenditure

in

the

four

Intergenerational Reports issued between 2002 and 2015 have projections which
vary significantly, emphasising the difficulty in predicting the financial impact over
many years (The Treasury 2015). As shown in Table 4.4 the actual and projected
expenditure have decreased from 2002 to 2055. Expenditure includes payments
to individuals such as: Age and Service Pensions; Disability Pension;
Parenting/Family Benefits and Unemployment Benefits. These are expected to
decrease over time as the older population grows and the working population
stabilises. In contrast, revenue is expected to remain stable over the same period
due to stabilisation of taxation rates and the government’s taxation policies
however the projections exclude the impacts on the growing older population and
decline in the workforce which pays taxes.
Table 4.4 Actual and Projected Government Expenditure and Revenue
(2002-2055)
Intergenerational

Actual

Expenditure

and

Report

Revenue as a percentage of

Budgeted

Expenditure

and

Revenue as a percentage of GDP

GDP
2002

2001-2002

2041-2042

Expenditure: 6.85%

Expenditure: 7.38%

Revenue: 20.8%

Revenue: 22.4%
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2007

2010

2015

2006-2007

2046-2047

Expenditure: 6.9%

Expenditure: 7.1%

Revenue: 20.7%

Revenue: Not provided

2009-2010

2049-2050

Expenditure: 6.9%

Expenditure: 6.9%

Revenue: 20.4%

Revenue: 23.1%

2014-2015

2054-2055

Expenditure: 4.5%

Expenditure: 3.2%

Revenue: 22%

Revenue: 23.9%

(Data from Intergenerational Reports: 2002, 2007, 2010, 2015) (The Treasury 2015)

Further, the Intergenerational Reports are based on the Fiscal Aggregate
Projection Model that relies on projections of future revenues and expenditure on
areas such as health, income support payments, education and aged care. In
addition, since 2010, by incorporating interest payments and receipts enables the
model to calculate long term projections of the government’s cash balances (The
Treasury 2015). This model is designed to adopt the traditional cash and accrual
accounting system where the operating statement, cash flow statement and
balance sheet are interconnected. This ensures that any changes to one
statement will affect the other statements (The Treasury 2015).
In order to improve budgetary management, the Australian government has
moved towards adopting the public sector balance sheet method by matching
revenue and expenditure and assets consumption. The balance sheet, containing
assets and liabilities measures the government’s net worth, is considered a
superior measure to net debt to achieving fiscal sustainability as it considers all
changes in the government’s assets and liabilities (Cooper & Dollery 2004).
Hence maintaining zero net worth indicates a financially sustainable budget.
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Australia has not used the generational approach as pioneered by Auerbach et
al. (1991), and the four intergenerational reports have not analysed public policies
in “age cohort or generational terms” (Bessant et al. 2011 p146). This absence
highlights the notion of the spiralling costs of aged care services as severely
distorted and impacts on the equitable distribution and access to social services
and welfare and these issues still remain to be addressed. Further questions are
raised as to whether the aged care reforms are adequate and whether this system
will sustain valued social functions. These are issues that the Australian
government does not want to describe or address and the use of generational
accounting “threatens” (Bessant et al. 2011, p152) to enable this. Hence the
current framing of this problem privileges certain groups such as the government
and the taxpayers to the detriment of other groups such as older Australians.
Coory (2004) emphasises that increases in life expectancy demonstrates
economic and social progress with a more structurally aged balance in Australia’s
population. However, Butler (2015) and Coory (2004) argue that the public and
political debates and policy structure changes in Australia are now predominantly
focused on altering health and aged care financing due to: the shrinking working
population and resultant decline in taxpayer generated revenue; along with the
increased costs to sustain the elderly demographic and the impact of these
negative characteristics of their federal budget.
Debates are further compounded with constant cynical and dismal projections
regarding the “skyrocketing” (Coory 2004, p581) costs of health and aged care
services. Consequently, Butler (2015) argues that older Australians are made to
feel that they are a burden to society when they once substantially contributed to
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the development of this nation for the purpose of enabling future generations to
live long and in prosperity. Therefore it is important to recognise that such
financial considerations dominate decision making to the detriment of other
objectives as noted above as they are more difficult to measure and quantify,
which is crucial for public sector services. Accounting numbers as quantified,
financial aspects of performance are accepted as the main indicators of the
success of a government. It is considered to be “objective, unbiased and
accurate” (Funnell et al 2012, p164) however in contrast the reality is that the
reported accounting information reflects the interests and intentions of particular
groups such as the government, government agencies and aged care providers.
There is little evidence regarding the effects of population ageing on healthcare
costs, and consequently, the needs of individuals such as older Australians are
not accurately considered. The effects of such inaccurate decision making and
quantification of the elderly only in financial terms has enabled widespread
pessimism about population ageing. This attitude has become embedded in the
national aged care policy as a means to justify the reduction in expenditure to
sustain the aged care industry.

4.7 Cost Accounting - Accounting, Power and Reconfiguration of
Government
Funnell et al. (2012) refer to the meaning of costs as a “measurement of the effort”
(p170) of providing services which are measured in financial terms. As the
government is reliant on the new public management regime, the requirement for
accurate costing data is vital. Without accurate, timely and reliable costing data it
is difficult for the government to obtain important performance measures and to
make meaningful and confident decisions regarding the level of funding to be paid
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to the aged care sector.

In order for the government to continue to know and control their costs, they must
be informed of the costs which are constructed from various pieces of information
to meet the needs of decision makers within the government and other interested
parties. These costs are classified in a number of ways according to the purpose
for which the cost data will be used, e.g. an activity, or a department of the
program are referred to as cost objects which are then further divided into direct
and indirect costs (Funnell et al. 2012). Direct costs relate to expenditure that is
readily traceable and agreed to a particular cost object (e.g. labour costs
associated with providing aged care services); whilst indirect costs cannot be
specifically attributed to a particular program or department (e.g. unpaid carers’
costs for family members who remain in the home to look after their elderly
parents).

The three tier structure of the Australian aged care system where at the highest
tier of the structure the Commonwealth is responsible for policy development and
funding mechanisms. The Australian States are in the mid-tier and are
responsible for providing community care and residential aged care services. This
structure has led to difficulties in providing “appropriate and equitable” (Courtney
et al. 1997, p230) aged care services and persistent debate regarding the
direction of aged care policies and reforms. The third tier of this structure includes
the ‘for profit’ and ‘not for profit’ aged care service providers. The ‘for profit’ sector
is financed through subsidies received from the Commonwealth government,
which pays for the patients’ accommodation and other services. The majority of
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private aged care organisations “obtain a significant proportion of their income
(and therefore their profits)” (Courtney et al. 1997, p230), as payments from the
government and, ultimately, the taxpayer.
The ‘not for profit’ sector is generally owned and operated by “religious and
benevolent organisations and agencies” (Courtney et al. 1997, p230). The
principal objective of these organisations is the provision of care and services
rather than the “generation of profits for investors” (Courtney et al. 1997, p230).
These organisations also receive a significant proportion of funding from the
Commonwealth government; however, their focus is not to generate profits to
generate a return to investors. Refer to Table 4.5 which shows the amount of
subsidies paid by the government and received by aged care service providers
during 2007-2012. The aged care industry data shows the costs to provide
community and residential care services has increased each year between 2007
and 2012. Thus, the average annual growth in expenditure and subsidies paid by
the government to support the industry is 10.2% (KPMG 2013).

Table 4.5 Government Expenditure on Aged Care 2007-2012
2007-2008

2008-2009

2009-2010

2010-2011

2011-2012

$(mil)

$(mil)

$(mil)

$(mil)

$(mil)

647

736

814

897

1,058

Residential Care

6,003

6,474

7,097

7,954

8,738

Total

6,650

7,210

7,911

8,851

9,797

Community Care
Packages

(KPMG 2013)
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The Australian government’s policy makers are increasingly apprehensive
regarding the increasing “long term public cost of social expenditure” (Coombs &
Dollery 2004, p460) on social services including aged care, health and social
security. Coombs & Dollery (2004) suggest that in the last twenty years there has
been an increase in the number of social welfare programs and the funding
allocated to them as the structure of government expenditure is moving away
from general public expenditure (such as physical infrastructure) to social
services expenditure (such as the Age Pension). Simultaneously there is a rise in
expenditure on social services and declining financial dependency which has
“masked the degree of exposure” (Coombs & Dollery 2004, p460) of governments
to the long term financial impacts of the ageing population on demographic
change. As a result, the government has increasing concerns about the alleged
growing disparity that exists between the expenditure of public funds on older
people in comparison to younger people.

In order to make effective decisions, plan, control and implement effective
programs the government requires details such as the nature and magnitude of
costs incurred during the course of the provision of aged care services (Funnell
et al. 2012). The measures of efficiency and costs of inputs required are
dependent upon accurate costings. Prior to the adoption of the new public
management system, the traditional public sector ethos was to concentrate on
expenditure limits (Funnell et al. 2012). This is in contrast to the accounting
principles of the private sector, where its level of costs must be tailored to their
budgeted expected revenues generated. Further, the government has the ability
to influence the amount of revenues it derives in order to cover its costs by
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agreeing on the types of services that it will subsidise (such as aged care
services) and will then determine the taxation levels in order to achieve its
legislated obligations. Such data also enables the government to assess whether
the continuing need to provide funding to aged care is required (hence the shift
to increasingly rely on the user pays approach). Additionally, the important factor
is that government’s income sources are not unlimited and must also be “carefully
managed” (Funnell et al. 2012, p169) in order to demonstrate sound financial
management; and for political reasons to avoid excessive taxation which
increases the risk of isolating the government’s voting supporters.

4.8 Emphasis on Cost Accounting in the Health Care Sector
Preston (1992) notes that the cost based system in the health care industry
provides incentives for hospitals and doctors to increase their costs rather than
to decrease them. Institutions which reduce their costs subsequently suffer a
reduction in their income as past costs affect future reimbursements or subsidies
provided by the government. Therefore, the greater the costs to provide aged
care services, then the greater the subsidies received from the government by
the aged care service providers. As such, aged care service providers are
encouraged to solve their financing problems by maximising their subsidies
instead of minimising their costs. This may be a solution for an aged care
provider. However, it creates a “problem for society” (Preston 1992, p88). As the
government is increasingly facing financial constraints, it is managing its costs in
the same manner as the private sector with greater scrutiny of their costs and
planned expenditure. To the government’s advantage, it now relies on the
“sophisticated and reliable” (Funnell et al. 2012, p170) accounting information
which is capable of supplying and assisting the government in its planning and
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decision making.
Russell (2016a) emphasises that during the last ten years, the number of privately
owned aged care homes has doubled in comparison to aged care homes
operating in the not for profit sector. The publicly listed companies (such as
BUPA, Estia, Japara and Regius) are the fastest growing owners of aged care
facilities and also receive considerable government subsidies (Russell 2016b). In
the 2015 financial year, Estia received an increase of 10.9 per cent in government
subsidies for the provision of aged care services (Russell 2016b). Further,
approximately 70 to 80 per cent of aged care providers’ revenue is derived
through government subsidies via the programme of ACFI (Aged Care Funding
Instrument) (Mirus Australia 2016). This could mean tens of millions of dollars per
year for large aged care providers and millions of dollars per year for smaller aged
care providers (iCare Health 2013).
Although the government’s aged care reforms and changes to the Aged Care
Funding Instrument (“ACFI”) since 1 July 2012 were designed as budget cuts to
save the government $1.2 billion in subsidies paid to aged care providers, this is
in contrast to the providers of aged care homes who are lobbying for decreases
in regulation and increases in government subsidies (Russell 2016a).

The

difficulty with the government subsidies is that they “serve the interests” (Russell
2016a, p12) of the providers rather than the interests and needs of the residents.
The higher the level of care required by the resident, the higher the subsidies paid
by the government. Thus residents who enter a facility and immediately require
higher levels of care; or in the initial stages of entry require lower levels of care
and are subsequently reclassified as requiring higher levels of care, resulting in
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the provider receiving higher income from the government. The consequence is
that staffing levels rarely increase; nor are extra services provided and care
quality improvements aren’t provided to the residents. These consequences arise
as the providers of care services continue to provide the same levels and care
services and retain the additional funding which ought to be spent on providing
higher levels of care (Russell 2016a).
During the 2020 Royal Commission into residential aged care identified that there
are a number of improvements that are required to be made in relation to staffing
levels and quality of care provided. The recommendations included the
requirement for a minimum ration of care staff to residents; along with 186 to 265
minutes of case-mixed care per resident per day from nurses and personal care
workers; and daily minimum registered nurse and allied health care time per
resident (Australian Ageing Agenda 2020). The proposed improvements to the
system will enable the provision of quality care services and additional care where
required and will address the community’s expectations. The challenge in
addressing this proposal is providing the level of funding required as the present
system of aged care funding is insufficient to provide the level of care that people
expect.
In 2011-2012 there were 1,054 residential aged care providers and the majority
of providers were not for profit organisations. In contrast, for profit providers
generated the greatest profits before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation
(“EBITDA”), per resident per annum in comparison to not for profit and
government operated homes (KPMG 2013). Despite the increase in costs and
funding to the aged care industry, growth in EBITDA has been inconsistent
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between for-profit and not-for-profit organisations.
The introduction of the new Aged Care Funding Instrument in 2008 (which
replaced the former Resident Classification Scale) improved EBITDA where
average annual EBITDA growth per resident was 4% in 2006-2007 which
increased to 28.9% between 2008-2012. Despite for-profit providers having the
lowest occupancy rates throughout this period, 62.1% of for profit providers
achieved the greatest EBITDA growth. The for profit organisations are also
generating more cash and trade than not for profit and government owned
providers as they are charging higher accommodation bonds to residents in
comparison to not for profit and government owned facilities despite the not for
profit organisations owning more than double the amount of facilities compared
to for profit organisations (KPMG 2013). Refer to aged care industry data in Table
4.6 which provides a composition of aged care industry data. This suggests that
there is an inefficient and ineffective use of taxpayer funds which ought to be
expended on the recipients of aged care services and to improve standards of
care.
Table 4.6 Aged Care Industry Data by Ownership Type 2011-2012
Not for

For Profit

profit

Government

All Providers

Owned

No. of providers

552

392

110

1,054

No. of facilities

1,623

811

282

2,716

EBITDA per resident

$8,176

$13,121

-$1,508

$9,274

$185,581

$233,032

$144,575

$201,182

Average Bond Per
Resident
(KPMG 2013)
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The purpose of the aged care reforms is to increase competition and to operate
in a “consumer driven, market based system” (Department of Health 2016c).
However the aged care services model continues to be driven by the negative
“terminal decline model” (Keast 2016) which focuses on profiteering of the
deterioration of the elderly as providers received additional subsidies when the
residents’ health declines; to the “restorative approach” (Keast 2016) which
encourages long term rehabilitation through services such as physiotherapy,
strength training along with greater quality of social care such as lifestyle
programmes to improve the residents’ quality of life (Keast 2016; Russell 2016a).
However, there is no financial incentive for providers to improve or sustain the
quality and wellbeing of the lives of the elderly and are instead rewarded for
“promoting dependency” (Russell 2016a).
Further, the current aged care system enables providers to perform their own
assessments of new and existing residents to determine the level of government
subsidies that they require. In addition, many providers employ staff solely to
complete the ACFI paperwork and to “generate income” (Russell 2016a, p12) for
the providers rather than to provide quality aged care services. Further, other
providers engage the services of Aged Care Consultants who promote
themselves as specialists in the industry who can help to maximise the subsidies
received to fund the aged care homes (Russell 2016a). This is advocated by
organisations such as Mirus Australia (2016) and iCare Health (2013) advocate
as being able, and encourage aged care providers, to review and optimise the
level of subsidies received to correct and improve the levels of funding that they
receive.
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iCare Health (2013) suggests that since the aged care reforms have been
gradually introduced, the purpose of the reforms was also to reduce the
documentation and administration required when requesting funding via
government subsidies. It also emphasises that staff of aged care providers are
under increased pressure to improve their record keeping and maintenance for
the purpose of providing sufficient evidence when making funding claims as any
inefficiencies in their record keeping could impact on their funding entitlements
and ultimately “the bottom line” (iCare Health 2013). As a consequence, their time
to provide quality of care and quality of life to residents has declined. Further, the
increased controls by the government on residential aged care places and prices
have resulted in little incentives for aged care service providers to be innovative
and improve services to a standard that is above the required minimum legislated
standards (O’Keefe 2016). Some aged care service providers offer an increased
variety of premium services and products. However, this has resulted in confusion
as older Australians are struggling to understand the “concept of choice” (O’Keefe
2016) and the requirement to pay for additional services.
These changes have also enabled cost shifting to occur. Cost shifting occurs
between the Commonwealth and other levels of government and between states;
however cost shifting is less transparent between generations partly due to the
budgetary “illusion” (Coombs & Dollery 2004, p465) which is derived from the
complexities and uncertainty of the financial impact of the growing aged care
industry. The aim of cost shifting is to improve social relations and the
configuration of interaction between institutions within the aged care sector and
to improve the distribution of economic capital. However as the traditional budget
balance and current policy does not impact on the distant future there is the
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incentive for the governments to “cost shift” (Coombs & Dollery 2004, p464) from
the current to future generations without fully disclosing the cost impacts on the
public expenditure which is a means of gaining social acceptance of the
government’s future initiatives. The current government benefits from the strategy
of cost shifting from current generations as it is aware that it cannot be held
accountable for future consequences.

4.9 Assessed Income and Assets when entering an Aged Care
Facility
From 1 July 2014, those entering into an aged care home for the first time and
who require government assistance with their accommodation costs and care
services will need to have their income and assets assessed. This assessment
is used to determine the costs that the older Australian is required to pay and the
amount of government assistance that will be received to cover accommodation
and care costs (My Aged Care 2016b). Income that is assessed includes: income
support payments from the Government such as the Age Pension and Service
Pension; deemed income from investments; net income from rental property and
businesses including farms; superannuation and overseas pensions; family trust
distributions and dividends from ownership in private companies; and deemed
income from excess gifting (My Aged Care 2016b). Prior to 1 January 2016, if the
former home was rented out, the rental income was excluded from the assessed
income test (My Aged Care 2016b). However, this is now included as another
type of income.
Assets that are assessed include: cash, bank accounts, financial investments,
special collections, foreign investments, superannuation balances, refundable
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deposits paid for accommodation in an aged care home. The former home is now
included in the assets test if the partner or a dependent child does not live there
(or a carer or close relative). Otherwise, as at 20 September 2016, the value of
the home is included at the lower of the net market value or the limited value of
$159,631.20 (My Aged Care 2016b). These outcomes show how the
government’s intention of saving and improving its budget is affected by shifting
the costs to users of aged care services.
Accounting as a social construction shows that such items as cannot be valued
or measured are ignored which reinforces the dominant ideology of the
relationship between accounting and economic efficiency as the ability to deliver
outcomes to society that people purportedly value. The manner in which the
government calculates the costs may be “fundamentally flawed” (Smark 2006a,
p343) due to the many aged care costs which are hidden by accounting (as noted
above) and do not directly impact on the federal government’s budget which could
result in poor funding and policy making decisions.

4.10 Accounting and the Construction of the Costless Elderly
Accounting records are kept, which show the cost and profit of the aged care
industry, the costs to sustain each elderly person and the profitability of the
providers of aged care services (refer to Tables 4.5 and 4.6 which the costs and
profits of aged care services providers). These phenomena are abstract concepts
which are developed by the “human intellect” (Hopwood 1990, p9) and are
shaped by the economic, political and social influences. Although these
accounting records are not always visible, they are a tool for social “observation,
monitoring and control” (Hopwood 1990, p9). The accounting technique is
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adopted as a technology of governance (Neu 2006) in which accounting and
other numerical techniques enable authorities to “shape, normalise and
instrumentalise the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations” (Miller & Rose
1990, p8) of society in order to achieve the desired objectives of authorities such
as the federal government.
The traditional accounting language such as cost, profit, contributions, expenses
and return on investment creates a “structure of meanings” (Roberts & Scapens
1985, p448), which enables members of the government to interpret and translate
these meanings into policies which orient future actions. Further, accounting
practice reinforces the rights of society to hold the government accountable for
their actions. Accounting practice involves communicating values, behavioural
expectations, results that are desired or unfavourable as well as what ought to
happen and how to grasp an understanding of what has happened (Roberts &
Scapens 1985). The parliamentary budget is an ideal example which highlights
what has happened and is evaluated in terms of how effectively government
agencies use resources and how effectively agencies discharge government
initiatives. It also assists in the development of future expectations such as
priorities with respect to resource allocation and income distribution objectives
(Australian Parliament House 2018). The use of accounting reports such as
budgets also sustains the notion that the government, as the creator of the federal
budget, is responsible, therefore accountable to the public in relation to the aged
care industry.
It enables the knowledge of the aged care service providers to be mobilised and
utilised by the government as central to its calculations in determining shifting
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responsibilities from the government to the public. Governing by numbers
enables the shift in politics where control is passed to other professional groups
rather than maintained by the same elites. Mennicken et al. (2008) suggest that
numbers and calculations are not simply solutions to accountability problems and
can create transparency difficulties.
Further, the use of accounting information enables the shift of traditional public
services into enterprises which adopt the language of market forces; supports
competitive practices and pressures; heightens the focus on efficiencies and
profitable sectors (Hopwood 1990). The prices of the provision of aged care
services are related to the costs of providing these services. The costs are then
related to the quality and quantity of the provision of aged care services and
sourcing the appropriate quality of staff from the labour market to provide these
services. The quality of the services provided is also influenced by consumer
demand. However, through the use of market based (rather than cost based)
prices, this enables more competitive pressures on decision making by the
governments and aged care service providers and the assessment of overall
provision of aged care services. Through the reconfiguration of the aged care
system and the impact of accounting changes, the traditional public based aged
care system is shifted to a market oriented system.
Thus the accounting calculus is explicitly recognised as an “instrument of
domination” (Roberts & Scapens 1985, p449) as it enables the government to
define what has occurred with the public’s resources and who is responsible (or
accountable). When the government provides the public and taxpayers with
information explaining what has occurred with the public’s resources, it leads
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them to understand that efficiencies are required by reducing expenditure in the
aged care industry. This leads the public and taxpayers to the misbelief that as
they are voters they have the power to make a positive change by electing to gain
efficiencies within the aged care system. Instead, the voters’ support enables the
government to increase its power and control over public resources and the
manner in which it is used. As a consequence, this creates an increasing division
between public activities (e.g. health and aged care, education) and the level of
public resources allocated to the activities.
The Australian public has the right to understand the long term financial
implications of current policies which can be achieved through transparent
processes and the publication of measures which are readily comprehensible
(Coombs & Dollery 2004). Further, the market forces are also driven by the
“rationality of costings” (Hopwood 1990, p14) which is enhanced by the need for
an economic understanding of its impact. Hence a relationship exists between
accounting, and the economists’ (or the federal Treasury’s) claims that it must
know how this information impacts on the functioning of society and how it assists
in its decision making to allegedly improve society. Accounting and economic
calculations are the links to the impersonal objectification and quantification of
people and items rather than the application of subjective judgement; and
enables comparability of costings (Mennicken et al. 2008; Porter 1995; Miller &
Power 1995). It is this impersonal and objective process which enhances the
credibility of numbers and becomes a powerful political resource where the
political process of negotiations and desired outcomes occur (Mennicken et al.
2008; Porter 1995; Miller & Power 1995).
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4.11 Accounting’s Short Term Calculus as a Long Term Panacea?
The current problem is that the government’s decisions are focused on enhancing
its political utility by achieving short term goals rather than aiming to address
persistent social injustices. The government employs politicians, accountants and
managers to calculate and determine solutions to relieve growing financial
pressures with the proclaimed aim to “protect the most vulnerable members of
the community” (Ball & Seal 2005, p455). The use of social accounting
thoughtfully includes information that concerns stakeholders, their views and
preferences. It is an emancipatory form of governance which facilitates and
enhances transparency, dialogue and ultimately social change (Gray 1992).
The discursive nature of the economic calculation highlights the nature of the
“politics of quantification” (Mennicken et al. 2008, p5) and the significance of
numbers in public life. The ability to use accounting as a means of social control
highlights its role as the link between accounting, accountability and the power of
the elite and experts (Mennicken et al. 2008; Fligstein 1998; Porter 1995).
Reliance on these accounts ought to be treated as an image rather than a reality
(Roberts & Scapens 1985) as it is a reality that is distorted. An image is taken at
a particular point in time and from various angles, lenses and focuses. It may be
a significant image however, it also excludes other significant elements which
may not be visible in the image. The categories and format contained in the
government’s accounts and budgets reflect the interests and concerns of the
government and are not necessarily a true reflection of society’s concerns and
needs. Thus the information recorded in these accounts may misrepresent the
true reality and events and actions needed in order to ensure equitable actions
are undertaken. Accounting and the accounting profession are significant
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influencers on society as their reporting decisions and methods can reflect social
decisions and impacts which in turn influence society; and finally can influence
society when policy changes are required (Lehman 1995; Hopwood 1984).
Accounting plays a significant social role however, social developments and
changing social values also impact how accounting it utilised in thought and
practice (Walker 2016). It functions as a key protagonist in areas such as:
technology in the construction of social relationships; organisational and social
control; the establishment of social identities; and the consolidation of social
structures (Walker 2016; Morgan & Wilmott 1993). It is a component of an active
programme of social control imposed by the powerful government in the form of
a downward approach. The downward approach is imparted through the
development of a new social policy which is the revised aged care policies as part
of a suite of a new range of processes, means testing, user fees and subsidies
arrangements.
In contrast, accounting may contribute towards “democratic deliberation” (Neu
2006, p412) it may also prevent the construction of a united public interest by
“shattering” (Neu 2006, p412) the public into various isolated interest groups with
competing ideologies. Hence the dissolution of the public interest may be a victim
of the politics of numbers (Neu 2006). Further, it induces a more standardised
process of accountability and replaces interpersonal relationships, which
consequently stifle public life and political judgement rather than enhancing it
(Mennicken et al. 2008). This is evident in the government’s contention that there
is slow growth in the working population to enable it to generate sufficient
revenues to pay for increasing public costs of the aged in health and welfare
services. Thus the government’s increased attention is focused on how it can
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respond to providing funding for future public care to older people. In addition,
due to the growing elderly population and the increasing demands on aged care
services, there is growing fear of a burgeoning health budget.
The subjects which become objects of economic calculation through the formerly
standardised notion of accounting become governable where each type of
calculation creates certain visibilities and unique possibilities of intervention while
concealing others. Issues such as the ageing population are disclosed and made
transparent after being subject to particular forms of calculation renders other
social issues as “invisible and unaccountable” (Mennicken et al. 2008, p5).
Accounting is involved in the redistribution of accountability and redefines the
type of governance in “intended and unintended ways” (Mennicken et al. 2008,
p5) and challenges the true meaning of aged care services through its increasing
authority and instruction.
Finally, the use of the accounting language deployed by the government to paint
a terrifying picture supports the broader national interest. This includes the
announcement of the retirement of the Baby Boomer population, which will
require staggering tax increases or immense budget deficits. Consequently, this
is also projected to result in the required budgetary cuts to other social services.
Use of this language resulted in reducing the Age Pension entitlements in 2014
and the increase in means testing arrangements for recipients of aged care
services from 2012. However, as this chapter highlights, this form of “self-serving
rhetoric” (Butler 2015, p4) presents a misleading picture to the Australian public
regarding the nation’s economic future. Further, the growing use of accounting
as a control mechanism in the public and public services sector complements the
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new public management philosophy which borrows the private sector discipline
of the well-established accounting mechanism (Smark 2006c).

4.12 Accounting’s Role to Account for Direct Costs and Ignore
Indirect Costs
Numerous alternative community arrangements for managing the ageing related
health issues have been explored over the past twenty five years. There is now
a further change in direction from the radical shift in funding away from residential
care in aged care facilities to increased funding in community aged care
packages to maintain older people in their homes for longer (Courtney et al.
1997). However, the largely ignored consequence is that the form of care relies
heavily on the majority of unpaid work of family carers, which are mainly female
relatives (along with partners, family, friends and neighbours, and is considered
to be a less expensive approach to institutional care (Productivity Commission
2010a; Courtney et al. 1997). Informal care includes assistance with
“communication; paperwork; mobility; cognitive or emotional tasks and transport”
(Productivity Commission 2010a, p10). Such types of assistance come at a cost
to the community as the value of unpaid care was estimated to be worth
approximately $40 billion in 2010 (CEPAR 2014; Access Economics 2010) which
represents a significant saving to the federal government.
While in 2015, the average hours spent on informal care was approximately 13
hours per week and is estimated to cost approximately $60.3 billion (Carers
Australia 2015). Additional social impacts are that carers work less and are more
likely to live in poverty as they earn lower incomes and are more likely to suffer
mental health issues. This is a significant indirect cost as approximately 83 per
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cent of older Australians received assistance from informal carers in 2003
(Productivity Commission 2010a) and is expected to continue to grow with the
growing elderly demographic.
Although the Australian Government offers financial assistance to carers, it is
minimal and includes a Carer Allowance (which is approximately 15 per cent of
the Age Pension and covers some of the caring costs). Some are also eligible for
the Carer Payment, which is means and work tested. However, if the carer
studies, volunteers, or works more than 25 hours per week, there is a greater risk
that the carer payment may be cancelled (Carers Australia 2013). Care needs
continue to increase, and resources to provide aged care services are shrinking.
Additional pressures facing the aged care sector in Australia include a shrinking
workforce; economic challenges; increasing levels of dementia and demands for
dementia related care services; and caring for families and communities (O’Keefe
2016). The social consequence is that families are becoming fragmented as
families traditionally performed the caring role and may no longer be able to
provide such care (O’Keefe 2016).
Ultimately the ignored social consequences of these supplements create
disincentives to work and monetise family relations (CEPAR 2014). The direct
costs are given a “voice” (Smark 2006a, p343) through the accounting calculus
which heightens the government’s power to consider the quantifiable social costs
in its policy making process whilst indirect costs are not appropriately inscribed
and are essentially “muted” (Smark 2006c, p343).
Therefore, activities undertaken such as volunteering and informal caring are not
given a dollar value by the government and are excluded from the calculation of
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the alleged financial impact of the older population on the working age cohort.
Instead, when older Australians approach the stage of declining health and
increased dependence, the costs of ageing substantially increase; while their
contribution to society decrease. These costs are communicated by the
government as a future financial burden; however it fails to consider the vast
differences in the contribution by Australians in the earlier stages of their
retirement. This shows that by inscribing some costs whilst ignoring others (such
as informal care), accounting affords the opportunity to quantify direct costs whilst
informal costs remain visible. Further, the use of more stringent means tests by
incorporating assets enables the visibility of revenue and assets held by the
elderly. This enables the government the power to reduce the subsidies it pays
and further penalises the older Australian for being hard working and good
savers.

4.13 Conclusion
In this chapter, the aged care reforms show the extent to which the Australian
government has reduced the visibility field as it is reinforcing the corporate and
private view of the funding and provision of aged care services. Accounting has
succeeded in positioning itself in a central role in debates regarding “economic
efficiency and capitalist rationality” (Morgan & Wilmott 1993, p16) as the use of
traditional accounting principles such as income, expenses and empirical data
enables the government to calculate budgetary deficits and declare a future
budgetary crisis. The government has adopted new public management
principles of rational planning and efficiencies while its traditional doctrine of
distributive fairness, intergenerational equity and justice are no longer the prime
social focus.
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A literature review is performed in Chapter 5 and explores how the Australian
government has increasingly adopted private sector practices in the aged care
industry. The ideologies of shifting from effectiveness to efficiency and
rationalism are based on the models used in the aged care industry in the United
Kingdom. The purpose of this literature review is to examine the consequences
to the public sectors who adopt private market sector principles. Further, this
chapter demonstrates that there are knowledge gaps in the existing literature as
there has been focus on the adoption of private market practices in other
government sectors such as the health and medical sectors (and little in relation
to aged care). Additionally, regulatory space theory will also be described as it
will be used as a lens to address the research question.
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Chapter 5 Literature Review

The WHO asserts that a right to health is a fundamental right of every
human being “without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic
or social condition” (World Health Organization 2014, p7).

5.1 Introduction
This chapter consists of a literature review to explore how the demographic
change in the Australian population and rapidly rising ‘number of age and lifestyle
related chronic health problems’ in which Courtney et al. (1997, p231) has
highlighted the issue that the Australian health care system is increasingly
“difficult to control, organise and finance”. Further, concerns have been raised by
community groups and health consumer groups regarding equitable access to
the services, as well as the accountability of the aged care service providers
(Courtney et al. 1997).
In order to address the research question, and to explore how and to what extent
the Australian government is transferring its accountability to aged care providers
and Australian citizens, this topic will be explored through the lens of regulatory
space theory. This analysis will be incorporated to demonstrate which actors have
entered the regulatory space of the development of political issues, particularly
the development of the Australian aged care policy and how (or whether) they
have influenced this process and the production of the Living Longer, Living
Better Reforms in Australia.
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5.2 Knowledge Gaps in the Existing Literature
The purpose of this literature review is to emphasise the little existing literature in
relation to the accounting practice, accountability and new public management in
the aged care sector. There is a wealth of literature regarding the concepts of
accountability, new public management and privatisation or adoption of private
services in public industries in Australia such as the primary health care and
public hospital systems and the prison industry. Healy’s (2002) paper is the only
known accounting based article which briefly comments on accountability in the
aged care sector. However, its main focus is to review the changes to the
structure of the aged care systems in Australia and the UK.
Articles such as those written by Hughes (2011) and Howe (2008; 1998; 1997)
discuss the current aged care system and describe the proposed changes to the
aged care sector. The literature described above fail to discuss the concepts of
accounting, accountability, and how private sector services are increasingly
utilised to solve social problems. Additionally, whilst there is existing literature
regarding policy making and regulatory space theory, Andrew (2010) notes that
little accounting research exists regarding which stakeholders are involved (and
not involved); and how accounting information has been utilised to influence aged
care policy decision making.
Moreover, the gap in the existing literature is important to explore as the changes
to the aged care sector has been explored in the areas such as the decline in
quality of aged care and health services through an economic perspective rather
than a human perspective. As such it is important to explore this issue through
the accounting perspective as accounting as a calculus continues to be relied
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upon in the role of justifying the shift in accountability from the government to the
elderly citizens. It is used as a means of legitimising its decision to increase
efficiencies and reducing expenditure on an ageing population, and it is expected
that this will escalate as the elderly population grows. Firstly this chapter will
perform a review of Healy’s (2002) article to demonstrate how Australia has
shifted its aged care policy and will compare this to the policy adopted in the
United Kingdom. It will also explore the impact of shifting the aged care policy
from the use of central planning to the market model policy.

5.3 Adopting Private Sector Practices
Health care systems in relation to the aged care sector in developed countries
have radically changed. Australia is gradually shifting its aged care policies since
the late 1990s to the direction from a central planning model to a market based
model (refer to Figure 5.1 below). The table is explained in further detail below
and provides a comparison between the Australian and United Kingdom
strategies to demonstrate how its accountability is shifting to the communities and
its felt impact.

5.4 The Central Planning Model
Prior to 2011, under the central planning model, the Australian national
government was responsible for the “command and control” (Healy 2002, p6) of
the aged care program. Historically this was the favoured method to use as it
enabled the Australian government to restrict the growth of places in nursing
homes. This included capping institutional places; promoting institutional care
substitutes and caps on subsidies; allocating tied funds and regulating aged care
standards. This is in contrast to the United Kingdom, which preferred market like
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model strategies.
Figure 5.1: Typology of Policy Strategies: Australia and the United Kingdom
Policy models

Policy strategies - Australia

Policy strategies - United Kingdom

Market Model
Subsidise fees
Supply (Partially utilised by Australia and Increase community funds
fully utilised by the UK) concepts:

Subsidise fees
Increase in aged care funds
Privatise
Purchaser/provider split

Demand (Australia is moving towards
this model) concepts:

Charge users

Charge users

Supply concepts:

Cap institutional places
Cap subsidies
Tie funds
Substitution
Regulate nursing homes

Substitution

Demand concepts:

National eligibility criteria
Assess each applicant

Local eligibility criteria
Assess each applicant

Planning Model (formerly utilised by
both nations)

Source: Adapted from Healy (2002, p6)

The predominant and most effective method used by the Australian government
was to cap (or place a ceiling) on the number of nursing home beds. In 1986, a
cap was placed on 40 nursing home beds and 60 hostel beds per 1,000 people
aged 70 years and over. This meant that there was a reduction in the number of
people entering nursing home care and an increase in the number of people living
in hostels. Based on this, there was a reduction in subsidies paid for the more
costly nursing home care due to the introduction of the government’s favoured,
and less costly, hostel residency approach. This nursing home level was achieved
in 2011 due to a freeze on approvals for an increase in nursing home places while
the older population grew (Healy 2002). Subsidies were continued to be funded
by the Australian government during the 1980s, and these were based upon the
low and high dependency levels of the resident. The subsidy covered two
components: the living costs such as laundry and food; whilst the second
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component related to personal and nursing care which was according to the level
of the resident’s dependency. This distinction is important, as it now relates to the
“user pays” policy (which was introduced in 1997 in Australia), which now requires
the resident to pay for their living expenses; and also contributing towards some
of their care costs (Healy 2002).

Market theorists perceive that this planning model policy resulted in an inefficient
and unresponsive system causing market failures and inequitable distribution of
wealth (Fine & Chalmers 2000; Healy 2002). This is also a consequence felt by
the United Kingdom government as regulation responsibility is divided between
the local health authorities and social service departments. The demise of the
government’s central planning policy and devolution and privatisation of the
industry means that the government’s price is the loss of control of this industry.
In order to determine the amount of subsidies required for each individual, case
assessments are required to determine eligibility for subsidies, and allocating
appropriate services to the level of care they need. The aim of this process in
both Australia and the United Kingdom is to control the growth of institutional care
and divert more people to community support which also restricts the amount of
funding to subsidise each individual. The planning model was formerly utilised by
both nations, and the market model is now utilised by the United Kingdom, whilst
the Australian government is also rapidly moving towards this approach.

5.5 The Market Model
The market model approach insists that public sector agencies behave in a more
“business like way” (Healy 2002, p7), and to charge for goods and services. It
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includes the adoption of private market practices with a heightened focus on
resource management and searching for less costly ways to provide public
services; increased competition between organisations; and the shift in focus on
measuring outputs of an organising which focus on financial outputs (the
efficiency of services provided), rather than the impacts of outputs and
achievement of goals (the effectiveness of services).22 Under the planning model,
institutional places and subsidies are capped. However, under the market model,
the policy is to uncap subsidies as the intention is to transfer the long term care
of people out of hospitals and into nursing homes or community care. The
consequence of this policy for Australia and the United Kingdom was a sharp rise
in expenditure on aged care services by 70% and 60% in both countries
respectively between the 1980s to the early 2000s. The subsequent increase in
expenditure on aged care services required a shift in the manner that this industry
was funded. Since the 2000’s the aged care policy in both nations has now shifted
the “balance of care” (Healy 2002, p7) from institutions to community care with
the intention for the elderly to maintain independence in their own homes. The
Australian government aimed to increase aged care funding to meet the needs of
the growing elderly population but reduce the reliance on institutional care (which
is still subsidised), and to increase the role of community services. In contrast, in
the United Kingdom the subsidies are provided by local social services
authorities. They also decide whether the individual requires institutional or
community care, and are expected to choose the most appropriate and least
expensive care package. However, the problem with this method is that the
number of nursing homes has grown due to the increase in the elderly population

22

Refer to Chapter 3 for further discussion on the market model and new public management.
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and local authorities have their own financial incentive to keep their institutions
full. In addition, older home owners could sell their homes to pay for their
institutional fees and was less costly than the community services package.
Social service departments also gave priority to the most needy, which were the
elderly who required high levels of care and institutional care (Healy 2002). Hence
by incorporating the market model approach to local authorities contributed
towards the increase in costs of institutional care and increase in number of
places in institutional care.

Privatisation refers to the transfer of services from government to the private
sector, along with the introduction of market practices. The Australian government
has split the purchase and provision of aged care where the Commonwealth
government is a funder and not a provider of these services. The State
governments provide some institutional care, and the voluntary (“not for profit”)
and private (“for profit”) organisations in most States are the majority providers of
institutional and community care services. However, the government has further
tightened purchasing of these services through service contracts which is in line
with the adoption of market practices introduced into the public sector following
the adoption of the new public management principles in the 2000s.
Consequently, the Australian national government has privatised some aged care
(approximately 36%, refer to Chapter 4 for further discussion) to “for profit”
organisations. However, the majority of services provided are still by “not for
profit” organisations. The United Kingdom privatised this sector in the 1990s,
which resulted in more than 75% of nursing home beds being owned by the
private “for profit” organisations (Healy 2002). There is an increased risk with the
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reduction of government control as the United Kingdom is vulnerable to the
private sector lobby group pressures including the withdrawal of the private sector
from institutional care if the industry ceases to be profitable. This risk is also faced
in Australia if the government shifts its position and allows further privatisation of
the industry under the market model.

The question of who should pay for aged care continues to be a debated question.
Both Australia and the United Kingdom have introduced and increased copayments for aged care. This means that older people tend to be asset rich and
income poor, and are required to sell or mortgage their family home to pay for
these costs (Healy 2002)23. Both countries have now shifted the responsibility for
aged care funding to individuals above asset and income levels (which now
includes their family home), which requires them to contribute towards their
residential and community care fees. The governments benefit from this approach
as they are able to raise additional revenues by reducing their subsidies paid
whilst collecting additional fees from the elderly. Since the LLLB reforms in 2012,
the Australian government has adopted the demand side market model approach
by increasing fees charged to the elderly. It is anticipated that this will decrease
demand for institutional care and increasing community care, with the expectation
that this will reduce expenditure in this sector.
The main aged care strategy is to aim to substitute more expensive care with less
expensive care in order to reduce expenditure and increase revenues. Both the
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Older Australians are considered to be asset rich as it includes the superannuation balance they own upon
commencement of retirement. This is due to the Australian government’s compulsory superannuation system which
helps Australians enhance their retirement incomes and decreases their reliance on the Age Pension. Employers are
currently required to make contributions of 9.5% of the employees’ salary to a superannuation fund which assists the
employee to save for retirement. This contribution rate will increase to 12% in stages between 1 July 2021 and 30 June
2026 (The Treasury 2015).
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Australian and United Kingdom governments’ aims are to substitute institutional
and medical forms of aged care with less costly community based and less
intensive care. The impact of this strategy are the following shifts: moving from
hospital to nursing home care; nursing home to hostel and residential care;
institutional to community care; health to social care; from more to less expensive
hospital staff to carers; from carers to technological aids (such as personal
alarms); and from the state to the family. The further implication is that, as a result
of the LLLB reforms in 2012 (noted in Chapter 2), older people are expected to
contribute more towards the costs of their care and are subject to more stringent
means tests to determine whether the government can reduce the subsidies
payable per resident (or person requiring home care) as the main aim of this
strategy is to enhance efficiencies and reduce costs. Finally, as described above,
the constant movement in accountability has resulted in placing the responsibility
of the wellbeing of the elderly from the state to the family, saving the government
substantial amounts of taxpayers’ funding.

5.6 The Shift from Effectiveness to Efficiency and Rationalism
As described in Chapter 3, the government falls under the public accountability
banner. In particular, the financial accountability aspect is imposed on
government agencies. The government’s goals are to eliminate waste and to
utilise resources wisely (efficiency and economy). However, society’s ultimate
goals are to meet common needs, including service quality and service
availability, with less emphasis on efficiency. Hence policy effectiveness ought to
be the highest level of accountability as it is concerned with whether the
government’s goals have been achieved (Funnell & Cooper 1998). Hood (1991)
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argues that the accounting practice is a key element in this new concept of
accountability and new public management where activities need to be “more
closely costed and evaluated by accounting techniques” (p94). This idea is
couched in the language of economic rationalism where accounting is utilised as
a form of social power entrenched in the public policy making process (Boyce
1999; Hood 1995; Hood 1991). This in line with the significant reforms to the
Australian public sector accounting which occurred between 1998 to 2000 and
represented the replacement of the cash basis of accounting with the accruals
basis of accounting (Davis 2016). The accruals system of accounting in Australia
incorporates accrual budgeting; accrual management systems and financial
reporting; and whole of government reporting (Davis 2016; Funnell & Cooper
1998). However, the conventional perception of accounting is that it represents a
neutral, objective financial and economic reality, exclusively in a numerical and
dollar based manner. For the government’s purpose, financial accounting has
been limited to involving the identification, measurement (or calculation) and
communication of economic information which has been characterised by the
denomination of Australian citizens in numerical and monetary amounts (Boyce
1999). This limited form of accounting is artificially constrained as it fails to
consider that accounting ought to be a broader human practice and could include
more meaningful conceptions of the world to be accounted for (Boyce 1999;
Arrington & Francis 1993). It also fails to consider social accounting which
involves the communication of information concerning the impact of the
government and its activities on society which are not quantifiable in numerical or
monetary terms (Boyce 1999).
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Based on the transition to the market model 24 in the aged care sector the
government is incorporating elements of new public management with a
heightened focus on quantification of elderly citizens as a rational method of
financial management to achieve government’s social goals. Decisions made are
based on costs rather than on the benefits where access to services should be
based on need instead of becoming a service to citizens who can most afford it.
Both Australian Liberal and Labor led governments have continued to develop
and implement casemix funding as it is a beneficial funding mechanism for the
provision of services and treatment rather than focusing on health outcomes
(Courtney et al. 1997). Its two objectives are to promote and reward efficiency
and to ensure that standards are achieved to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the aged care policy (Courtney et al. 1997). Hence aged care services are funded
on the basis of how the services perform and the outcomes that they produce. It
establishes a system of measuring the efficiency of delivery of aged care services
on the quantitative basis of the number of people treated; the level of services
they require; their length of stay at aged care facilities and resources required
(Kendig & Duckett 2001).
As discussed in Chapter 2, the development of the funding formula matrix (the
ACFI scale also referred to as the Aged Care Funding Instrument) is based on
matching the “qualitative descriptions with quantitative measures” (Courtney et
al. 1997, p233). This funding matrix enables the classification and weighting of
the elderly into differing levels of aged care assistance and associated costs

24

The market model is a concept developed for the privatised market (and not developed for the public
sector as it does not operate in a free market), which relies on the increased focus on efficiencies and
reductions in expenditure. In order to achieve this, the private sector market measures goal achievements
and conducts performance assessments with a greater focus on economic efficiency (Funnell et al 2012).
This concept is further discussed in Chapter 3.
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(Lane & Whittaker 2014). This matrix has been developed on the basis that the
total amount of resources required to service each person within each category
can be averaged and the costs to provide services to the elderly in each category
to remain “roughly equal” (Courtney et al. 1997, p233).

As such the government is increasingly finding ways of reducing expenditure and
more efficient ways of delivering services whilst maintaining the “political support
of increasingly larger numbers of older voters” (Fine & Chalmers 2000, p5).
However, the Australian federal government defends its position by stating that
the policy objectives and rationale for its involvement in aged care is due to
ensuring equitable access to appropriate care, protecting vulnerable Australian
citizens, improve the wellbeing of the community and “the correction of market
failures such as gaps in the provision of information” (Productivity Commission
2011, pxxvii). At the same time, it needs to take into account the effect of this
policy on current and future taxpayers who fund aged care subsidies. The
government promotes the aged care reforms as aiming to support the
independence and wellbeing of elderly citizens and for the elderly to receive
support and access to services as their needs change (Hughes 2011). However
the government also contradicts itself by noting that it is moving towards a
consumer directed market providing elderly Australians with increased choice and
control over their lives; along with ensuring that there is an efficient use to
resources dedicated to caring for the elderly, resulting in equitable distributions of
resources amongst generations (Aged Care Crisis 2015; Lane & Whittaker 2014;
KPMG 2013; Productivity Commission 2011; Hughes 2011).
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The difficulty in adopting the economic rationalist25 approach is the increasing
pressure to achieve efficiencies which can disadvantage the older population.
There is a shift in considering aged care services as ‘welfare’ rather than ‘health’
services and gives the government the power to reduce funding to the aged care
industry. The government argues that this is a social problem, however, growing
older is associated with medical or health related conditions such as illness and
disability which required medical care (Butler 2015); the increased focus on
efficiencies and cost cutting can be achieved at the expense of quality of care; an
increase in referring older people to community health services rather than to
aged care facilities resulting in incorrect levels of care provided to the elderly; and
asking older people to contribute more towards the costs of their care which were
previously paid for by the government (Howe 2002; Courtney et al 1997: Howe
1998).

The government also assumes that Australians will be increasingly asset rich and
will have the ability to contribute further towards their own costs of care (KPMG
2013; Productivity Commission 2011)26. The concept of a user pays system of
financing requires elderly citizens to pay more for the care they receive and
reverses the amount of public expenditure through the reduction of subsidies
payable (Fine & Chalmers 2000). The user pays system (or fee for service

25

The economic rationalist approach asserts that the policy-making process primarily ought to base
resource allocation decisions on “financial costs and benefits” (Funnell et al. 2012, p111). Although the
government promotes the social interest and social impacts as the main reason for social reform, its main
interest is to reduce the government’s costs and increase revenues. This is a component of the market
model concept which focuses on increased efficiencies and incorporates a heightened focus on cost
reduction and increases in revenues. The market model concept has been further outlined in this chapter
and a full discussion on this is incorporated in Chapter 3.
26
The Report on the Residential Aged Care Sector was prepared by KPMG in July 2013. The report was
commissioned by the Aged Care Financing Authority (“ACFA”) and developed by KPMG to assess the
impact on aged care financing arrangements. The report considers areas such as access to quality aged
care services; sustainability and viability of the aged care industry.
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system) is not a new concept and has also been adopted in the Australian primary
health care industry. The Australian Department of Health and Ageing (2009)
notes that there are increasing pressures to provide healthcare services more
efficiently and effectively. Primary health care entails the provision of clinical
services by general practitioners, nurses and allied health workers who are
“accountable for addressing a large majority of personal health care needs” (King
& Green 2012, p594). Access to primary healthcare in Australia is the greatest
problem due to a combination of decreasing supply and increasing demand for
healthcare services. Demand is increasing due to the ageing population; longer
lifespans; increases in cases of chronic diseases and advances in medical
technology (National Health & Hospitals Reform Commission 2009). The reform
in the late 2000s was aimed at improving efficiency, availability and quality of
services and to contain future spending growth.

However, the fundamental aim is to provide quality clinical services to patients
(King & Green 2012). Primary healthcare practices in Australia are generally
private business owned by the doctors working in the industry. Corporations are
increasingly entering the market, and this trend is expected to continue. The
Australian federal government has also entered the primary healthcare market by
establishing general practitioner super clinics which are health care centres that
offer “extended hours and team based care” (Australian Government 2010).
Andrew (2007) argues that the increasing engagement of private sector services
to deliver social services increase social risk. This is evident in the competitive
health services market system, which is predominantly fee for service based
(similar to the user pays system); however, this has resulted in pressures to
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increase patient turnover per hour. This ensures that sufficient consultations are
performed to generate fees that would cover operating expenses and produce
profits that would provide adequate returns to owners (King & Green 2012).

All Australians have equal access to the universal publicly funded health scheme
known as Medicare. Medicare covers “basic hospital, medical services and
pharmaceuticals” (van Doorslaer et al. 2008, p99). Although Medicare appears to
be equally distributing health care access, those on lower incomes are more likely
to consult a general practitioner, and those on higher incomes are likely to consult
a specialist. Further, those on higher incomes are likely to be admitted into
hospital as a private patient rather than as a public patient. A fundamental feature
of the health system is the asymmetry of information between providers and
patients, which is distinct from competitive markets which have perfect
information. Thus the price signals result in under servicing populations who
cannot afford to pay for access while overservicing populations which can
(Eckermann et al. 2016).

The Australian Coalition Government faced criticism regarding equitable access
to Medicare following its announcement on May 13, 2014, of the proposed
changes to Medicare (Williams et al. 2015). This included proposals such as the
reduction in Medicare rebates; and to introduce a co-payment for general
practitioner consultations, pathology and radiology services. However, the current
surviving policy is the $5 reduction for rebates to non-concessional patients which
was effective from 1 July 2015 (Eckermann et al. 2016; Williams et al. 2015). This
was part of a drive for the Coalition Government’s proposed $8.5 billion reduction
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in funding health care services (Williams et al. 2015).

The introduction of fees paid by patients represents a shift in Australia’s
orientation of a social and health welfare system where universal access was
paramount along with the social redistribution of costs to fund equitable health
care access (Williams et al. 2015). In 2014, the former Australian Treasurer Joe
Hockey supported this shift and stated that: “it is the responsibility of the
government to provide equality of opportunity with a fair and comprehensive
support system for those who are most vulnerable” (Liberal 2016; Williams et al.
2015). Based on this comment and introducing a co-payment and reducing
rebates, whilst gambling on the health of the Australian population for the purpose
of boosting the government’s budget, it appears that this social experiment is
required to link the budgetary changes to health outcomes.

The imposition of a fee acts as a financial penalty or disincentive to access
medical services and will hinder populations with fewer economic resources from
accessing health services. This will result in increased health needs and
escalating related health costs. However, the introduction of such fees will also
reduce the government’s time and resources required.

Subsequently,

government expenditure will decrease, and efficiencies are gained. In contrast,
Kiil and Houberg (2014) and Keeler (1992) provide international evidence which
shows that there are negative consequences on health outcomes when a user
pays system is introduced. The World Health Organisation (2014b) highlighted
that a user pays system or out of pocket payments for access to health services
is an obstruction to “universal health coverage” (Williams et al. 2015, p107). This
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reduces the opportunity for the public to enjoy a healthy life which is “a core
human right” (Williams et al. 2015, p107). The Government’s increasing push
towards favouring a user pays system in the health, and aged care sphere is in
contrast to the World Health Organisation’s (2014a) concerns raised. The World
Health Organisation (2014b) notes that such payments often cause considerable
financial burdens or financial catastrophes on families and access to such
services ought to be “based on need and not the ability to pay” (World Health
Organisation 2014b, p11).

According to Heath (2015) former Australian Health and Aged Care Minister
Sussan Ley27 failed to consider these challenges where she noted that the health
care policies ought to be aimed at making patients pay for general practitioner
services “to make sure that people value the service they get from doctors” (Heath
2015). As such, there is a critical need to consider equitable access to the health
system across all populations; an increased emphasis on achieving health
outcomes; and the use of health system services. Focusing on short term
accountancy and cost impacts will deny health access to a portion of the
population, given the expected negative downstream effects on the health system
(Eckermann et al. 2016). Further, fees for health care services act as a
disincentive to use these services and increases the risk of poor management of
existing and early health conditions to the Australian society which is beyond
simply “poor health outcomes” (Williams et al. 2015, p109).

27

Sussan Ley was the Minister for Health from 23/12/2014 to 19/7/2016; the Minister for Aged Care from
30/9/2015 to 19/7/2016; and the Minister for Health and Aged Care from 19/7/2016 to 24/1/2017
(Parliament of Australia 2017).
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Similar concerns have been raised in the aged care industry where the use of a
similar private sector service is difficult to ensure efficiency and to enhance the
accessibility of services to those who need ongoing care. It would also increase
inequities with the financially disadvantaged or those living in areas that are less
wealthy could lose the opportunity to access equal types of aged care services
(Hughes 2011; Howe 2008; Fine & Chalmers 2000). Hence the government’s
most significant measure of efficiency is its value for money assessment, being
cost effectiveness, rather than service delivery (Andrew & Cahill 2009).
Consequently, the concept of value for money involves a trade-off between cost
and quality to determine the viability of the government’s current or future projects
in terms of meeting its stated public policy objectives (Andrew & Cahill 2009).

5.7 Shifting Accountabilities in the Public Sector
Andrew (2007) argues that the consequence of adopting private sector services
in managing and delivering services to the Australian prison industry reduces
government’s accountability towards the public as it creates a distance between
the service provider and the community (Shaoul et al. 2012). Service providers
present predominantly technical accounts of events and are responsible for the
delivery of services which are measured against performance indicators. This
creates significant challenges in fulfilling the government’s ethical and moral
responsibilities as the government is able to report these results in an objective
manner protects them from direct responsibility to society (Andrew & Cahill 2009).
Whilst studies have been conducted into the privatisation of industries (and the
use of private agencies to provide public services) such as water (Shaoul 1997);
telecommunications (Florio 2003) and prisons (Andrew 2007), little accounting
research exists regarding the role of accounting, the way that accounting is used
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between parties (e.g. the government, private organisations and citizens) and the
parties involved in the development of public policy (Andrew 2010).

Steane (2008) suggests that the Australian government formerly played a more
activist and interventionist role and acted on its own initiative in regards to public
policy development. The Australian government is distinctive to the United
Kingdom as there has been an escalation of its attentiveness to commit to the
shift in the nature of the involvement of stakeholders in economic life and public
policy development (Parker & Gould 1999). The stakeholders can be multiple
actors who come from a network of public, private not profit and for profit
organisations, community groups, professional bodies and consumer groups who
are involved in consulting on issues such as concerns for value for money of
services provided, standards of delivery, commitment of resources to the
community, aged care service monitoring, rational planning, policy reviews and
evaluations (Steane 2008; Howe 2008).28
During the course of the review of Australia’s aged care system, the Gillard Labor
Government referred to the Productivity Commission for a systematic enquiry and
report to prepare recommendations on the restructuring of the system. Public
consultations were held with over 490 submissions received from organisations
and individuals which suggests that the use of inquiries reflects a “wider shift in
public policy development (Hughes 2011, p526), where the public are
(uncommonly) invited to participate in parliamentary policy making. This further

28

Further discussion in relation to this aspect is discussed under regulatory space theory. This theory refers to th e
development of regulation which is created in a space that is occupied by regular actors such as private and state
bodies. Actors outside of this space enter it and attempt to determine a solution to a constructed problem. This is
described in further detail in Chapter 5 and will be applied to the analysis and research question in Chapter 7.
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supports the notion of transferring accountability from the government to the
citizens as this method was utilised by the government to “manage the exposure
of government and politicians to the risks associated with policy development”
(Hughes 2011, p527) and enhances the government’s disguise of behaving
legitimately for government decision making through this participatory process.
Contrastingly, with specific reference to the process of preparing the Living
Longer Living Better (“LLLB”) reforms, stakeholder consultation may also be
beneficial as it can raise public awareness of the contemporary and relevant
issues affecting the aged care services and the impacts it has on the community
and citizens; it can identify potential benefits for reform; it can be beneficial as the
likely outcome is that well informed recommendations are prepared, and it can
provide governments with the opportunity to assess the community’s reactions to
different policy approaches (Hughes 2011; Healy 2002; Steane 2008). Further,
the public policy development process has extended to include public
consultations with stakeholders in the community.

Sinclair (1995) defines accountability as “ensures that those who have authority
over public resources provide an account for the use of those resources in terms
of compliance, efficiency and effectiveness…involves the fundamental (sic) of
honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and careful, effective application of
resources” (p221). The government raises taxpayer revenue and distributes
these resources towards services such as aged care services (Funnell & Cooper
1998). Hence as aged care costs are subsidised by the federal and state
government the concept of public accountability applies as the government has
an increased responsibility to its citizens to ensure that these resources are
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equitably distributed (Funnell & Cooper 1998). However, Australia’s aged care
policy development during the last twenty years has substantially shifted from a
public enterprise towards a privatised market model with an increased focus on
efficiencies and reductions in expenditure. The growing use of traditional
accounting principles including income, expenses and empirical data enables the
government to calculate budgetary deficits and declare a risk of a future “crisis of
fiscal sustainability” (Bessant et al. 2011, p143).
The aged care system has shifted from being about the “availability of care
towards the ability to pay” (Gardner 1995, p164) by partly eliminating universal
access through increased means testing resulting in increased fees paid by the
elderly for aged care services provided in aged care homes or community care
(McCoppin 1995). In addition, subsidies paid to aged care homes have been
reduced, and funding to community care services is increased to encourage older
Australians to stay at home longer as this is considered to be the cost effective
alternative to aged care. As such the government is rapidly shifting its
accountability from the public sector to the private sector by increasingly
expecting the care of the elderly to be a family responsibility at the expense of
society (Minichiello 1995). This transition to management accounting style of
activity based funding29 is to “ensure greater accountability and efficiency” (Smith
2012, p206) for the provision of care within the health care system and potentially
improve patient care. These are the forms of concerns raised in the aged care
system where it is increasingly a system available to those who can most afford

29

Activity based funding refers to the providers of health and aged care services being funded for the activity that they
undertake when treating patients or providing care services to the elderly. The critical elements of activity based
funding is that you must be able to “define, classify, count, cost and pay for each activity in a consistent manner” (Eagar
2011, p1). The Commonwealth government determines the price it will pay the provider for a unit of activity.
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it.
The involvement of federal and state governments, the not for profit or traditional
voluntary sector, for profit organisations, community organisations, consumer
groups and professional bodies shows that there are competing interests in
Australian aged care policy development (Howe 2002). Policy making is a political
process where the balance of care reflects “the balance of power among interest
groups” (Howe 2002, p115). The changes in the balance of power determine the
shifts in the balance of care, accountability and rational policy development in
aged care. The next section will outline the theory which will be used to explore
the research topic and address the questions raised in this thesis. As such, the
theory which forms the basis of this theoretical discussion is regulatory space
theory.

5.8 Application of Theory to the Research Question
There is a growing concern in the shift in public accountability where the
increasing adoption of privatisation is eroding the “traditional accountability
arrangements” (Dowdle 2017) which has historically provided Australian society
confidence in the federal government. This includes shifting essential power and
governmental responsibilities to other public, and private actors, who generally
operate outside of the political authority of government developed accountability
frameworks (Dowdle 2017). These actions question whether the political forces
which shape the lives of Australian society are actually acting in the public’s
general interest.

This issue is further compounded by differing perceptions of the concept of public
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accountability. It can be perceived in terms of a rational and transparent form of
bureaucratic economic and social control; participating in and supervision of the
political decision making process; adopting market competition practices and
disciplinary control over market pricing (Dowdle 2017). While there is growing
concern that there an accountability problem within the government, there is also
division regarding the exact cause of the problem. In addition, there is conflict
regarding the appropriate solutions to restore appropriate accountability and to
whom this belongs.

Regulatory space theory relates to the development of regulation in a space
which may be occupied by different actors, including the “state and private
bodies” (Macdonald & Richardson 2004, p491). However, such actors are outside
of this space which they enter and attempt to determine a solution to a
constructed problem which impacts society. Hence for the purposes of this thesis,
this theory will be linked to the aged care industry reforms with particular focus
on exploring how the Australian government has changed its accountability
through the use of the accounting technology; and to review how these changes
have occurred as discussed in previous chapters. This exploration will occur
through the regulatory space theory lens to show the influence on the process
and development of public policy and the actors involved and how this has
resulted in the Australian government’s shift in its accountability towards
Australian society.

5.9 What is Regulation?
There are competing ideas regarding the concept of regulation as it has a myriad
of meanings. It can represent the “heavy hand of authoritarian governments”
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(Levi-Faur 2010, p3), which contains the rules that may restrict human or national
behaviour and liberties. In contrast, it can also represent a restructure of rules
that serves the interests of the dominant interest groups and reframes power
reforms in an apparent civilised manner (Levi-Faur 2010). Hancher and Moran
(1989a) define regulation in the narrow context as the process of designing legal
rules; “the creation of institutions responsible for their implementation” (p271);
and the enforcement of the legal rules. However, the wider context of regulation
includes the nature of control enforced by competition between large companies
(Hancher & Moran 1989b). Any form of regulation development and conception
faces the challenge of dominance and control, which is usually held by large
corporations. Based on this Stigler (1971) suggests that there are two opposing
views on the purposes of regulation: the first view is that regulation is
implemented for the protection and benefit of the public at large, or for smaller
independent classes or groups within society. The alternate view is the political
process of regulation development may result in great moral acts for the benefit
of the public or vulgar behaviour through acting out of self-interest (eg by the
government or the public).
In a democratic nation such as Australia, regulation is a public good and is used
as a tool to control actions which are profit driven; and to protect and govern the
government’s and society’s social and economic risks (Levi-Faur 2010).
Regulation is mostly developed by social actors who monitor other actors such
as governments; or it can also be developed solely by the government which is
enforced by local and state bodies (Levi-Faur 2010). However, a combination of
these methods is adopted in Australia in relation to aged care policy development
and implementation. Additionally, the implementation of regulation and
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accountability is required for the protection and benefit of the public at large and
for smaller independent classes or groups within society. This generally applies
to industries which may “injure the public” (Stigler 1971, p3) and at a cost to the
social goal. It is also a strategic social tool used by actors with private and special
interests to exploit the majority of those affected by the regulation (Priest 1993;
Jarrell 1978; Stigler 1971). Thus, regulation is a legal instrument used as another
form of social control that enables the emphasis of societal issues and implement
“responsive regulation” (Levi-Faur 2010, p3).
Any form of regulation development and conception faces the challenge of
dominance and control which is usually held by large corporations. Regulation
development can be narrowly identified as the “process of making and enforcing
legal rules” (Hancher & Moran 1989), however the wider context includes the
nature of control enforced by competition between large companies (Hancher &
Moran 1989). Regulation development and standard setting is a political process
that is influenced by “institutional authorities’ responses to lobbying and other
forms of pressure from interested groups” (Palmer 2013, p221; Stenka and Taylor
2010; Kwok and Sharp 2005). Most regulators, standard setters and
governments encourage the participation of entities affected throughout this
process which is often undertaken through lobbying on the proposed regulations
or standards (Christensen and Mohr 1999). Hence the process of developing and
implementing regulations suggests that it requires considering how that the
legislation and legitimate role of the regulator could impact those who may be
affected by these decisions rather than implementing a “command and control
system” (Macdonald & Ricardson 2004, p492). Hancher and Moran (1989) also
argue that the creation of boundaries and allocation within this space are
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influenced by market, cultural and political forces as there may be conflicting
interests within this space.
There are a number of tensions in regulatory development which have gained
importance including considering the consumer or public interest (including those
of the taxpayers). Their interests can deviate over the medium to long term and
presents a challenge in finding the ideal channel for effective consumer
representation which has been prominent in public issues such as health and
aged care regulation and utilities regulation (Watson 2013). Political influence is
another tension imposed on regulatory development. This can be impaired by
factors such as social goals of financing programs including social health and
housing; and the government’s fiscal benefits of tax boom driven revenues
generated. These factors can also weaken political willingness to allow other
actors to influence policy development as the government continues to adopt a
private sector attitude by focusing on financial aspects of public policy rather than
their social effectiveness (Watson 2013). Hence the regulatory space theory
enables closer attention to be paid to the actors and institutions involved in the
process of changes to the aged care funding policy.
Thus regulation development is also considered to be a social process as the
regulatory development space may be occupied by different actors including the
state and private bodies. The State may develop regulation however ensuring its
compliance with regulation is problematic as the bodies that are subject to
regulation may utilise methods of avoiding compliance. Further, within this
concept, regulatory issues are suggested by Hancher and Moran (1989) as being
“ideological constructions” (p291), where the social actors construct the world in
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particular way which may suit their purposes and agendas. Hence the regulators
must address this issue and work with these actors or attempt to influence them
in order to establish and maintain the legitimacy of their decisions and actions
(Macdonald & Richardson 2004). Additionally, the existing space implies that
there is a boundary surrounding the regulator and the regulated, and there are
others who may try to occupy this space.
The manner in which regulation is developed is further explored under the theory
of regulatory space. This is particularly applicable to the aged care industry as
there are regulations (such as the Aged Care Act 1997) which explain how
government subsidies are required to be expended; regulations relating to the
provision of quality care services and annual financial reporting to demonstrate
that the government funding was appropriately spent thereby demonstrating
whether social goals have been met.
The failure to adhere to these regulations increases the risk of sanctions imposed
on the aged care service provider through avenues such as the withdrawal of
government subsidies. Based on these basic factors it is imperative to impose
such regulations on the aged care industry for the purpose of protecting the
public, notably the elderly recipients of the aged care services; and the broader
society to ensure that the government’s distribution of taxpayers’ money (in the
form of subsidies) to aged care service providers are utilised in an appropriate,
efficient and effective manner. As such, the government has the highest power
above all citizens, which is the ability to collect money through taxation. The state
has the power to determine the allocation of resources and the economics
decisions of firms and households without their consent (Stigler 1971). The most
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common contribution that a group would seek from the government is a “direct
subsidy of money” (Stigler 1971, p4), and the aged care industry has for many
years demonstrated that it has the skill in obtaining such public funds to support
and sustain this industry.

In order for aged care service providers to continue to receive government
subsidies and remain within the industry, they are also subject to strict regulations
relating to matters such as quality assurance and consumer protection measures
(the aim of this is to enhance the sector’s accountability to the government and
citizens). This includes the accreditation of residential care facilities by the Aged
Care Standards and Accreditation Agency; prudential regulation and reporting
requirements in relation to accommodation bonds; building certification
requirements; a Complaints Investigation Scheme where people receiving care
or the relatives, guardians or legal representatives of those receiving care are
able to raise a complaint or concern about an Australian Government aged care
subsidised service (Productivity Commission 2011). Residential and community
service providers are also subject to state, territory and local governments
involved in aged care regulation which covers the building, planning and design,
fire safety, occupational health and safety, food, fire and drug preparation storage
for consumer protection purposes (Productivity Commission 2011). In instances
where aged care services providers fail to meet regulations, sanctions are
imposed, which increases the risk of losing government funding and the inability
to continue to operate within the industry. Hence the aged care industry is subject
to numerous regulation and reporting requirements in order to ensure that it is
complying with laws for the protection of the elderly being a vulnerable group
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within society.

The government’s policy development systems are rationally devised and
employed and serve the purpose of fulfilling the needs of the members of society.
However, this may not necessarily mean that the government will serve any
individual’s concept of the public interest. The difficulty with regulation is the issue
of discovering when and why an industry or a group of people is able to use the
government to serve its purpose; or why the industry or group is targeted by the
government to be used for unknown purposes (Stigler 1971).

5.10 The Notion of Regulatory Space
The regulatory space paradigm was initially developed by Hancher and Moran
(1989b) as a method of “summarising and integrating” (Kent 2003, p10) a series
of studies regarding economic regulation. The concepts of regulatory space also
relate to the development of legal regulation which occurs within a regulatory
space.

Regulatory

space

is

developed

through

communication

and

interdependence relationships between state and non-state organisations which
are linked through networks and compete for power (Hancher and Moran 1989a).
As such the distinctions between the public and private actors are “blurred”
(Hancher and Moran 1989a, p272), and the space can both be occupied and
contested by the actors (Hancher and Moran 1989a). The amount of space that
an actor or group of actors can occupy at the certain point in time can be affected
by economic, contingent and historical factors (Inversi et al 2017). Therefore,
regulation is not only situated in space but also in time (Inversi et al 2017).
Thus this theory provides a rich example of developing a research framework to
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examine the role of the Australian governments and aged care service providers
(for profit and not for profit); their actions and impacts which are placed in a
historical and political context in relation to the development of aged care policy.
The regulatory space metaphor functions as a “broad theoretical lens” (Young
1994, p85) to focus on the issue of aged care policy formation. Regulatory space
theory also enables the focus on issues which influenced the change in aged care
policy rather than on the functioning of the government and aged care providers.
As such, this theory will also be used to address the question of who is involved
in the process of aged care policy formation. This includes consideration of
bodies involved including the federal and state governments; beyond the
organisational roles of the Productivity Commission and to consider the roles of
other actors (Young 1994) such as community representative groups, aged care
service providers (for profit and not for profit), community service providers,
health organisations, health education institutions and aged care research
groups.
The use of accounting reports as a tool for constructing and presenting aged care
costs as a growing economic and social burden enables the shaping of demands
for change to the aged care funding model. These changes occur both within and
external to the boundaries as determined by the governments and Productivity
Commission. This theory will also be used to highlight the correlation between
the federal and state governments; government bodies including the Productivity
Commission; and other actors and organisations within the aged care industry
to assess the impacts on the “broader social and economic environment” (Young
1994, p85), which emphasises that actions are no longer undertaken in a
“vacuum” (Young 1994, p85). Finally, this theory also gives consideration to the
176

roles of other participants in the regulatory space, and the extension of
accounting methods adopted towards the public sector to solve a social problem.

The regulatory space is described by Hancher and Moran (1989b) as consisting
of three components: who is subject to regulation, what issues are regulated, and
what remedies the regulator may use. Regulation and a regulatory body also exist
within this environment (Macdonald and Richardson 2004). Coen and Thatcher
(2008) further suggest that there are five factors that structure a regulatory space
which include: the participants involved in the decisions regarding development
regulation and implementation; the actors responsible for the allocation of powers
and responsibilities for implementation of regulation; the possible mechanisms of
implementation and dealing with issues of consistent application and
interpretation of the regulation; the principals which legally delegate the powers
over the implementation of regulation; and the actors which have control over
actors responsible for decisions relating to regulation implementation. Young
(1994) further adds that regulatory space is a construction that is based on the
regulatory issues which are “subject to public opinion (p84). As such the
regulatory space is “a space…available for occupation” (Hancher & Morgan
1989a, p277) which forces the researcher to ask the question as to who is
involved in this process of regulation change and development?
Entering this space are also five categories of unelected bodies: the service
providers; the risk assessors; the boundary watchers; the inquisitors; and the
umpires and whistle blowers (Vibert 2007). They share common features
including operating in technical domains and rely mainly on private actors for
information; and are involved in epistemic communities. The facilitation of the rise
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of the unelected bodies is due to globalization; the shift to a service economy and
the implementation of the New Public Management (refer to Chapters 2 and 3 for
further discussion) reforms; and the fundamental division in policy making
between the judgements underlying a policy and political judgements (van Veen
2010).
This space is shaped by the allocation of power to the actors who enter this
space, along with the political and legal environment, organisations and markets
involved. It is imperative to look beyond the institutional boundaries of the federal
government and consider the roles of other actors such as aged care service
providers; community service providers; the medical profession; local
government authorities; the Productivity Commission and other government
funded bodies. Traditionally the regulatory space was consumed by those with
authority and decision making to the influential (Vibert 2014) which results in
powerful conglomerates of relationships. In contrast, Rauhaus (2015) offers a
new perspective in which the regulatory policy space is more “inclusive and
representative” (p2). The decisions made in policy development and ultimately
imposing the regulations is a task which is now perceived to be conducted in a
“fair manner” (Rauhaus 2015, p2) however this raises questions of competence.
It is perceived that each individual involved in the “process of governance and
regulation” (Rauhaus 2015, p2) possesses knowledge to contribute to this
process. This contribution arises due to the existence of various groups with
differing interests in a society where power is shared between these groups and
the government (Gardner 1995, p184). The challenge associated with a
regulatory space is when new regulatory problems and solutions emerge due to
the participants within this space. They merge to share new ways of thinking
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about the role of the aged care industry; who is responsible to fund the industry
and manage the development of new aged care policies. While there are
concerns regarding the future direction and funding of the aged care industry it
highlights how management accounting techniques have been incorporated as a
tool for “strategic management” (Chahed 2014, p199) and developing an efficient
and effective aged care funding system.

5.11 Competing Interests in the Regulatory Space
Gardner (1995) defines interest groups as bodies (consisting of various
members) which attempt to influence public policy with outcomes that favour the
defended interest. They may not necessarily apply pressure to influence the
outcomes however, their interests may be considered by the government’s policy
makers. Consequently, political conflict arises due to the process of resolving
conflict between the competing interests of the interest groups and the
government (Gardner 1995). The predominant conflict is based on the allocation
of scarce resources and the impact on the provision of public goods and services.
Thus it is these interests, values and ideologies that are defended. However,
Vibert (2015) stresses that there is a major challenge in achieving democratic
representation particularly noting that politicians perceive themselves as able to
interpret the “public mood” (p76) but are not perceived as able to make
appropriate judgements regarding public policy where it is impacted by the
economy or the market. Vibert (2015) argues that politicians possess “substantial
influence, discretion, and authority” (p88) in regulatory development; however,
the average citizens’ voice is “overshadowed or restrained” (p88).
Power is exercised by unelected actors who behave independently from elected
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institutions including: banks, audit and inspection offices, health and
environmental agencies; and social and economic regulators (Vibert 2007; Young
1994). These unelected actors are influential in the development and
implementation of public policies; have the ability to decide who has access to
the markets and how they should behave in the markets, and provide information
and measure government efficiency (van Veen 2010). They also issue social and
economic regulations with imposing sanctions on those who do not comply whilst
simultaneously claim that they are providing a platform for citizens to voice and
exercise their rights.
Young (1994) suggests that interests are also constructed, and they do not define
the actions of the actors or the interests of the actors whom, as a result of their
relationship with other actors, are in a particular category. Rather, these actors
“interpret, construct and reconstruct” (Young 1994, p86) their interests whilst they
construct and connect the “problems, actions and solutions” (Young 1994, p86).
As such, the problems within the aged care industry are not seen as simply
existing. Instead, they are constructed as problems by the actors within the
regulatory space. The changes relate to developing the right progress and
processes within the aged care industry to allow the system to “become what it
should be” (Young 1994, p86); and to eliminate what it should not be. As such, it
should be an efficient system which adopts private market practices where it is
no longer perceived as a public good that is fully sustained by the federal
government.
Thus this study shows how the regulatory experience is also impacted by the
“wider political, legal and cultural factors” (Chahed 2014, p200) which become
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the focus of the issues impacting the community and are subject to regulatory
debate within the government. In this study, regulatory space is a space within
which the measurement and recognition of accounting practices are used to
justify the increased focus on efficiencies and the allocation of accountability
within the aged care industry. This space is constructed by people, organisations
and events that act upon accounting information to enable drastic change within
the aged care industry. It enables a rationale to develop stricter regulations and
funding processes through the use of management accounting practices. Further,
this theory enables the focus to be on the issues associated with funding and
accountability within the aged care industry rather than the operations of the
industry itself. This study also recognises that the shaping of demands for change
have occurred within the accountancy lens and have influenced the change in
the aged care industry both inside and outside of this boundary. This lens
emphasises the interrelations between the federal government, the Productivity
Commission and with other actors and organisations, along with the broader
social and economic environment. This relationship also highlights that the
federal government is not making its decision and creating social change within
a “vacuum” (Young 2014, p85). As such regulatory space is not a space within
which drastic changes to the aged care industry can occur. Rather it is a space
for “tinkering” (Chahed 2014, p201; Young 1994, p85) with existing practices
within the aged care industry. In contrast regulatory change can also be “radical
and innovative” (Chahed 2014, p201) in which the ongoing debate surrounding
the existing regulated practices within the aged care industry can be the
foundation for “radical innovation and change” (Chahed 2014, p201).
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5.12 Conclusion
This chapter includes a literature review of the little available literature which
exists in relation to the impact of accounting and shifting accountabilities in the
aged care industry. It explores the historical differences in the aged care policies
utilised by the Australian and United Kingdom governments, and how their
policies have shifted towards adopting the market policy. This chapter also
demonstrates how the increasing adoption of private sector markets in traditional
government-controlled public enterprises such as the Australian health sector
result in the increased focus on efficiencies rather than the effectiveness of
government policies. Finally this chapter explains the use of regulatory space
theory as the theoretical lens used to explore the actors and institutions involved
in the process of changes to the aged care policy; and the change in the
Australian government’s attitude towards accountability in the aged care industry.
In order to address who influences the government in aged care policy
development and decision making, Chapter 6 outlines the research framework,
which is used to address the research question. The theoretical framework is also
described which includes the adoption of a qualitative based research
methodology and content analysis as the method that will be utilised to explore
how the use of language influences the development of political issues,
particularly the development of the Australian aged care policy which resulted in
the new aged care legislation as a product of the Living Longer, Living Better
Reforms in Australia.
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Chapter 6 Research Methodology

6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the research methodology and research framework that
will be used in order to address the research question which is: “How and to what
extent is the Australian government transferring its accountability to the
Australian aged care industry and citizens?” Initially, this chapter explores the
concept of the qualitative research methodology and is followed by the
justification of employing a qualitative methodology. The selected research
method used in this study is qualitative content analysis which will include a
description of the data collection and analysis process. Finally, the importance of
research trustworthiness is considered. Thus the collection of rich data to be
analysed in this study enables the identification of how the accounting practice
results in social exclusion (Poullaos 2009) as it enables the “processing,
recording, classification and communication” (Walker 2016, p44; Carmona et al
2008) which then influences the assembly of “social identities and enforces social
stigma” (Walker 2016, p44; Ezzamel 2012). Such research also demonstrates
how the accounting practice is used for organisation of information, valuation and
reporting which enables the construction of social order (Walker 2016; Ogborn
2007; Vollmer 2003). However, Walker (2016) and Napier (2006) reflect on
accounting’s role in the construction of society as generally assumed and
described in accountancy research, rather than “described and analysed”
(Walker 2016, p45). As such, the use of qualitative research will enable the
description and analysis of the use of accounting and its impact on the current
social order.
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6.2 Research Methodology
Chua (1986) and Gaffikin (2008) define methodology as the approach to the
entire research process and the framework for gathering knowledge. Neuman
(2011) further explains that this incorporates a collection of specific techniques
utilised to “…measure and observe social life” (p2), gather and analyse data and
information and report on the results. The purpose of determining a methodology
is to enable researchers to plan and critically examine the composition of
research methods; to evaluate the usefulness of individual techniques and the
probability as to whether particular research designs will contribute to knowledge
(Krippendorff 2013). Hence the methodology is important as it provides a
“language for talking about the research process” (Krippendorff 2013, p5) rather
than the subject matter that is investigated.

The research methodology consists of two types which are quantitative and
qualitative methods of research. The quantitative research process involves
adopting a systematic procedure and techniques incorporating precise, objective
measures and quantitative data. It enables the researcher to observe individual
behaviour in gaining an understanding of the social world (Gaffikin 2008; Dillard
1991). Cause and effect relationships are identified by manipulating the control
environment, which enables us to identify opportunities to improve the “quality of
life” (Dillard 1991, p11). Once the results of the observation of human behavior
are completed, it enables the prediction of human behavior which results in social
control and order and consequently, a manageable society (Gaffikin 2008).
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The traditional prevalent language in research is that quantitative research is the
“dominant language” (Morrow & Brown 1994, p202). Instead, social research
incorporates qualitative based analysis and excludes numerical analysis of large
aggregates of data (Babbie 2015). According to Gaffikin (2008), the quantitative
research methodology is not always suitable for a research topic as not all topics
are easily quantifiable or can be quantified. Thus, qualitative based research is
required to enable the exploration of singular cases or a limited number of cases
in greater detail. The case which is researched incorporates “natural language”
(Morrow & Brown 1994, p206) of the analysed actors or the actions involved in
the associated study field. This enables interpretation of the social world based
on: the studied actors and their actions; the studied case; and whether it is an
individual, organisational or societal issue. Thus qualitative analysis is a method
of analysis which is not based on measurement and reporting of findings which
are quantified (Morrow & Brown 1994). It is a minimalist and nominalist approach
in which reality is regarded to be a social construction (Morrow & Brown 1994)
that is based on the construction of our consciousness.

6.3 Justifications for Using Qualitative Research
This research is based on qualitative research and allows the interpretation of
text; describe its symbolic meaning; and explain how it relates to the social
situation being explored through a cultural and historical context (Dillard 1991).
According to Walker (2016), accounting plays a vital role in the development of
modern society in which research is beneficial to demonstrate how the accounting
practice is a “social and organisational phenomenon” (p42). It is now a
fundamental and influential component, rather than a secondary fragment, of
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social relations (Miller 1994). As such accounting is no longer regarded as a
neutral and technical practice as it possesses such an important social role.
However, it also provides the ability to collect rich data to enable the analysis and
identification that reality is a social construction and the people involved in it are
social actors.

By employing the interpretive, qualitative approach, the researcher can
investigate in depth the responses made by the actors to the questions raised by
the researcher. It also enables the researcher to explore the relationship between
the social actors such as government agencies, professional bodies that operate
within the aged care industry, and their related social environment. Therefore, the
nature of this study is to investigate and attempts to understand the interaction
between the government and the social environment and the impact of these
interactions. Hence this study does not aim to prove a hypothesis or to make
quantifications of human behaviour. It also does not aim to perform causal
analysis nor predict human behaviour. Rather, this study aims to capture the
process of human interaction and negotiation which results in people forming their
own interpretations that are attached to “people, things and situations” (Tomkins
& Groves 1983, p368). Through the interaction between the actors, contexts and
actions, meanings can change over time, resulting in the development of new
social rules. As such qualitative research is considered an appropriate
methodology to investigate research problems that are driven by human
interaction and social contexts and aim to understand how social reality is
created.
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As discussed in Chapter 5, empirical qualitative research on the Australian aged
care industry from an accounting context has rarely been conducted, and studies
concerning the utilisation of accounting through the adoption of new public
management in this industry were difficult to locate. Therefore the contribution of
this study is that employing a qualitative inquiry will address this research gap.
Further, the adoption of qualitative content analysis is beneficial to this study as
it enables the categorisation and analysis of collected data; and to gain an
understanding and interpret the meaning of the data. It will enable this study to
address important questions regarding accounting’s function in the construction
of social relationships; the disposition of social control; the reinforcement of social
structures and construction of social identity (Walker 2008). Through qualitative
research, it is important to explore how the accounting practice is socially
significant; how social developments impact on the accounting practice and how
the accounting practice also influences social development and values (Walker
2016).

Consequently this method will be used to argue that accounting information has
been utilised to assist in decision making throughout the Australian aged care
policy development process. This has resulted in the shift in the perception of the
role of accountability in the aged care industry and the impact that this has on
Australian society and the providers of aged care services. Accordingly, the
flexible nature of this approach will allow the researcher to gain an understanding
of the nature of the dynamics of the phenomena being explored, which cannot be
explored through a quantitative approach.
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6.4 The Qualitative Content Analysis Framework
Some researchers have suggested that qualitative content analysis forms part of
a rich set of tools that was used to examine significant amounts of qualitative data
(Huian (2013); Palmer (2013); Suguhara & Wilson (2013); Gordon (2012); Lodhia
& Martin (2012); Pellegrino & Lodhia (2012); Steenkamp & Northcott (2007);
Adams & Kuasirikun (2000); Hackston & Milne (1996)). Qualitative content
analysis consists of the basic general phases of “data collection, coding, analysis
of content and interpretation of results” (Duriau 2007, p13). Graneheim and
Lundman (2004, p8) further suggest that the purpose of qualitative content
analysis in social research is to organise, interpret and describe meaning from
the data and to explain “realistic” (conclusions from the interpreted data. As such,
the social researcher’s main focus is to understand how reality (or fact) is
constituted through language and in human interaction (Fleck 1979). Therefore
its purpose is not to criticise any (mis) representations.

Content analysis has traditionally been considered to be a quantitative research
method. This is a method of analysing the content of text that is utilised for
communication and can be in written, spoken or visual formats (Cole 1988;
Krippendorff 2013). The content that is analysed includes words, symbols,
themes, pictures or any communicated message contained within the text
(Krippendorff 2013). The reading of text is a qualitative method, even when
particular characteristics of a text are subsequently converted into numbers and
statistics (Krippendorff 2013). In addition, the word frequency within text is
considered to be an indicator of importance as it assumes that groups of words
or common words “reveal underlying themes” (Duriau et al 2007, p6). These
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reoccurring key words can be interpreted as an association occurring between
the fundamental concepts that will be explored (Huff 1990; Weber 1990).

Finally, this process is exploratory whilst its intent is “predictive or inferential”
(Krippendorff 2013, p1). It enables the reduction of text that is subsequently
represented as phenomena or events into categories defined by the researcher
to better enable them to analyse and interpret (Harwood & Garry 2003).
Moreover, it is increasingly adopted as a method for “understanding social
phenomena” (Krippendorff 2013, p24), including social and environmental
accounting investigations where manual approaches are often utilised for
performing content analysis (Lodhia & Martin 2012).

The interpretation of

collected data and “focus on human communication” (Downe-Wamboldt 1992,
p313) enables the researcher to recognise whose voice is being heard and why;
and how their voices may influence and act as a catalyst for social change.

The adoption of qualitative content analysis in this thesis enables the description
of how particular media depicts certain social problems, political problems or
members from certain professions and how their certain interests can occupy
particular spaces (Krippendorff 2013). Thus, this study will apply the general
principles strategy as noted by Duriau (2007), and a qualitative content analysis
framework as suggested by Krippendorff (2013). The use of the qualitative
content analysis technique in this enables the researcher to analyse, group, and
categorise the collected data, and to gain an understanding to explain the
meaning of the data. It also enables the collected data to be categorised into
concepts and themes and content analysis is applied to examine the relationship
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between the concepts and themes. This unique contribution and combination
enables this study to gain an understanding of the meaning of the data; to
address the importance of this study and research question. Finally, it will enable
this study to explore how the Australian government’s perception of accountability
has shifted from effective to efficient aged care services. Further, the increased
burden to fund this sector by shifting accountability to the recipients of aged care
services will also be explored through the lens of qualitative content analysis.
Therefore this method is adopted to assist researchers to understand what the
analysed text means to people; what the text “enables or prevents” (Krippendorff
2013, p2); and the impact of the information conveyed by the text (Krippendorff
2013).

The type of content that is analysed in this study is text from public submissions
received by the Productivity Commission in 2011 which was in response to the
Productivity Commission’s report entitled Caring for Older Australian Issues
Paper (which was released in 2010). The key data in these submissions are
categorised into main themes and interpreted in order to understand the meaning
of the text. Further, the analysis is limited to identify groups of words or common
words to reveal underlying themes. Following this, the application of regulatory
space theory to the identified themes and categories will be utilised in this
analysis to address the research question. These themes are then interpreted in
order to understand the meaning of the text. Finally, conclusions will be drawn
from the interpretation of the text. As such, this approach has been adopted as it
corroborates the qualitative content analysis conceptual framework.
This section describes the process of data collection through the qualitative
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methodology perspective. Duriau (2007), and Harwood and Garry (2003)
articulate that the research design consists of a logical process which consists of
a number of stages. The first stage in this study consists of identifying a topic of
interest, formulating ideas and developing the research question. This stage
explains what is occurring and is followed by the second stage which consists of
data collection and explains how the study will be undertaken. The third stage of
the study consists of the analysis of the collected data to explain why the
phenomenon is occurring. The final stage is the interpretation of the results within
the theoretical framework guiding the research study. It also addresses the first
stage of what is occurring and concludes with an explanation regarding why it is
occurring.

The qualitative based research process requires the collection of documents
which enables the researcher to draw inferences from the data in the analysed
texts to address the research question (Krippendorff 2013, p83). The data is
interpreted, and conclusions are formed based on the collected data. Wellington
& Szczerbinski (2007) and Harwood and Garry (2003) identify a number of
potential sources of information used to interpret a research question. It includes
documents such as speeches, newspaper articles, open-ended responses to
questions, interviews, direct observation, government papers, web pages,
audiotapes of meetings or group discussions, annual reports, accounts, oral
histories and policy documents. Such documents provide empirical evidence
relating to a particular matter that allows you to build a richer and accurate picture
than can be obtained through fieldwork and interviews (Myers 2009). Rather than
being a historical record of someone’s thoughts or actions, the document can be
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perceived as an actor in its own right, which is independent of the person or
persons who wrote it. As such, the importance of a document is that it can be as
“significant as speech in social action” (Myers 2009, p152).

According to Wellington and Szczerbinski (2007), the analysis of such rich
documentary data is called “documentary research” (p76). Documentary
research can also be extremely efficient and productive as the use of
documentary analysis techniques addresses the limitations of physical sources
such as interviews and observation as it enables the researcher to categorise,
investigate and interpret the written documents (Payne & Payne 2004; Elo &
Kyngas 2008). Most importantly, it provides a means of validation, which
increases the trustworthiness, reliability and validity of research (Faulkner 1982).
Therefore to maintain data validity, this study uses data collected from multiple
sources relating to the Australian aged care industry including the Australian
government’s aged care policy documents; the Productivity Commission’s
reports which were released in 2010-2011 (the Caring for Older Australians
Issues Paper (2010a) and the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older
Australians Inquiry Report (2011); public submissions received by the
Productivity Commission in 2010 and other related documents. These documents
were collected from multiple Australian government internet websites which are
publicly accessible. After the data has been collected, the data is prepared and
categorised, and content analysis is then used to categorise the data into groups
of themes to enable the identification of frequently occurring themes. Themes will
not be identified by key words that have been utilised, rather through the
identification of themes described in the data collected. The identified themes will
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then be interpreted and conclusions drawn to address the research question. The
articulated conclusion is based on the context drawn from the collected literature
and experiences of the preparer and transmitter of the text and the researcher
who interprets the text. Downe-Wamboldt (1992) adds that this is a beneficial
research mechanism as the focus on human communication reduces the loss of
meaning from the original data.

6.5 Data Preparation
Content analysis starts with data that is intended to be analysed for specific
research questions. The content analysis process begins with the data being
converted into written text. The identified data units are then recorded,
categorised, compared and contrasted to reach a conclusion about the content
of the analysed communication (Harris 1996; Collis & Hussy 2003; Harwood &
Garry 2003). Data collected from multiple sources are then analysed together
rather than separately. Each data source is important as it enables the analysis
and understanding of “how particular phenomena are represented” (Krippendorff
2013, p22) and reinforces the research results.

This study will follow the approach explained by Harwood and Garry (2003) to
extract then record and categorise data from written public submissions received
by the Productivity Commission to identify commonly occurring themes within the
text. Content analysis will be applied to 206 out of 333 submissions made to the
Productivity Commission in response to the inquiry into the Caring for Older
Australians Issues Paper (Productivity Commission 2011). These submissions
will then be categorised into various groups operating within the Australian aged
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care industry. Individual submissions will be excluded30 (127 of these were
excluded) as they are less influential and it is far more effective to have a coalition
of groups which can publicly promote the desired outcomes whilst claiming to
represent the public interest (Andrew & Cortese 2013). Further Huian (2013)
suggests that it is considered important to analyse the positions of different
stakeholders to the issuance of new legislation. Based on Huian’s (2013)
approach, content analysis will be applied to analyse and consider the positions
of multiple stakeholders to the issuance of new legislation. The responses in the
submissions explored in this study represent a broad range of for-profit and notfor-profit entities (which are small and large); from a range of aged care sectors
(ie health, social services, education) and from a wide range of different
geographical locations around Australia as well as professional bodies and
government departments. Hence the respondents have been divided into eight
categories based on the nature of the respondent’s operational activities and
purpose within the aged care industry: community representatives; not for profit
aged care service providers; for profit aged care service providers; councils and
local government authorities; community service providers; health care
institutions; health education institutions; ageing and aged care researchers.
Further, there did not appear to be any obvious subsections of the sector that did
not forward a submission to the Productivity Commission’s inquiry (Palmer 2013,
p224). Therefore, this study condenses the volume of collected data which is then
interpreted. By doing so, this study will stay true to the qualitative content analysis

30

Individual submissions have been excluded in this study for the following reasons: They have not addressed the
questions in the Productivity Commission’s Issues Paper that are included in this study (example submissions 36, 40,
58); the submissions discuss their personal experiences in the aged care industry which is not the focus of this
study; and coalitions of organisations have more power to enter and influence the regulatory space and subsequent
changes to regulation or legislation in comparison to individuals. This concept relates to regulatory space theory
which will be applied to the analysis in Chapter 7.
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process and end result.

6.5.1 Categorising the Data
In qualitative content analysis, the data are coded into categories or themes. A
category describes the “what” (Graneheim et al 2017, p32) of items including
“things, opinions, attitudes, perceptions and experiences” (Graneheim et al 2017,
p32), which are derived from a collection of similar data that will be sorted into
appropriate groups. Categories and themes are identified by the researcher to
collect relevant information and to enhance the understanding of the particular
phenomenon (Downe-Wambold 1992). Morse (2008) describes a theme as an
essence or a thread that intertwines throughout the data, which brings meaning
to a topic or experiences throughout several categories. Graneheim and
Lundman (2004) suggest that a theme regularly recurs within categories or may
interweave between categories.

This study will categorise the collected data and then identify common groups of
words and subject matter used to identify the various themes raised in their
submissions. Data identified in the public submissions received by the
Productivity commission, government documents and Productivity Commission
reports will then be used in this process. Finally, the themes identified will be used
to determine whether the government is trying to alter the Australian society’s
and government’s perceptions or manipulate each parties’ perceptions with
respect to the government’s accountability towards the Australian aged care
industry. As such, it is important to identify the common words of particular
subject matter as this highlights the importance of this theme to relevant
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stakeholders in this study which is an approach explained by Krippendorff (1980).

6.5.2 Develop Conclusions from the Categorised Data
The final step in the analysis process consists of data interpretation and
conclusions are formed based on the collected data. Further, the articulated
conclusion is based on the context drawn from the collected literature and
experiences of the preparer and transmitter of the text and the researcher who
interprets the text (Krippendorff 2013). Through the process of data collection and
analysing the data, this study will draw conclusions based on this data that has
been categorised.

6.5.3 Criteria for Identifying Trustworthiness
Content analysis in qualitative research design seeks to maintain accuracy,
objectivity and credibility to ensure that the analytical results are as trustworthy
as possible. The trustworthiness (validity) criteria in qualitative content analysis
as described by Guba and Lincoln (1994); Graneheim et al (2017); and
Bengtsson (2016) include the following components: credibility (internal validity);
transferability (external validity); dependability (reliability); and confirmability
(objectivity).

A challenge concerning the reliability of the research is its trustworthiness and
that the entire study is comprehensive. Through the use of qualitative content
analysis in aged care research, the trustworthiness of the essence or thread
weaving through the entire research network must be considered. This includes
the introduction; the appropriateness of the research method and background;
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the integrity of the research findings, discussion and conclusion (Graneheim et al
2017). In order to ensure the trustworthiness of the study, it is important to clarify
whose voice is being heard throughout the research thesis which includes the
“participants’ voice or the researchers’ interpretation” (Graneheim et al 2017,
p33). Rolfe (2006) suggests that the reader judges the quality of the research and
it is the authors’ responsibility to present the research findings in such a way to
ensure its persuasiveness to readers which will enhance its trustworthiness. This
can be enhanced by the researcher establishing the accuracy of the information
gathered during the research process by providing “trails” (Graneheim et al 2017,
p33) in the thesis, which enables the reader to understand how and why decisions
were made; and facilitates the readers’ judgement process. Throughout this
study, the key stakeholders within the Australian aged care industry have been
explained to identify the key voices in this analysis. Further, this study also
explains the key sources of data collected, which includes public submissions
and government reports which have been obtained from government public
internet websites. Finally, this study has also explained the research method and
methodology, which will be utilised.

Credibility refers to the demonstration in this study that the procedures in
gathering data and its analysis have been performed, and that relevant data has
not been excluded or that irrelevant data has been included (Bengtsson 2016;
Graneheim and Lundman 2004). In addition, it is also dependent on how
adequately the categories and themes address the collected data; and how
similarities and differences between categories have been judged (Graneheim &
Lundman 2004). This credibility can be enhanced by receiving agreement and
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acknowledgement from co-researchers; from associates; from the interviewees
or from an expert panel (Bengtsson 2016). As such, the participants’ recognition
of the research process is also a form of credibility. In this study, in order to
increase research credibility, a peer reviewing process will be conducted where
colleagues acting as independent reviewers will review the collected data in order
to obtain multiple perspectives about the data. The collected data was reviewed
and it was initially decided to review all submissions that were received in
response to the Productivity Commission’s Issues Paper and the second round
of submissions that were received following the release of the Productivity
Commission’s Caring for Older Australians Report. Following the independent
review it was agreed to reduce the number of submissions to review only the
submissions that were received in response to the Issues Paper as these
responses were instrumental to the decisions made by the government prior to
the Living Longer, Living Better Reforms. Further reviews also identified that key
themes could not be readily identified by relying on common words used. Rather,
the subject content of the submissions was used to determine the key themes.
The benefit of this process is that it allows the researcher to enhance their
interpretation of the data and to avoid biased explanations by asking a qualified
peer to question and challenge the initial conclusions made.

Transferability refers to the level of which the research results may be applicable
to other settings; groups; study objects and the number of informants (Bengtsson
2016; Graneheim & Lundman 2004). The degree of representation of the sample
is dependent on how generalisable the results may be (Krippendorff 2004). This
is more limited in qualitative research as the studies often make “limited claims”
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(Bengtsson 2016, p13) as the focus is on smaller sample sizes, and sometimes
single cases, which makes the generalisation more difficult. In order to address
this notion, it is important to provide a distinct description of the context, selection
and characteristics of the data collection and analytical process (Graneheim &
Lundman 2004). Thus this study has identified and made reference to the use of
data obtained from public submissions and Productivity Commission reports
which are publicly available on Australian government websites.

Dependability refers to the “stability” (Bengtsson 2016, p13) of the data and how
it may change over time; and whether any alterations are made to the data by the
researcher during the analysis process (Graneheim & Lundman 2004). In order
to maintain the dependability of the study, the entire research process follows the
standard process which is guided by the research methodology as described in
this chapter. As an example, the public submissions to the Productivity
Commission and government documents that are utilised are fully transcribed so
that accurate interpretation can occur and is consistent with the use of the data
from the public submissions. In addition, the empirical data collected from public
submissions, government documents and public websites are stored in a logically
and systematically ordered manner.

Confirmability addresses the concept of the “objectivity or neutrality of the data”
(Bengtsson 2016, p13); Polit & Beck 2006). Hence it is imperative that the
interpretations and concepts discussed in the study are in relation to “truth and
trustworthiness” (Bengtsson 2016, p13) as in qualitative research, there is not
one single truth. The research importance is placed on the depth of
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understanding a specific issue rather than focusing on a single truth and
generalisation (Rolfe 2006; Patton 2002). Therefore, it is important to link the data
collection questions to the research questions in order to reduce subjectivity.
Bengtsson (2016); and Lincoln and Guba (1994) suggest that confirmability can
be achieved by utilising multiple data sources; methods and informants to verify
the description and interpretations that have been used. As such multiple sources
have been used in this study to address the research question. Sources include
various government publications and public submissions to the Productivity
Commission. As such, this process contributes to the trustworthiness of the
analysis framework.

6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the research framework has been identified. The research
methodology is based on qualitative research methods where reality is a social
construction. This chapter also explores how content analysis as a qualitative
research technique will be utilised to extract data from submissions received from
the Australian Productivity Commission to identify commonly occurring themes
within the text. As such, this research methodology enables us to understand
what the actors in the aged care industry have said; how it was said; why it was
said and the impact their words have had in relation to the development of the
Living Longer Living Better Reforms and how the Australian government’s
attitude towards accountability has diminished. This methodology also enables
the exploration of the main concerns and the comprehension of the complexity of
the factors which define the shift in accountability between the Australian
government, the Australian aged care industry and its impact on Australian
society.
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Chapter 7 applies this research methodology where concepts and themes within
the communicated text are identified, and content analysis will be applied to
examine the relationships between concepts and themes (Lodhia & Martin 2012).
Further, regulatory space theory will also be incorporated in the analysis to
demonstrate which actors have entered the regulatory space of the development
of political issues, particularly the development of the Australian aged care policy
and how (or whether) they have influenced this process and the production of the
Living Longer, Living Better Reforms in Australia which resulted in the Australian
government’s shift in perception towards its accountability towards older
Australians.

201

Chapter 7 Aged Care and Government Accountability in
Australia

7.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the data collected for the purposes of this study which
includes submissions received by the Productivity Commission which was in
response to the Productivity Commission’s report entitled Caring for Older
Australians Issues Paper (“Issues Paper”) which was released in May 2010
(Productivity Commission 2011). This report focuses on the challenges that
Australia faces over the next 40 years, with the rising elderly demographic aged
65 years and over. Challenges include the rising cost of provision of aged care
services; the question of who is responsible to sustain the industry; and who and
how ought the aged care industry be funded. Prior to the government introducing
the Living Longer, Living Better reforms, the Productivity Commission invited the
public to forward submissions to the federal government in response to its Issues
Paper and provide opinions on how the federal government can address these
challenges and improve the industry. Hence this chapter will identify the
categories of the nature of organisations which prepared a submission in
response to the Issues Paper. Further, an explanation of the nature of each
category of organisations is also provided in order to understand the goals of
each category which also shapes their interest and how this influences the
content of their submission. Finally, key themes that were identified in analysed
submissions are also briefly explained in this chapter. The purpose of this
information is to demonstrate how the submissions did or did not influence the
Australian government’s shifting focus from the provision of effective services to
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the provision of efficient services. The consequence of the government’s
adoption of private sector practices is the increased focus on cost control and
reduction in expenditure across government funded enterprises such as the
health and aged care systems in Australia. There is less consideration of the
effectiveness of the government’s policies in the aged care industry which results
in a decline in meeting the needs of the vulnerable people in Australian society.

7.2 The Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older Australians
Issues Paper (2010)
The Productivity Commission is the Australian Government’s advisory board
which conducts independent research and analysis covering economic, social
and environment concerns which affects the welfare of Australians. It was created
as an independent authority in 1988 to replace the former Industry Commission,
Bureau of Industry Economics and Economic Planning Advisory Commission
(Productivity Commission 2019). The Productivity Commission was established
to undertake independent research and provide advice to the Government
relating to matters relating to the productivity performance of an industry, industry
development and productivity performance of the entire Australian economy. Its
purpose is to also promote public understanding on these matters (Productivity
Commission 2019). The overall role of the Commission is to improve the
economic performance of the Australian economy through increased productivity
in the public and private sectors in order to improve the standards of living for
Australians in the community; to encourage the development and growth of
Australian industries that are efficient in the manner that they utilise their
resources; to develop structural changes in the economy in a manner which
avoids social and financial hardship arising from these changes; and to recognise
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the interests of the community, consumers, companies and employees
(Productivity Commission Act 1998). The key functions of the Commission are to
hold public inquiries and research studies; monitor and benchmark performance
across industries; self-initiated research and reporting on the results of research
and analysis. Its overall commitment is to be transparent through the publication
of Annual Reports, legal documents such as plans and procedures which are in
the public interest (Productivity Commission 2019).
The regulation of aged care services are predominantly the role of the Australian
Federal Government (with some involvement with the State governments). The
Aged Care Act 1997 and the accompanying Aged Care Principles are the main
legislative instruments that provide the aged care framework and covers areas
such as: user rights; service planning; aged care services eligibility; accountability
and quality assurance (Productivity Commission 2010a). The Productivity
Commission (2010a) suggested that the demand for the types of aged care
services is broadening due to: changing patterns of diseases amongst the aged
(including dementia); growing affluence amongst older Australians; and
improvements in technologies in the provision of aged care services and medical
treatments. There is also increased diversity amongst older Australians in
preferences to living arrangements and their expectations regarding quality of
care services provided.
Based on these identified challenges, the Australian Government asked the
Productivity Commission to develop detailed options on restructuring Australia’s
aged care system to ensure that it can address the ongoing challenges it faces.
This task includes developing the system from the current funding regime and
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regulatory requirements to a new system which addresses the changing patterns
in demand of aged care services required. It also requires the assessment of the
mid to long term financial implications of changes to aged care roles and
responsibilities and its impact on the financial sustainability to the aged care
industry (Productivity Commission 2010a).
In order to understand the public sentiment towards these challenges the
Productivity Commission invited submissions from the public including the “older
Australians and their families; other carers; providers; the aged care workforce
and volunteers about their experiences with aged care services and their ideas
on how the system could be improved” (Productivity Commission 2010a, p7)
through formals documents and information mechanisms such as emails.
Following this process, in preparation of recommendations to the government,
the Productivity Commission also noted that it would conduct its own analysis.
This would incorporate input from participants through the consultative process;
roundtables and public hearings. It also drew upon past reviews to avoid
replicating research that remained current (Productivity Commission 2010a, p9).
It also sought to identify and consider arrangements that would provide the
optimal outcomes for the community; the interests of the older people, their
families and carers; aged care service providers and workers. The Commission
also took into account wider social implications, including to taxpayers and to
social policies.
This study uses the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older Australians
Issues Paper (2010a) as a key source as it invited submissions from the public
to comment on its expectations regarding the management of the aged care
205

industry. The study conducted by the Commission includes several important
questions which relate to accountability in the aged care industry in Australia31.
These questions are presented in the report and are used to trace to the
submissions provided by relevant parties as they provide commentary on the
questions posed in this report. The Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older
Australians Issues Paper (2010a) sought responses with reference to a number
of key aspects and questions contained in the report which relate to accountability
in the aged care industry in Australia. The theme of accountability has been
identified as a key theme in the report released by the Productivity Commission
and submissions received from the public. The questions in the Productivity
Commission’s report relate to the areas of cost cutting, efficiencies and
effectiveness. These areas are important as they can be linked to the
accountability definition, which is being used in this study, as explained in Chapter
3: Accountability “…ensures that those who have authority over public resources
provide an account for the use of those resources in terms of compliance,
efficiency and effectiveness…involves the fundamental (sic) of honesty,
openness, adequate disclosure and careful, effective application of resources”
(Sinclair 1995, p221).
Effectiveness relates to the adequate application of the public’s resources
through the provision of aged care services which meets social needs (Funnell et
al 2012). It can be seen in the questions noted in the report that effectiveness is
an area that is referred to the least. The topic of accountability, including
efficiency and cost cutting are the themes that are explored in detail through the

31

During a public consultation, many questions are asked of the public in order to obtain a wide range of possible
responses. These responses may not necessarily reflect the current policy however these responses may be used to
support the decision not to adopt a new policy (or amend the current policy).
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report. Efficiency relates to the careful use of the public’s resources which is
considered to be the most important concept of accountability by the government
(Funnell et al 2012). It relates to cost cutting measures by reducing its
expenditure in the aged care industry whilst it expects older Australians and
society to increase their own contributions. This is the negative aspect of
accountability as it demonstrates that the cost benefit is provided to the
government and not to the customer. The spiral effect is that the aged care
service providers also seek to increase their profits by reducing the quality of their
care services. The consequence of reduced time is that the quality of care
provided to each person diminishes. However, less time spent to care for each
person results in financial savings and increased profits for the institution. This
results in the “de-volution” of accountability where we no longer see efficient and
effective use of resources. We witness the contra progression of accountability
where resources are not efficiently and effectively used as the focus is on
reducing the quality of care services provided to the elderly and increasing profits.
Effectiveness is not achieved in this manner as society’s needs have not been
met due to the provision of inadequate aged care services.
This study uses the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older Australians
Issues Paper (2010a) to explore how the concept of accountability was a key item
in the questions that it raised to the community when it sought public consultation
for comments as to how to address the government’s growing concerns of
maintaining a sustainable aged care industry. The report provides questions for
the public to consider and address when the Productivity Commission invited
submissions from the public, and to comment on the government’s role and what
the public expects regarding how the aged care industry ought to be managed.
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This request is presented in the report, Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper,
which is used as a key source to trace the submissions provided by parties in the
aged care industry to comment on the issues identified in this report. The report
highlights several important questions that relate to the theme of accountability in
the aged care industry in Australia.
These key aspects can be described as the following in relation to the
accountability practice in Australia: with respect to the notion of accountability,
the Productivity Commission (2010a) asked questions such as the following in its
report: “Who should pay for aged care service and are the current government
subsidies and user charges for aged care appropriate. It also asked for comments
relating to whether there are components of aged care costs such as
accommodation, living expenses, personal and health care that warrant
government subsidies and/or should they be the personal responsibility of older
Australians; and to what extent should means testing be applied?” (Productivity
Commission 2010a, p20).
The Productivity Commission’s report also asked whether the aged care industry
should be funded by a mixed model with a dominant taxpayer funded component
(as currently applies), or a system that relies more heavily on consumer
contributions that is supported by a financial safety net. This could involve
additional or alternative mechanisms such as greater reliance on private savings
(including reverse mortgages) or the introduction of private long term care
insurance or a social insurance scheme (Productivity Commission 2010a). The
nature of these questions shows that the elderly are not regarded as recipients
of health services who would traditionally be identified as patients or recipients of
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care services. There is a shift in the move towards a free market enterprise where
the elderly are regarded as “consumers”, which emphasises the use of private
sector language and there is a lack of consideration that the elderly are a
vulnerable group in society who require additional care services which were once
considered as a public good.
The Productivity Commission then shifts its focus to improving efficiencies and
productivity with requesting comments with respect to the following questions:
“What are the most appropriate methods of adjusting public funding, or insurance
arrangements, to keep pace with cost increases and changes in any care
benchmark, while providing incentives to increase efficiency and productivity
(p20); and whether there are any “unexploited productivity and efficiency gains in
the aged care sector; where such unexploited gains are seen to exist, what policy
changes are needed to support their realisation” (Productivity Commission
2010a, p26). This shows that there is an emphasis on enhanced efficiencies in a
sector where the provision of effective and quality services is the focus of items
that ought to be addressed. Instead, the focus has shifted to cost cutting,
enhancing government savings and reducing public expenditure by shifting the
responsibilities to fund this industry to the private sector.
Through the adoption of new public management principles, the focus is on the
transition of a segment of the health care market to a privatised model of health
care. This is in contrast to the original purpose of the development of the aged
care sector in the 1950s by the former Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies
(refer to Chapter 2 for further discussion), which was to provide a fully subsidised
segment of the public health sector. Funding issues noted in the Productivity
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Commission’s (2010a) report was the debate regarding the adequacy of current
fees schedule and subsidies; and the “efficiency, equity and sustainability of the
aged care funding arrangements” (p19). Concerns raised in the report include
questioning regarding the extent to which some elements of care, particularly
everyday living expenses and accommodation fees, which are more heavily
subsidised than equivalent levels of care received in the home; the method for
indexing care subsidies within the aged care sector and the extent to which this
results in funding falling behind corresponding rises in input costs; the
effectiveness of the provision of extra services and adequacy of incentives for
service providers and “consumers” (p19).
In addition, the long term objective of the government is to achieve greater
integration with the provision of aged care services for older Australians. The
National Healthcare Agreement argues that older Australians ought to receive
“high quality, affordable health and aged care services that are appropriate to
their needs and enable choice” (COAG 2009). Hence the Productivity
Commission (2010a) also asked in its report: “how effective has the aged care
system been in addressing these objectives? What changes, if any, should be
made to these objectives?” (p15). The emphasis in these questions is in relation
to the affordability of aged care services. This suggests that the government
wants to move from a publicly funded sector to one that is fully paid by older
Australians. Affordability is traditionally not a concept that is considered under the
publicly funded services, as effectiveness of the provision of services has
traditionally been the key component in the provision of public services. Such
language is further derived from the private market with an emphasis on
affordable services that allows older Australians to choose which services they
210

require. Historically these were services that were publicly funded, in the nature
of public health care services. However, these services are now subject to being
partially or fully funded by the elderly. Increasingly the aged care system is
shifting towards a mechanism which requires the elderly to fully fund the costs of
their care, which also contradicts the government’s historical approach to the
system being fully government funded.
The next section will perform an analysis of a sample of public submissions
received by the Productivity Commission in 2010. These submissions were in
response to its 2010 Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper. As discussed in
Chapter 6, content analysis is a research technique that will be utilised to extract
data from submissions received by the Productivity Commission to identify
commonly occurring themes within the text. Content analysis has been applied
to 206 out of 333 submissions made to the Productivity Commission in response
to the inquiry into the Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper (2010a).
The data collected for the purposes of this study was obtained from the following
main groups: community representatives groups; private sector service
providers; councils and state governments; health organisations; health
education institutions and aged care researchers. An explanation of the purpose
and mission of each group is described below. Further, the data collected from
the above categories of groups will be analysed to explore their perspectives on
the issue of accountability in the aged care industry.

7.3 Categorisation of Submissions
The submissions described above will become the data that will be used in this
study. As such a total of 206 submissions have been incorporated into this
211

analysis (as individual submission were excluded), hence the respondents have
been divided into eight categories based on: community representatives (74
submissions); not for profit aged care service providers (48 submissions); for
profit aged care service providers (10 submissions); councils and governments
(15 submissions); community service providers (31 submissions); health care
institutions (21 submissions); health education institutions (4 submissions); and
ageing and aged care researchers (3 submissions).
The table below shows the content analysed in the submissions for each category
and the main themes that were identified which are: 1) Accountability; 2)
Efficiencies and Cost Cutting; 3) Discrimination and Inequity; and 4) Consumer
Choice (refer to table 7.1). The key words, common groups of words and subject
matter which relate to the above four concepts and were identified in the
submissions were analysed include: the use of the words accountability,
responsibility, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. Sentences or subject
matter identified within paragraphs which discuss areas such as who ought to
contribute to funding the aged care industry; maintain responsibility to fund the
industry; how taxpayers’ funding ought to spend and reported; older Australians
should have access to affordable, effective and safe care; people ought to
contribute towards their care costs according to their capacity to pay; everybody
should be able to access aged care services even those who cannot afford to pay
for them; the system ought to be funded and regulated by the government;
responsibility and management of aged care policies; the government ought to
develop a system of fees based on means testing arrangements; who ought to
pay for aged care; who is responsible for the provision of services; who ought to
look after the elderly; who ought to fund the industry and types of funding models.
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In this study the theme identified as being the key subject matter in the analysed
content is accountability. The key words, phrases and subject matter that will be
used to address the research question are included in Table 7.1. They will also
be used to explore whether the concept of accountability is shifting and is
perceived as no longer solely the government’s responsibility. Further, this
analysis will also explore the stakeholders’ positions as to whether funding the
aged care industry ought to be a social responsibility or whether the government
ought to be solely responsible to oversee it as a funder, regulator and policy
developer.
Table 7.1: Key themes identified per category of submissions received by the
Productivity Commission (2010b):

Category

1.Australian Ageing

Submission
Numbers
83, 260, 302

Main Themes Identified

 Funding dedicated to ageing research is required. It is unknown which

Research Institutes

models of community are most acceptable, effective and cost efficient
in the Australian context (Efficiency);

 Research is needed to analyse the impact of the global financial
crisis on people’s financial plans and retirement intentions, and how
this will impact the economy in terms of financial sustainability of
the health and aged care sectors (Efficiency);
 Recognise that there needs to be aged care planning as a social
investment. Ensures quality care meets the individuals’ needs and
preferences (Accountability);


Aged care planning should be consumer driven and controlled,
providing a reliable and flexible mechanism to express and
anticipate tailored care choices to improve quality of end of life
(Consumer Choice).

2. Health Education
Institutions

73, 86,
235

232,

 Aged care services should be funded through a universal system
such as Medicare (Accountability);
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 The current ACFI model encourages the submission of high care
residents to increase funding to aged care providers, resulting in
greater inequities (Discrimination and Equity);
 Lack of funding has increased the focus on efficiencies, productivity
and cost cutting (Efficiency);
 Accommodation services should be charged to the elderly in aged
care homes. Pricing should be at a level that they can afford, with
means testing to be used to provide equitable accommodation for
everyone (Accountability);


The current government subsidies and user charges are less than
appropriate as they do not consider the needs of residents and
families, and the escalating costs to provide these services
(Accountability).

3.Health
Organisations

65, 69, 80, 85,
93, 79, 103,
145, 147, 158,
175, 176, 177,
187, 203, 205,
222, 244, 250,
482

 Funding should be provided by the Commonwealth government
(Accountability);
 Deficiencies in current funding model and there needs to be more
individualised care services rather than a one size fits all approach
(Accountability);
 Funding should be allocated on an individual basis, and consumers
should have choice as to how the funds are spent (Consumer
Choice);
 Remove the focus on the quota of beds and number of packages
(remove the quantification of the elderly) (Efficiency);
 Instead improve focus on achieving positive health outcomes,
improving quality of life and health care will result in efficiencies
and productivity gains. This will reduce the need for aged care
services and government expenditure (Accountability);
 Cost saving measures will reduce the number of places in aged
care homes and encourage the elderly to remain in the community
for longer will reduce government expenditure (Efficiency);
 Delay access to aged care homes so that the elderly can have a
better life for longer. This is also in the public interest as expensive
outlays of public funds can now be reduced or delayed
(Accountability);


Current subsidy levels are not adequate across all levels of care as
most of the ACFI funding is aimed towards high care, resulting in
inequities in accessing aged care services (Discrimination and
Equity);
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Funding for services should be based on future needs and
demands, rather than on historical factors (Accountability).

4. Community
Service Providers

5. Councils and
Governments

51, 62,
117, 150,
160, 162,
186,
189,197,
214, 218,
221, 223,
229, 233,
238, 240,
242, 243,
257, 270

75,
157,
165,
188,
200,
220,
225,
236,
241,
251,

50, 53, 87, 97,
108, 180, 183,
259, 263, 266,
268, 329, 420,
458, 329

 The right level of funding is needed for high quality affordable
health and aged care services (Accountability);
 Consumers should have choice as to where they receive their
services, and how they will pay for these (Consumer Choice);
 Increased accountability for aged care service providers with
respect to the expenditure of funding. Require audited budgets and
financial statements accessible to everyone (Accountability);


Inadequately funded system due to current ACFI mechanism which
needs to be reviewed (Accountability).

 The current Medicare Levy ought to be redesigned or introduce an
Aged Care Levy to increase the funding pool to fund future aged
care costs (Accountability);
 Consumer directed care should be introduced to give consumers
choice regarding the services they want and need, and where to
obtain it (Consumer Choice);
 Accommodation bonds should be introduced into high care
services to offset other increasing costs and to ensure equity
across all aged care services (Accountability);
 The federal government should be solely responsible for funding
the Aged Care Sector. The shift for them to be solely responsible
increases the chances of integration between the health and aged
care sectors (Accountability);
 Local councils and state governments have had to make significant
financial contributions by providing land and capital, and services
and facilities to older people for many years. They would like to
continue to provide this support to non-profit organisations
(Accountability);
 The funding models and subsidies paid across community care
packages need to be reviewed due to some people being charged
higher fees despite requiring less care. This has increased inequity
in the current system (Discrimination and Equity);
 It is acknowledged that carers reduce the costs for the
governments by providing care for their relatives at home and in the
community (Accountability);
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Encourage people to stay home longer, providing more community
services will reduce costs to governments and delay the move to
residential high and low care facilities (Accountability).

6. Aged Care
Service Providers
(For Profit)

76, 131, 134,
136, 206, 240,
237, 265, 305,
324

 The government ought to improve the funding and costing models
to reduce investment risk in aged care residential homes
(Accountability);
 Requires improved transparency regarding the costs to provide
services to accurately determine pricing to provide services and
determine who ought to be responsible for paying for these
(Accountability);
 The aged care industry is underfunded to provide adequate care
needs and support for elderly patients (Accountability);
 The aged care system requires a consumer directed care model
where the elderly should be given funding power to determine what
services they need and want, and the services are tailored to their
needs (Consumer Choice);
 The government should still be responsible to fund the industry by:
ensuring that funding is allocated so that choices in the types of
services received and accessible is not limited; ensure that funding
allocation is based on the costs of providing services not on the
funding sources and not rationed based on the number of spaces
available (Accountability);
 The government needs to ensure that funding is allocated and
accessible to those who cannot afford to pay for the services they
need. This ensures that the system is equitable (Discrimination and
Equity);


Accommodation bonds should be introduced into high care
services to reduce the reliance on banks for investment funding.
Currently there is a lack of funding for investing into the
development of new aged care facilities (Accountability).

7. Aged Care
Service Providers
(Not for Profit)

49, 82, 98, 99,
100, 105, 110,
111, 124, 128,
129, 130, 141,
142, 143, 148,
152, 156, 161,
166, 168, 170,
171, 173, 195,
196, 198, 212,
215, 217, 218,
221, 223, 246,

 Industry is inadequately funded leading to increased cost cutting
and efficiencies (Accountability);
 Consumers require choice of services and how they pay for these
services (Consumer Choice);
 Weaknesses in ACFI funding model is discriminatory and
inequitable as it encourages aged care service providers to accept
more elderly patients with high care needs (resulting in higher
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252, 254,
267, 269,
279, 288,
323, 325,
369, 406

258,
272,
311,
356,

subsidies received for high care needs patients)(Discrimination &
Equity);


The government fails to consider the increasing costs in providing
services and increases in funding are not in line with inflation.
Increases in funding are well below the Australian Consumer Price
Index (Accountability).

8.Community
Representatives

44, 52, 67, 77,
81, 84, 88, 95,
96, 102, 110,
113, 125, 126,
127, 133, 137,
138, 139, 140,
144, 149, 154,
155, 163, 164,
167, 169, 172,
181, 192, 193,
194, 199, 201,
202, 204, 207,
208, 209, 210,
211, 216, 219,
224, 227, 228,
254, 247, 261,
285, 286, 287,
290, 292, 294,
295, 296, 297,
298, 301, 303,
304, 306, 307,
308, 309, 321,
322, 326, 327,
330, 414, 433



Inequitable system (Discrimination & Equity);



Require effective and efficient use of funding (Accountability);



Weaknesses in ACFI funding model leading to inequitable funding
to residents and decline in quality of care (Discrimination & Equity);



Increase in accountability and transparency of aged care service
providers (Accountability);



People should contribute towards the costs of their
accommodation and their capacity to pay but not pay
towards the costs of their care (Accountability);



Opposition towards paying the imposition of accommodation bonds
for nursing home care. No other areas of the health system are
patients required to pay a bond (Accountability);



Ought to be a universal access system that does not discriminate
and penalises those for being good savers (Accountability).

The key theme of accountability is the focus of this study and will be discussed in
further detail in the next section. Firstly, a brief introduction of each category of
submissions (e.g. for profit service providers), their purpose and aims are
explained. It is important to explore these categories at it also demonstrates how
their submissions reflect their aim and strategy; which can also influence the
shaping of the regulatory decisions made by the federal government.
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Many submissions were received from organisations which conduct their
operations and are known as aged care service providers. This category of
service providers has been divided into the profit and for profit categories. Whilst
their overall aim is to provide aged care services to their customers, they have
different missions and visions which impact on the direction they choose to take.
Both types of organisations are required to generate profits each year; however,
greater emphasis on this is placed by for-profit organisations. As a result, both
types of organisations are impacted by differing profits; their focus on efficiencies
and how they manage their profits. Their differences are described in further
detail below.
7.3.1 For-Profit Service Providers
The for-profit service providers were incorporated in this study and data was
collected from 10 submissions. These providers are either private companies
(which has a small number of company members and can reinvest profits to the
benefit of the company); or are public companies (which has shareholders and
dividends are paid to its members). The main difference between for-profit and
not-for-profit organisations is the focus on profits. According to Christadelphian
Aged Care (2019), profit is the organisation’s surplus funds that remain after all
expenses have been accounted (this includes salaries and wages, care
expenses, depreciation and maintenance costs). In a for-profit organisation, this
profit is distributed to the owners and/or investors and shareholders of the
organisation. Thus the aim of for-profit providers is to enhance profits to generate
returns to its investors and financial stakeholders and to promote growth in the
company. As a consequence, quality of care is generally considered to be lower
by for-profit providers due to the increased focus on efficiencies and cost cutting
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through reductions in expenditure (Comondore et al 2009).
Investment in residential aged care is led by the private sector providers and the
growing trend for these providers is to acquire existing facilities in order to grow
their investment portfolios. For-profit providers also have incentives to grow their
capital as it requires sufficient levels of capital to attract capital contributions.
Returns on capital investment also need to be sufficient to maintain adequate
current investment levels and to attract new investment to meet the growing
capital demands in the future. The Aged Care Guild (2017) suggests that the
sector requires the generation of sufficient capital returns and cash flows to fund
future capital expenditure and attract further equity investments from financiers.
Otherwise, there is an increased risk that the government will be required to fund
the sector or the alternative will be to fail at providing adequate services to the
elderly population.
The submissions analysed from the for-profit organisations shows that their focus
was on the government to develop an aged care industry that is more efficient
which requires the care recipient to contribute more towards the costs of their
care. Their primary concern is the decrease in profitability and the decrease in
funding is stifling their ability to invest in the development and refurbishment of
aged care facilities. This demonstrates that due to the increased focus on the
financial capacity of the industry, there is a decline towards the focus in service
quality provided. As the government has encouraged service providers to
increase their focus on efficiency gains and service providers are following the
government’s government aged care policy to increase profits the ultimate victims
are the elderly as its customers and society.
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7.3.2 Not-For-Profit Service Providers
Not for-profit service providers are also in this study and data was collected from
47 submissions. The majority of providers under this category include religious,
charitable and community based organisations (Parliament of Australia 2019). A
not-for-profit organisation’s profit is reinvested into the organisation to further
provide services and facilities to enable it to enhance and advance its aims,
mission and vision (Christadelphian Aged Care, 2019). Although not-for-profit
organisations are entitled to make a profit, it is financially prudent to achieve this,
as the surplus is used to enable the organisation to advance its mission and
values, creating a sustainable organisation. This enables the organisation to
focus on improving the quality of care for their residents and facilities.

Based on the differences between not-for-profit and for profit-organisations, it is
anticipated that the for-profit organisations will focus on enhancing its revenues
for the purpose of attracting capital expansion to enhance organisational growth
and investor returns. Due to the increased pressure to increase returns to
investors, as residential aged care is a highly labour intensive industry, there is
increased pressure to reduce labour costs. However, the not-for-profit providers’
focus is to improve revenues in order to attract quality carers and enhance the
quality of care to its patients. The analysed submissions by not-for-profit
organisations argue that the government ought to be primarily accountable to
manage and fund the aged care industry. These organisations are calling for the
government to focus on providing quality care services; to focus less on reducing
costs and expenditure in the industry; and to incorrectly claim that the industry is
a severe financial burden to Australian society for the purposes of enhancing its
political motives. As demonstrated, the nature of these organisations is to focus
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on providing quality of care and quality of life to the elderly rather than supporting
the direction of the government. Based on this, there are contrasting views in the
data that has been analysed in the collected submissions by the for-profit and
not-for-profit organisations.

7.3.3 Councils and Governments
The councils and governments category consists of local councils across all
Australian states along with state governments. The aim of councils is to supply
public goods and services, and to represent and include local citizens in
determining local needs and how these local needs can be met. The federal
government is responsible for the conduct of national affairs, including social
services and providing pensions to older Australians. They are also responsible
to fund social activities which are provided by state governments in areas such
as aged care, health and education services. Ultimately the aim of councils and
governments are to meet the national and local needs of all Australians.
Data collected for the purposes of this study was derived from 14 submissions.
The federal government did not forward a submission given that the Productivity
Commission’s study was conducted on behalf of the federal government. As
such, this would have been considered to be a conflict of interest if the federal
government provided a response and instead adopted a neutral approach. The
position adopted by the councils and state governments in their submissions is
to support older people to live independently and safely as possible in their homes
while receiving appropriate and quality care assistance. It also emphasises the
need to promote well-being; increasing prevention and early intervention of
ageing health related issues whilst providing continuous and accessible care
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across the health and aged care service sector (Parliament of Australia 2019).
As such, they adopt a neutral position which meets the needs of individual older
people whilst also addressing and meeting social needs which demonstrates that
their greatest concern is to care for the elderly.
7.3.4 Community Service Providers
This

category

consists

of

not-for-profit

and

government

administered

organisations which provide care or support services delivered at the person’s
home or within the community to assist them to remain living in the community.
Providing these services also reduces the risk of admission to a hospital or a
residential facility. Services provided include: nursing and personal care;
domestic services; social support; gardening and home maintenance services.
As explained above, the aim for not-for-profit service providers is to focus on
individual care needs and providing high quality services. They rely on federal
and state government funding to ensure that they can provide these services to
adequately meet social needs. Data collected from this category was derived
from 31 submissions that were received. The analysed submissions raise
concerns regarding a number of matters: the lack of government funding has
decreased quality of care services provided; the manner in which the elderly are
assessed for care needs to be individually tailored to ensure that specialised
funding is provided to each person particularly to those who require more
complex needs (eg dementia patients); the government ought to cease their focus
on measuring outputs and costs and change their focus to measuring outcomes.
Overall this category of providers do not support the government’s increased
focus on efficiencies and call for their focus to distance itself from efficiencies to
the traditional area of providing effective, quality care services and for the
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government to be accountable and responsible for the industry.
7.3.5 Community Representatives
Community representatives consist of organisations or organisations working as
a co-operative to maximise community resources and deliver improved options
for people older people living in the community. They also represent consumers,
providers, health professionals and unions involved in aged care. The aim of
these coalitions of groups is to advocate for the improvements towards the quality
of care at the end of life for older people living in residential and community
settings; seek improvements in funding to aged care services and call for
increased accountability from organisations operating in the industry. Community
representatives are also not-for-profit organisations; however, as they don’t
provide direct care services to the older community, they don’t receive subsidies
from the governments as aged care and community service providers. They rely
mostly on grants to support their information services and projects which are
derived from federal, state and local governments. Other revenues are also
derived from community donations and fundraising activities to ensure that they
have adequate funding to meet their social aim and mission. Data collected from
this category was derived from 73 submissions that were received. The
submissions analysed express concerns regarding the government’s focus on
reducing expenditure and call for the government to remain solely accountable
and responsible to manage the planning of services and providing funding for
these services. They also call for service providers to be more transparent
regarding how the funds received are expended in order to assess whether
adequate services are provided to the elderly. Their key focus in its submissions
is to provide quality of care to the elderly and improve their quality of life; whilst
223

ensuring that the government and service providers remain accountable to
society.
7.3.6 Health Care Institutions
The health care institutions category consists of a mix of for-profit and not-forprofit Australian health institutions which provide health care services to
Australian residents of all ages. They aim to provide health care services that are
accessible particularly to older Australians and to ensure that they don’t live in
poverty; maintain adequate nutrition and standard of living. In addition, they aim
to reduce chronic illness in the elderly in order to reduce rising medical costs that
also reduce dependency on aged care services. Such institutions are funded by
a combination of fees charged for services; government grants; donations and
fundraising activities. The overall aim of these institutions is to improve quality of
life and wellbeing, which reduces pressure on the medical and aged care
systems; subsequently minimising the financial and social costs to the
community. Data collected from this category was derived from 19 submissions
that were received. The analysed submissions identified that the main suggestion
is that the government ought to be responsible to restructure the aged care
funding system to ensure it is more equitable. It also calls for a subsidy structure
where care services are assessed based on individual needs rather than the
current standardised approach. These organisations also suggest that the
government ought to integrate aged care service, and health care needs to
reduce the risk of cost shifting and blame to the health care sector which has
resulted in the decrease in necessary funding for aged care services. Its overall
concern is that the government ought to remain solely responsible for the
management of quality aged care services and to increase its focus on effective
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services rather than efficiencies in the industry; and to improve the quality of life
for the elderly.
7.3.7 Health Education Institutions
Health Education Institutions consists of not-for-profit organisations whose aim is
to provide support, resources, education, training and research to medical
practitioners, the nursing profession and community service providers (Australian
College of Nursing 2019; The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners
2019). The purpose of these organisations is to improve the quality of medical
and care services provided to the elderly to maximise independence and
wellbeing through their chosen form of accommodation. These organisations
derive their revenue from professional membership fees; government grants and
community donations. Data collected from this category was derived from 4
submissions that were received. The submissions analysed suggest that the
government ought to be accountable for the aged care industry and develop a
universal funding scheme for the aged care industry to ensure that all citizens
have equitable access to these services. Their key concern is that the elderly
have limited access to care services due to lack of funding which does not
adequately meet their needs. A holistic approach is suggested where the
government ought to focus on long term quality of life for the elderly rather than
short term efficiencies and improvement in productivity, which negatively impacts
on the elderly and society.
7.3.8 Aged Care Researchers
Ageing and aged care researchers maintain a specific program of research to
address the gaps identified in the aged care industry. They adopt a multi225

disciplinary approach to explore the impacts of medical, psychiatric, nursing,
health, environment and technology on ageing people. These not-for-profit
organisations are independent to governments, and their mission is to improve
quality of care for older Australians while advocating for sufficient government
funding to ensure that these social needs are met. Data collected from this
category was derived from 3 submissions that were received. The analysed
submissions identified that their concern was the government’s lack of funding
provided to aged care researchers. The requirement for increases in funding is
for ageing researchers to assess the quality of care and support provided to the
elderly, and to identify the impact to the elderly and their carers with increasing
costs to pay for their care resulting in increased poverty and emotional distress.
By undertaking this research will enable these organisations to develop a deeper
understanding of attitudes towards ageing and to develop an evidence based,
robust aged care system. This will enable them to collaborate with the
government’s aged care policy developers to make better informed decisions
regarding ageing policies and programs to the benefit of all Australian society.
As explored above, each category of submissions have different missions and
agendas. Overall the main purpose in a for profit organisations is to earn sufficient
profits to provide a return on capital for its investors. This also influences the level
expenditure it can afford in providing care services to the elderly. When the focus
is on increasing profits, it can have a detrimental impact on the quality of care
services provided. In contrast, the not-for-profit organisations’ main aims were to
provide quality services to the elderly and improve their health and wellbeing in
the community. Their other goal was to also generate profits each year which are
vital to ensure that they have sufficient cash reserves to pay for their expenditure.
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However, their profits are retained within the organisation to ensure that they can
continue to provide adequate aged care services. Therefore what can be seen is
that both types of entities have the aim to provide quality care services however,
this is impacted by the profitability of the organisation and the influence of the
stakeholders. Subsequently, these aims have an influence on the responses that
they provided in their submissions to the Productivity Commission. The theme of
accountability was identified by reading each submission, and this has been
analysed and described under each category of submissions in the next section.
This analysis also includes comparisons and contrasts between submissions and
categories of submissions. A summary of the accountability related matters
identified in the submissions from each category has been summarised in Table
7.2.
Table 7.2: Summary of accountability related matters identified in the
submissions received by the Productivity Commission (2010b):
Category

Accountability Related Matters

1.Australian Ageing

• Government is responsible to increase funding relating to

Research Institutes

the government’s plan to support research in ageing
initiative.

2. Health Education Institutions

• Government is responsible to fund aged care industry
through a universal health type of system for the elderly.
• Aged care system funding model ought to be changed to
incorporate different models of care and funding.
• Government or community ought to be responsible for
funding.

3.Health Organisations

• Government is responsible to fund and manage aged
care industry. Requires shift in focus on improving health
outcomes and quality of life rather than costs per person.
• Government ought to increase community funding to
support older Australians to remain at home for longer.
• Government is responsible (along with states, territories
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and local councils) to review aged care policies and
promote healthy ageing.
• Government is responsible to develop acceptable
standards of aged care services and more flexible,
personalised services.
• Government ought to simplify accountability and
transparency of aged care services, standards and
accessibility.
4. Community Service Providers

• Government ought to focus on achieving outcomes and
effectiveness of services rather than measuring outputs.
• Government ought to be solely responsible for funding
aged care industry and develop different funding models.
• Government ought to understand how aged care and
health care services are linked; improved management of
services and subsidies with improved integration.

5. Councils and Governments

• Develop partnership with federal and state governments
and local councils to develop one consistent regulatory
aged care framework which addresses local funding and
aged care service needs.
• Government to be responsible for funding and policy
development of aged care system.
• Government’s lack of transparency and calculations used
to demonstrate future growth costs can’t be met solely by
the government.

6. Aged Care Service Providers
(For Profit)

• Government ought to place needs and interests of elderly
first rather than focusing on expenditure and funding.
• Requires one level of responsibility with ought to be with
the government.
• The elderly should be partially responsible to fund aged
care services.
• Government’s lack of transparency and calculations used
to show true costs of care don’t adequately address the
decreased sustainability and profitability of aged care.

7. Aged Care Service Providers
(Not for Profit)

• Government’s lack of transparency and accountability to
address increasing problems and develop appropriate
solutions.
• Government ought to assume full responsibility to
manage funding and policy making of aged care.

8.Community Representatives

• Government ought to assume full responsibility and
manage funding and service delivery of aged care.
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• Government’s lack of accountability is compounded by
different funding arrangements and management of care
services between federal and state governments.

7.4 Analysis of Accountability Theme
Accountability in the Australian aged care sector has been described in Chapter
3 for this study as relating to public accountability. As the government has
increased responsibility to its citizens, it has an obligation to provide an answer
to the public for its actions; determining social goals; reporting on the results of
the outcomes and determining the consequences when the outcomes are right
or wrong, and imposing sanctions or rewards when appropriate. The nature and
significance of this role of public accountability is central to the Australian
democratic system. As such it was identified that the definition of accountability
in this thesis is that it “…ensures that those who have authority over public
resources provide an account for the use of those resources in terms of
compliance, efficiency and effectiveness…involves the fundamental (sic) of
honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and careful, effective application of
resources” (Sinclair 1995, p221). Under this umbrella of public accountability, it
is important to know who is accountable; for what they are accountable; and to
whom they are accountable. There is the additional requirement of an obligation
of responsibility to the account-holders, and the public actor feels obliged to
inform the account-holders of their conduct. As described in Chapter 3, the
principal is the general public as they provide resources to the government
through the form of taxation revenues that are collected. The government then
provides public funding to service providers in order to fund the provision of aged
care services. The government and service providers are morally accountable to
229

the community to report on the manner in which these funds are spent and
whether they have achieved society’s goals. They are also responsible for
ensuring that they develop appropriate social programmes, and provide efficient
and effective aged care services to older Australians.
With respect to the topic of accountability, the Productivity Commission (2010a)
further asked in its report: “Who should pay for aged care services? Are the
current government subsidies and user charges for aged care appropriate? Are
there components of aged care costs-accommodation, living expenses, personal
and health care-that warrant government subsidies and/or should they be the
personal responsibility of older Australians? To what extent should means testing
be applied?” (Productivity Commission 2010a, p20). These questions were
challenged by constituents in the aged care sector and included arguments to
support the government’s ideology that the elderly ought to fund the costs of their
own care. However, there was opposition to this, with arguments that the
government ought to be the most responsible for sustaining the industry. An
analysis of the accountability theme is provided below, and quotes from certain
submissions in each category are incorporated. This reinforces the arguments
presented by these organisations which demonstrate how they support or
contradict the accountability theme.
1. Australian Ageing Research Institutes Submissions
The Ageing Researchers category commented in their submissions that further
government funding dedicated to ageing research is required. The Australian
Association of Gerontology Inc (Productivity Commission submission 83, 2010b)
and National Ageing Research Institute (Productivity Commission submission
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260, 2010b, p3) specifically suggest that there needs to be an increase in
Australian government funded research initiatives to adequately address the
research concerns described below. These submissions further add that the
National Health and Medical Research Council and the Australian Research
Council (both are Australian Commonwealth government entities), ought to be
accountable for “providing significant funding” (Productivity Commission
submission 83, 2010b, p5; Productivity Commission submission 260, 2010b, p6)
to support the government’s plan to conduct research in the care and support of
ageing Australians. The research outcomes will be used to support the
development of the most effective services in the prevention of poor health;
improve quality of life and promotion of well-being. The submission argues that
there has been inadequate funding in this area in comparison to the significant
investment costs to fund disease related research.
Further, this submission also requests that funding is required in relation to the
impact on carers of the elderly and the burdens that they face as they are more
vulnerable to depression, stress, poor health and poverty which also contributes
to “considerable social and economic loss” (Productivity Commission submission
83, 2010b, p5). As such this submission emphasises that there has been limited
and little quantification of the impact to the carers in these areas and research is
required in these areas to assess these impacts; the nature of assistance that
carers may further require; and the social and economic costs impacting the
government and the public due to increasing health and poverty issues facing
carers.
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Finally, the Australian Association of Gerontology Inc also argues that funding for
research is required in the area of changing social attitudes towards the elderly
by shifting the focus on ways that “older people continue to live rich and rewarding
lives that contribute to the fabric of Australian communities” (Productivity
Commission submission 83, 2010b, p5). It is emphasised that the attitude
towards older Australians needs to change from a negative perspective relating
to degeneration of health and escalating care costs to a positive perspective
where older Australians also contribute to the growth and productivity of
Australian society. Overall the benefit of conducting this research will enable a
deeper understanding of ageing and the development of a more robust evidence
base, which can be used by the government’s policy makers to make better
informed decisions on aged care policies and programs to the benefit of all
Australians. In addition, the ageing researchers organisations further argue that
due to the lack of sound evidence as a consequence of lack of funding and
research that many of the questions posed in the Productivity Commission’s
Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper (2010a) cannot be answered without
further research. This includes determining which models of community care are
the most “acceptable, effective, cost efficient and feasible in an Australian context
(Productivity Commission submission 260, 2010b, p3). As such, this category of
submissions emphasises that the government still ought to be accountable in the
aged care industry with respect to providing increased funding in ageing
research. This suggests that the policy makers’ decisions that have been made
are based on inadequate evidence and requires further research with respect to
the effectiveness of the current system; and its social and economic impacts. As
such, their focus is not on reducing costs or creating an efficient system. Rather,
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it is about meeting the collective needs of the Australian society which ought to
remain the responsibility of the Australian government.
2. Health Education Institutions Submissions
Different arguments are presented under the category of Health Education
Institutions where the main focus is on who ought to be responsible to continue
to fund the aged care industry. Their overall arguments suggest that aged care
services ought to be funded through a universal system such as Medicare; the
current ACFI funding model encourages the admission of high care residents
which increases funding received by service providers, resulting in greater
inequities towards accessing aged care services. Finally, the current lack of
funding has resulted in an increased focus on efficiencies, cost cutting,
productivity and fails to consider the needs of their families and the rising costs
to provide these services.
A submission provided by the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of
Psychiatrists argue that care for the elderly with special care needs (which is for
older Australians who, increasingly, require higher care needs such as dementia
related illness), cannot be driven by their ability to pay and ought to be
incorporated into a universal health system for the aged, such as a Medicare
system. It highlights that “accessibility and affordability for all Australians is
paramount to a well-functioning system” (Productivity Commission submission
73, 2010b, p13). In the same category, the College of Nursing (2010b), supports
this argument and contends that there are challenges surrounding the current
funding instrument and the lack of affordability of the aged care services. The
College emphasises that the current mechanical “one size fits all” (Productivity
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Commission submission 86, 2010b, p1) approach needs to change as it will not
be sustainable in the future. This is due to the constantly evolving demand in the
specialised types of care which has transitioned to incorporate low care, frail low
care, high care, complex high care, dementia care and palliative. As such, there
is the need for very different models of care which are associated with different
types of costs and funding required (with higher costs associated with the more
complex, specialised forms of care). It further points out that the recent calls for
the principles of user directed funding which is aimed at providing assistance in
line with the care recipients’ needs, gives them a choice in determining their care
with the ultimate aim to “support the fiscal sustainability of the aged care sector”
(Productivity Commission submission 86, 2010b, p2). However, this is not a
mechanism that is effective in the public sector as it is significantly restricted by
regulations developed by the Australian federal government which determine
pricing and supply of aged care services. As such with the application of private
sector market mechanisms will reduce the viability of the aged care sector and
will increase pressure on aged care service providers to find other means of
covering their costs to provide services at a declining rate of quality of care
services provided.
The College strongly supports “a cost of care study” (Productivity Commission
submission 86, 2010b, p2) which will assist in determining the adequate level of
funding that is required, the most adequate pricing for all services provided, and
a sustainable funding arrangement to ensure access is available to those who
cannot afford it. It suggests this study as the current subsidies that are paid are
insufficient across all levels of care services provided and the levels of costs
required are difficult to “quantify” (Productivity Commission submission 86,
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2010b, p6). Thus a comprehensive cost of care study is strongly urged. The
problem with the current funding mechanism is that it is aimed towards high care
which means that the level of care delivery is influenced by the financial
constraints of the subsidies paid. The funding mechanism enables the most
efficient selection of aged care residents who will attract the maximum subsidy
level (which are deemed as high care residents), which has created difficulties
for people with less needs to access aged care services, resulting in inequities in
the aged care system.
Accountability also includes providing equity and choice in the aged care system,
which the College refers to the “delineation between care and accommodation”
(Productivity Commission submission 86, 2010b, p5). It calls for the extraction of
care needs from the current aged care funding model to allow care needs to be
fully funded through current existing arrangements such as Medicare. This
funding model, as suggested by the College, would be “tied to individual care
needs and not care places” (Productivity Commission submission 86, 2010b, p5).
Both of these organisations in this category call for the funding of aged care
services to continue to be fully funded by the federal government through the
Medicare scheme. As such, it does not advocate for the elderly to pay for the
costs of their care.
In contrast, the College of Nursing suggests that accommodation in residential
aged care facilities ought to be “at a level of which the individual can afford”
(Productivity Commission submission 86, 2010b, p5) and should be subject to
means testing arrangements to ensure that there is equitable access to all levels
of accommodation. It notes that the provision of aged care services “will continue
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to be a costly exercise and slowly take more out of the budgets of the Federal
and State budgets as well as the personal budgets of Australians” (Productivity
Commission submission 86, 2010b, p5), which will continue to challenge the
health care system and impact on the aged care sector in future years. This
argument demonstrates that the solution to this growing challenge still ought to
be managed by the federal and state governments, which should continue to be
funded by the taxpayer as it relates to the national health care system.
Finally, the College notes that the user pays model has been campaigned for by
previous Australian governments as the ideal approach to fund the aged care
system. However, it argues that there are “elements of the community that can
afford their own aged care services…are prepared to…pay for these services.
However, for the majority of the community, this is not a real option as they are
living longer with a reduced capacity to provide the level of funding required. The
current Government subsidies and user charges are less than appropriate as they
do not factor into the current expectations of residents and families..the costs of
providing care are escalating” (Productivity Commission submission 86, 2010b,
p5).
This shows that the educators in the aged care industry are calling for the
accountability to remain with the government rather than shifting it towards the
elderly. It emphasises that the government’s ideology that the elderly will be able
to pay for the costs of their care is unlikely particularly as aged care services
cannot be traded as freely in comparison to the private market which trades in
goods and services. The aged care sector is a component of the health sector
and ought to remain a fully subsidised industry. This category of organisations
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calls for the government to remain accountable and to continue to fund the aged
care sector. Whether this is through the proposed Medicare system or the existing
subsidy arrangement, the government will continue to utilise taxpayers’ funding
to sustain the aged care industry. Finally, these organisations argue that there
are some elements of the community who can afford to pay for their own aged
care services and are prepared to pay for it. However, this is not a realistic option
for the majority of the community as they are living longer with a diminishing
financial capacity to contribute towards the proposed level of funding required.
3. Health Organisations Submissions
Under the Health Organisations category, the organisations that fall under this
category call for increases in subsidies paid in the aged care industry; and that
the subsidies ought to continue to be funded by the federal government. There is
the need to increase subsidies as the health organisations argue that there are
deficiencies in the current ACFI funding model and suggest that a more
individualised care services plan is prepared rather than a one size fits all
approach.
Health Cube Management Pty Ltd in its submission, emphasises that “the
fundamental aim of modern healthcare is to make the best match between patient
needs and expectations, and to deliver care in a timely, efficient manner that
achieves maximum benefit for the least cost” (Productivity Commission
submission 103, 2010b, p1). Their submission argues that the current
government’s funding mechanism contradicts the above statement as the
subsidies that are currently paid are only in relation to accommodation and
nursing care in residential aged care facilities.
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However, the subsidies do not cover the medical care needs of older patients.
Whilst medical care is covered by the Australian universal health system called
Medicare, it is a system that is designed for the general community and not
specifically for the elderly residing in these facilities. Medical Technology of
Australia asserts that older people have difficulty in accessing multiple services
in order for them to live at home independently. The elderly who wish to transition
from the hospital to home or to a residential aged care facility have limited choice
due to the government’s inconsistent funding arrangements between residential
and community care programs. Further, community care recipients continue to
pay for their accommodation, hospital and hotel costs which forces them to them
enter residential care in order for them to receive accommodation subsidies. This
leads to a “financial bias towards residential care” (Productivity Commission
submission 187, 2010b, p23), where more funding is provided to the aged care
service providers however the funds are not always used appropriately and
effectively as the funding does not adequately address the needs of the
individual.
Based on this, the government’s approach also needs to change from a short
term vision to adopting a long term vision of their responsibilities towards the aged
care industry. If the government changed their approach with a long term focus,
Health Cube argues that by providing subsidies to elderly patients in residential
aged care facilities would either: “achieve existing outcomes at reduced cost;
achieve better outcomes at no cost; or achieve significantly better outcomes at
relatively small increases in cost” (Productivity Commission submission 103,
2010b, p5). Hence this approach would achieve substantial benefits to the quality
of care for older Australians in aged care facilities and would achieve significant
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cost savings.
The Australian and NZ Society for Geriatric Medicine also support this argument
and highlight that government funding needs to be increased in order for
“preventative and rehabilitative strategies” (Productivity Commission submission
145, 2010b, p2) can be introduced to older patients. The benefits of introducing
these modes of care plans would minimise the onset of disability and maximise
independence. Cost savings would also be achieved, and these can be used to
address the increasing high care needs as patients’ health deteriorates with age.
It is suggested that by adopting these new funding models that they will improve
service delivery but may not necessarily involve more expensive care if the funds
are “more equitably, timely and appropriately distributed” (Productivity
Commission submission 145, 2010b, p3).
The Australian Psychological Society Inc agrees with the above arguments and
recommends that any “artificial funding and policy barriers between “health” and
“aged care” must be eliminated or at least minimised” (Productivity Commission
submission 158, 2010b, p4) so that residents of aged care facilities can also
access the range of health care services that is offered to the rest of the
community. Based on these comments in the submissions, the Health
Organisations advocate for funding to be “centre based, evidence based and
outcome focused” (Productivity Commission submission 158, 2010b, p4) which
requires the government to develop a “delicate balance” (Productivity
Commission submission 180, 2010b, p4) between the government’s policy and
regulation development and industry competition to ensure that the provision of
aged care services are “safe, affordable and accessible” (Productivity
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Commission submission 158, 2010b, p4).
The Australian Psychological Society Inc further recommends that the
government increases funding for community services “beyond the rate of
increase in the ageing of the population” (Productivity Commission submission
145, 2010b, p4), to support older individuals to remain at home for longer and
minimise unnecessary admissions into residential aged care facilities (referred to
as the concept “ageing in place” (Productivity Commission submission 145,
2010b, p3). Ageing in place refers to the practice of supporting people while they
are living in their own home environment instead of having to place them in a
residential aged care facility. Ageing at home is more beneficial than early
admission into a residential aged care facility as the elderly prefer to stay in their
own home; the costs of such community services are generally lower than those
provided in an aged care facility; older adults feel that they belong in the
community in comparison to feeling more isolated and lonely in an aged care
facility; and overall demand decreases for a place in an aged care facility.
Presently the types of services that are provided are funded by both the federal,
state and territory governments, as well as at the local government level. This
situation provides the opportunity for “blame and cost shifting” (Productivity
Commission submission 145, 2010b, p6) amongst governments as they don’t
want to take responsibility to provide adequate care services for the elderly. It
was easier to provide more funding to aged care facilities and place the elderly
into a home rather the address the growing demand for community care
packages and funding of these packages. The governments ignored the growing
problem that demand for community care packages exceeded supply, resulting
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in the elderly being placed unnecessarily into aged care facilities.
Consequently, the provision of residential aged care packages resulted in
ineffective and inefficiencies with increasing waste all the elderly did not need all
of the elements in these packages. Rather, by providing more community care
packages would result in providing effective services that are tailored to the
elderly’s needs which would also increase efficiencies. Occupational Therapy
Australia (2010b) further adds to this argument by emphasising that each state
and territory governments has different funding schemes and eligibility criteria
with limited subsidy caps which reduces the effectiveness of the provision of aged
care services and fails to increase the individual’s independence.
Additionally, The Australian Psychological Society Ltd recognises that the
government needs to consider that aged care does not “occur in isolation from
other systems” (Productivity Commission submission 157, 2010b, p4). The
current aged care policies, programs and funding mechanisms need to be
examined within this context before the government proposes or recommends
changes to funding and who ought to fund the industry. The care of older adults
is vital as they have some of the most complex health and social needs, and are
one of the most vulnerable populations of people in our society. They also
emphasise that the government has noted in various legislative instruments that
it is the right of every Australian citizen to have “access to quality, safe and
affordable aged care” (Productivity Commission submission 157, 2010b, p5), and
the government is still responsible to ensure that the aged care system improves
to reflect and protect this right.
As such, the Australian Psychological Society Ltd advocates for improvements
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to the ACFI assessment process as there is a high risk of overlooking important
subtle signs of an older person’s functional status ranging from continence to
cognition including their mental health. Due to the apparent lack of appropriately
trained and qualified health professionals, or professionals without extensive
experience, the elderly can be incorrectly classified for the types of services they
require. This can reduce the funding that the elderly require; and increases the
risk of “under-representing” (Productivity Commission submission 158, 2010b,
p5) particular conditions such as depression, which further denies adequate
funding in the aged care sector. As such the submission call for increases in
funding from the government which are aimed to maximise the health outcomes
of the elderly, which is based on the best available evidence, and they also
provide funding that is quarantined for specific therapies and services.
The joint submission from the Retirement and Aged Care Services and
Manchester Unity Australia Ltd supports these calls for improvements and
highlights that the government needs to “review the philosophy of ageing in place”
(Productivity Commission submission 205, 2010b, p7), by removing the criteria
of high care and low care status. Based on this, the government then ought to
provide funding entitlements to individuals based on their assessed needs, rather
than funding places according to a measurement of the quota of beds that the
government chooses to supply each year. Occupational Therapy Australia
enhances this argument and suggests that the government develop a
“standardised tiered funding system” (Productivity Commission submission 203,
2010b, p18), where the individual is assessed based on the needs that are
outlined in the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of
Functioning, Disability and Health (the “ICF”). This ought to replace the
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government’s outdated ACFI assessment matrix, which was developed
approximately 40 years ago. Further, there also needs to be consideration of the
“impact of age related impairments on activities and participation” (Productivity
Commission submission 203, 2010b, p18), and the individual’s personal and
environmental factors which are assessed in accordance with the World Health
Organisation’s ICF. By utilising this modern, relevant and appropriate matrix
would enable the consideration of the home and community environments, along
with the needs of the carer.
Thus, the submissions presented in the category of Health Organisations
emphasises that it is the government’s responsibility to “review and action to
promote healthy ageing in Australia” (Productivity Commission submission 203,
2010b, p21). They must review their policies across the aged care, health,
disability, aged pensions, superannuation and taxation sectors to ensure that
older Australians have the opportunity to participate in society. They must ensure
that older people “do not live in poverty and that they have sufficient financial
resources to achieve appropriate nutrition and standard of living” (Productivity
Commission submission 203, 2010b, p22). The government is responsible to
preserve in legislation the requirements for older citizens to age in place; have
the capacity to make unrestricted choices to assist them to achieve an acceptable
quality of life. There needs to be development and implementation of additional
policies with respect to the provision of equitable access to aged care and health
services that are not discriminatory based on financial resources; age; health and
aged care dependency.
Under the joint submission from the Retirement and Aged Care Services and
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Manchester Unity Australia Ltd, they point out that the Department of Health and
Ageing state that the Commonwealth government “aims to ensure that all frail
older Australians have timely access to appropriate care and support services as
they age…through a safe and secured system” (Productivity Commission
submission 205, 2010b, p4). Based on this statement, a fundamental principle of
this aim is that the Commonwealth will guarantee an acceptable standard of care.
These principles are contained in the Aged Care Act 1991 and other principles,
including the Accountability Principles 1998; Accreditation Grant Principles 1999
and Quality of Care Principles 1998. While these principles relate to the provision
of residential aged care services, the achievement of these principles can be
primarily measured through administrative regimes in which an aged care facility
demonstrates that it has “fulfilled the expectations of the Commonwealth by
adhering to the Accreditation Standards” (Productivity Commission submission
205, 2010b, p4). The key issue with this approach is that it is not focused on the
elderly who are living in a residential aged care facility or live in their home in the
community. The legislation does not permit the measurement or assessment of
the standard of service or care from the care recipients’ perspective. Due to the
lack of consideration of the key consumer of aged care services, the
Commonwealth does not meet its aims.
The joint submission recommends that the government reviews the overall aims
and objectives for aged care services to determine what constitutes: “appropriate
services; acceptable standards; and timely access” (Productivity Commission
submission 205, 2010b, p4). Following this review, there needs to be a review of
the measures for success and the mechanisms required to remain compliant. The
overall aim of this review is to “simplify accountability and transparency for the
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consumer, provider and Commonwealth” (Productivity Commission submission
205, 2010b, p4).
In contrast to the above organisation in the Health Organisations category,
Medibank Private Ltd (Productivity Commission submission 250, 2010b) and the
Department of Health and Ageing (Productivity Commission submission 482,
2010b) suggest that the older population will increasingly expect high quality and
flexible services that are offered. Medibank Private Ltd also suggests that as the
population ages, they will have access to a wider range of financial resources
and will have an “improved ability to fund the services they require” (Productivity
Commission submission 250, 2010b, p8) to ensure that they maintain
independence in their home as long as possible.
Medibank asserts that as the older population has increased financial
engagement with the government, its power will also increase and they will be
able to influence the development of the types of service supports they require;
and improvements in the funding arrangements which will be the key drivers to
improving the quality of aged care services provided. Medibank notes that in its
research, many participants presented their concerns regarding the limited mix
of support services and that these services are frequently designed to comply
with the aged care principles and the governments’ and providers’ interest, rather
than reflecting the flexibility they require to meet their own care needs.
Based on this, Medibank Private Ltd (Productivity Commission submission 250,
2010b) asserts that the government ought to enhance transparency of the funding
options. This would reduce the confusion currently experienced as described
above, which leads to peoples’ confusion regarding funding options and
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accessibility to aged care services. In addition, people may also be unaware that
they are responsible for funding some of their own care. Without this knowledge,
the elderly and their families may fail to ensure that they have sufficient finances
to pay for their own care needs. As such, Medibank Private Ltd also calls for the
government to review and change the existing funding methodology and to
consider other future funding options as well as being innovative by providing
more flexible and personalised care services.
Finally, Medibank Private Ltd surprisingly suggests that a “cultural change”
(Productivity Commission submission 250, 2010b, p10) will be required if there
will be a change to the funding model and the care and support services that will
be provided over the coming decades. The long existing culture of a partnership
between the governments and elderly Australians through the joint funding of
aged care supports through contributions and service payments; further culture
change will be required to ensure that future needs are met. The company
suggests that a “focus on increased personal responsibility” (Productivity
Commission submission 250, 2010b, p10) to fund more of the supports services
that people will increasingly need as they age.
The key challenge created to meet the increasing demand for aged care services
and the diversity of services offered is the governments’ ability to fund these
services in the long term future. Medibank Private Ltd suggests that the
governments need to review the aged care funding models; and to engage with
the community to consider who ought to fund the care and the support services
that an increasingly ageing population requires. Medibank Private Ltd also
provides a number of funding options to increase flexibility for the government
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and individuals to pay for the costs of aged care services and includes: the
government to provide support and make regulatory changes to support equity
releases into private housing so that people can fund or co-contribute towards
their care requirements as they age; a “co-operative model” (Productivity
Commission submission 250, 2010b, p10), where the government continues to
fund the aged care services to a certain care level. This care level ensures that
everyone has equitable access to care services based on their care needs and
incentivises people to contribute towards the costs of their care if they require
additional care or would like choice in the services they receive. The disincentive
created by this method is that people without financial resources can only access
the basic level of care; mandated social insurance to cover the costs of
independent living and aged care services; tax treatments which encourage
people to save money to support the care required in old age, which includes
superannuation (Productivity Commission submission 250, 2010b).
Medibank Private Ltd and the Department of Health and Ageing believe that by
adopting a new system will need to reflect the diverse future needs of Australia’s
ageing population. The development of innovative, proactive, high quality
services will enable people to live well and live independently. As such, this
creates the opportunity to “reduce Australia’s cost burden” (Productivity
Commission submission 250, 2010b, p12) associated with funding future aged
care services.
As explored in Medibank Private Ltd’s argument, it perceives that the older
population is a financial burden to the taxpayer. This argument supports the
Productivity Commission and the government’s calls for the elderly to increase
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their contributions towards the costs of their care. As Medibank Private Ltd is
equally owned by the government and shareholders and receives subsidies from
the government to cover the costs of health care services, it has a greater
incentive to support the government so that it can increase its revenues to ensure
it can continue to fund and support the health industry.
The Department of Health and Ageing’s submission explains that in April 2010,
the Council of Australian Governments (with the exception of Western Australia),
agreed to address the issue of roles and responsibilities by ensuring that that
Commonwealth (or the federal government), has “full funding and policy
responsibility for aged care” (Productivity Commission submission 482, 2010b,
p28). These reforms include a transfer of the funding of home and community
care services to the Commonwealth (except for Victoria, which is still funded by
the Victorian state government).
Based on this, the governments agreed to implement these changes from 1 July
2012, where the federal government is now the sole regulator of aged care
services; and is the sole government funder of long term care services. Under the
new arrangements the federal government will be responsible for: regulating and
funding community and residential care services for older people; states and
territories will be responsible for regulating specialist disability services; funding
and regulating community care services for people under the age of 65; funding
and regulating community and residential care services for people under the age
of 65. Finally, the federal, states and territories governments now “share
responsibility for providing continuity of care across health, aged care and
disability services” (Productivity Commission submission 482, 2010b, p29). The
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intention of these reforms is for the purpose of developing a nationally consistent
aged care system, which incorporates basic home care through to residential
aged care. It is also expected that the current combination of community care
service providers, which includes local government, state agencies and nongovernment providers, will continue.
The purpose of these reforms is for the federal government to develop a
nationally consistent system that enables older people to “seamlessly move”
(Productivity Commission submission 482, 2010b, p29) from basic home care
services through to residential care as their needs change. The federal
government will also work with the full range of aged care providers to ensure
that they are better supported to and to help older Australians and their families
to ensure that they receive appropriate care services as their needs change
(Productivity Commission submission 482, 2010b). Finally, the Department
acknowledges that the current financing arrangements concentrate on the
providers’ “immediate need to meet current regulatory arrangements”
(Productivity Commission submission 482, 2010b, 62), rather than to encourage
them to address and prepare for future challenges. It notes that the current ACFI
funding system for residential care will be aligned to care practices to promote
flexibility of aged care service deliveries. Providers will also “reap financial
benefits” (Productivity Commission submission 482, 2010b, p62) from improving
the health status of their residents. The Department notes that similar incentives
are currently not contained in the community aged care service programmes.
However, it stresses that these could be introduced by merging all home care
service programmes which incorporates a “tiered assessment tool” (Productivity
Commission submission 482, 2010b, p62). However, the Community Service
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Providers category below presents a different view of the Department of Health
and Ageing, which is explained in the next section.
4. Community Service Providers Submissions
The submissions under the Community Service Providers category provide an
“alternate view of human need” (Productivity Commission submission 203,
2010b, p24), and focuses on the impacts of impairment to aged care services
based on the government’s current funding model. The government ought to still
be responsible for developing aged care policies and fund the sector however it
needs to significantly improve the manner in which assessments are performed;
provide more funding to community services and promote health outcomes rather
than focusing on providing standardised, efficient services. This will ensure that
the elderly can maintain independent living and good quality of life at any stage
of their disease progression or ageing spectrum. Finally, by having “aligned,
accountable and connected governance” (Productivity Commission submission
203, 2010b, p24) across ageing and health services is required to develop a
system that is genuinely built for the older individual, as they progress through
their life stages and their capacities and needs change. Without significant
government change, there is a high risk that the current regulated balance of care
ratios developed by the government, that the quotas for residential high care and
low care places along with community care places provided will still not be aligned
with the community’s preferences. As such, the existing problems will continue,
and social goals will continue to be misaligned and not met.
Mission Australia stresses that the government’s current funding arrangements
creates a financial disincentive for residential aged care service facilities to
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improve the “health and independence of older people” (Productivity Commission
submission 117, 2010b, p6). The government claims that it wants to promote
health and well-being of older people and for them to maintain their independence
so that they can live in their home for longer. However, this in contrast to the
existing funding arrangements where the government increases its funding paid
to these facilities as the elderly are more dependent. Facilities that strive to
improve their residents’ health and promotes mobilisation, independence in daily
activities through physical rehabilitation and frequent medical intervention are
penalised as the government gradually reduces their funding despite their hard
efforts to improve the lives of their residents. Further, the ACFI funding model
provides minimal funding for challenging behavioural issues such as dementia
which is a disease that is increasing amongst the elderly. Providing care to the
elderly with “challenging behaviours” (Productivity Commission submission 117,
2010b, p6), is more labour intensive than providing care to the elderly with
physical challenges however less funding is given for this type of care despite the
need for continuous care provided by staff.
Care Connect Ltd provide a differing viewpoint where they call for the government
to stop thinking about funding issues and shift their focus away from “measuring
outputs” (Productivity Commission submission 229, 2010b, p1) to and move to
their former approach of “measuring outcomes” (Productivity Commission
submission 229, 2010b, p1). They suggest that the difficulties with utilising the
current model are that it favours self-interest and subjectivity, where aged care
service providers have an “investment in their models” (Productivity Commission
submission 229, 2010b, p2) and will most likely promote these such as direct care
and receiving high care services as they know that they will receive more funding
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under this option. However, it may not represent the client’s best interests.
Attendant Care Industry Association of NSW Inc supports this argument and
adopt Professor Kathy Eagar’s (from the Centre for Health Service Development
at University of Wollongong) comment that as there is a lack of “valid and
consistent tools to measure the need for community care, it is impossible to
measure “need” independent of supply, impossible to target services to those
with most “need” and impossible to measure the cost effectiveness or the
outcomes of community care interventions” (Productivity Commission submission
157, 2010b, p4). They suggest that the sole policy option is to assume that “need
equals demand” (Productivity Commission submission 157, 2010b, p4). As such,
due to the lack of the ability to meet demand, the clients’ needs are inaccurately
assessed and are not conducted in a timely manner. This creates increased
challenges as their real needs have not been properly assessed and creates
services gaps between the services they need and the services received.
Care Connect Ltd suggests a more equitable approach by developing a universal
assessment system. The starting point is to conduct an initial assessment of the
client, followed by periodic assessments and reviews, which is used to measure
outcomes. The client’s assessment history also ought to be recorded and
maintained as it follows their care journey. Their assessment history ought to be
made available from the Primary Care through to Community Care, Residential
Care and Acute or Hospital settings so that support plans may be “adjusted
quickly and effectively” (Productivity Commission submission 299, 2010b, p2).
This category of providers also suggests that there ought to be a “validating tool”
(Productivity Commission submission 299, 2010b, p2) which provides the ability
to measure providers on their real outcomes rather than how their funds are
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spent. The government also ought to reduce its focus on requiring the acquittal
on the use of funds and shift its focus on the importance of the outcomes that are
achieved rather than how the funds are expended.
Mercy Aged Care Services Brisbane also suggests that by not adopting this
approach will also increase the economic costs of the acute sector to the State
Governments at they carry the majority of the financial burden (Productivity
Commission submission 221, 2010b, p6). The community suffers due to system
inefficiencies, and optimal patient care is also lowered as the facilities do not have
the capacity to service their needs when the elderly are admitted to hospital
without necessarily needing to be there. Overall, specialist care services are
unable to be provided to these vulnerable patients, and the overall economic cost
impacts the ageing population. The current outcomes highlight that the
government is not meetings its accountability goals of appropriately utilising
social resources to ensure that effective outcomes are met. The outcomes are to
provide effective services to the elderly however their needs are clearly not being
met due to the increased focus on the efficient use of taxpayers’ funding to the
detriment of the increased declined in the older populations’ health and wellbeing.
Based on these challenges, there are also suggestions for the federal
government to be the sole provider of funding for the aged care industry. This
includes providing funding for all aged care services, including community and
residential based services. By having a sole provider would reduce confusion and
allows for “ease of access, continuity of care and ‘one stop’ service provision’
(Productivity Commission submission 117, 2010b, p9). The continuum of care
needs from the independence to dependency stages requires a “non-fragmented”
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(Productivity Commission submission 117, 2010b, p9) transition to various care
services. Further, aged care ought to be funded separately from health care.
Multicultural Aged Care Inc supports this and also recommends that the aged
care sector ought to be treated as a “separate body” (Productivity Commission
submission 243, 2010b, p13) that develops its own separate policies due to the
intricate and complex nature that addresses a vulnerable group with special
needs.
Aged Care Assessment Service Victoria adds to this argument and highlights the
importance of developing a more “seamless system” (Productivity Commission
submission 2014, 2010b, p2), when the elderly are transferring from low care
services to high care services to facilitate a smooth transfer to high care. Many
people are eligible for both services; however, as the system is complex, it is
difficult for them to access higher levels of care services as their needs change.
Elderly people are not unwell due to their age, but they have symptoms which are
common and part of the normal ageing process. Thus, a smoother transition is
required to have a single source of funding and a seamless approach for
transitioning from health care services to aged care services.
Hellenic Aged Care supports this argument and adds that the government needs
to understand the nature of the services provided in the aged care industry.
Residential aged care is no longer just a “step up from home care” (Productivity
Commission submission 186, 2010b, p3), but it is a “step down from hospital
care” (Productivity Commission submission 186, 2010b, p3). Aged care services
reduce the need for the elderly to remain in hospital under the health system
(which is more efficient for the government as it is more costly to subsidise the
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elderly in the hospital rather than in an aged care facility). As the care needs rise
when the elderly live in a residential care facility more funding then ought to be
redirected from lower care home services to higher care residential care services.
Based on this, the government needs to understand that there is a link between
aged care services and health care services however they need to understand
the differentiation between them which would also impact on how the government
subsidises both sectors.
The Aged Care Assessment Service Victoria also emphasises that the
government’s goal ought to be to revise the system with the view to immediately
“restore the independence” (Productivity Commission submission 214, 2010b,
p2), of elderly Australians rather than responding to their advanced decline in
health when there is less capacity to restore or rehabilitate their health. Latrobe
Community Health Service enhances this debate and adds that the government
also needs to revise the system and develop a plan to retain the strength of older
people rather than “responding to decline and therefore urgency” (Productivity
Commission submission 220, 2010b, p3) when care services that are
immediately needed are the most costly, labour intensive and difficult to always
provide.
Amana Living, in contrast, provides a stark expectation that if the government
does not address the above problems and appropriately direct the funding in the
manner as suggested above, that the only option for “core support needs”
(Productivity Commission submission 236, 2010b, p2) for older Australians to be
covered in the future is to a “significant extent by contributions from private
wealth” (Productivity Commission submission 236, 2010b, p2). The suggestion
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made by Amana Living is that as the Australians age and their care services
increase as their health conditions deteriorate, that they will need to significantly
contribute from their private savings towards paying for higher standards of care
or accommodation as their care needs rise.
This suggested system contradicts the purpose of developing a government
funded system, which is the government’s responsibility to develop and
effectively and efficiently manage and fund in a system through which no person
is disadvantaged. However, if the elderly are required to contribute towards their
care costs, this will create inequities, and social disadvantages as the elderly who
cannot pay for their care may not be able to receive care services. Based on this,
Amana Living (Productivity Commission submission 236, 2010b) suggests that
the government develops a funding stream that is based on lifetime contributions
made by Australian citizens through a separate taxation system or by developing
a separate system of public or private insurance to ensure the sustainability of
the industry and reduces the risk of the system being inequitable. However, is it
viable to develop another taxation system that will require all Australians to further
contribute towards the aged care sector, which clearly demonstrates that the
government is inadequately managing taxpayers’ resources?
The above arguments clearly show that a main concern in the community service
providers’ category is the lack of concern by the government to provide adequate
funding to encourage the elderly to improve their health and wellbeing, and
maintain their independence. In its submission, Amana Living accuses the
governments of burying “their heads in the sand to avoid having to confront and
address the massive long-term funding problems associated with the ageing of
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the population” (Productivity Commission submission 236, 2010b, p2). As such,
the government’s focus on extreme short termism allows them to act at a
distance. By focusing on improving the health and wellbeing of the elderly will be
beneficial in the long term due to the decline in health and aged care costs
required to provide more complex care services will decrease.
The Productivity Commission’s Issues Paper (2010) clearly demonstrates that
their key focus areas relate to supply and demand of aged care services; the
quantification of the number of places that the government ought to fund; and
who ought to be responsible for funding the system in the future. While the
government claims that it cares for the elderly’s long term care, it is not clearly
represented in the Issues Paper as the common theme is the call for the
government to focus on improving the health and wellbeing of older people which
would allow them to: live at home for longer and delay their entry into residential
care.
This argument was raised earlier in the Health Organisations category and is
further augmented by Latrobe Community Health Service who quoted from the
National Healthcare Agreement which states that: “older Australians ought to
receive “high quality, affordable health and aged care services that are
appropriate to their needs and enable choice” (Productivity Commission
submission 220, 2010b, p2). This quote is noted in the Productivity Commission’s
Issues Paper (2010) as discussed earlier in this chapter, and it describes the
government’s commitment to support this as it is their primary concern. However,
Latrobe Community Health explains the difficulty for the elderly to receive
appropriate community care when they receive funding for low level care. They
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require moderate levels of assistance, however they not sufficiently dependent to
receive high care services funding. Based on this, the industry is severely
underfunded as not enough people are receiving adequate funding to meet their
care needs. They also note that the system is inflexible with due to the limited
funding and the types of and levels of support available or provided to individuals
which also leads to unnecessary admissions into residential care when the client
would prefer to remain in their own home. Latrobe Community Health Service
acknowledges that increases to funding will be borne by the aged care industry,
they suggest that the actual cost can be “mitigated by improved client outcomes
and support” (Productivity Commission submission 214, 2010b, p2), which would
result in less hospital admissions and reliance on other services. Due to the
above discussed problems, there is an apparent mismatch between the
government’s National Healthcare Agreement aims as this is not supported due
to the restrictions on the level of care services; different care packages; eligibility
guidelines and limited funding options. As described above, it is less costly for
the government to focus on improving the health and wellbeing of the elderly
however the solution is simpler by focusing on the short term instead of the long
term wellbeing of all Australian citizens. This demonstrates that the government
does not want to be responsible for social wellbeing, and prefers that society
develops a solution to this growing problem.
In its joint submission by Clubs Australia, RSL & Services Association and the
Richmond Club (Productivity Commission submission 197, 2010b) identify that a
further consequence of the government’s lack of increased financial support is
that the aged care sector is perceived as not a worthwhile industry to invest, and
is draining on the organisations’ resources.

These act as a deterrent for
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prospective aged care providers, such as registered clubs, to enter the aged care
market, and current providers don’t have the financial capability to further invest
in residential aged care facilities. It is near impossible for aged care providers to
build new facilities when they operate on a cash flow model, particularly when
they are operating at a loss or a deficit. Another challenge is that banks are often
hesitant to lend to aged care service providers due to the increased exposure to
financial risk. If the current funding model is not reshaped, then it is likely that the
“viability of the industry may become untenable” (Productivity Commission
submission 197, 2010b, p30).
Their joint submission supports the submissions provided by Ageing Researchers
organisations where they call for an “an in-depth study of the costs of aged care”
(Productivity Commission submission 197, 2010b, p31). They also suggest that
the research study needs to incorporate a reasonable return on investment in
aged care. Once these costs are identified, the aged care subsidies ought to be
adjusted to reflect the true nature of these costs. This will also assist the
government in identifying whether there is sufficient existing capacity to meeting
the growing demands from an increasingly ageing population. Once the research
has identified the “true costs” (Productivity Commission submission 197, 2010b,
p31), it will encourage current and prospective aged care providers to further
invest in the industry. If the government fails to provide this additional support,
aged care service providers will then have to rely on additional revenues from
residents by charging them higher fees. This may be an appropriate option for
those with sufficient assets or income and have the ability to contribute more.
However, this funding approach may disadvantage residents with little or no
assets or income as they may receive lower quality of care, resulting in an
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inequitable system. Hence Clubs Australia, RSL & Services Association and the
Richmond Club support the other community service providers’ submissions and
highlight that the federal government ought to remain the “primary funder of aged
care” (Productivity Commission submission 197, 2010b, p31) in order for the
aged care system to remain equitable.
As such, this category of organisations calls for the government to develop a
more complete and integrated framework that covers aged care and retirement
care services. The fifth category of providers are Councils and Governments, and
their arguments are centred around their preference for the governments to
remain accountable and solely responsible for funding the industry which will be
discussed in further detail in the next section.
5. Councils and Governments Submissions
The submissions in the Councils and Governments category advocate that the
federal government ought to be solely responsible for funding the aged care
sector. The importance for this change is the federal government is already
responsible for funding the health care system and if the federal government is
solely responsible for funding the aged care sector increases the opportunity for
integration between the health and aged care sectors.
Local councils (or Local Government Organisations) provide land and capital for
partnerships to develop aged care facilities in their local area. They also provide
financial contributions toward providing community aged care services and
facilities that are essential for older people living in the local community.
Willoughby City Council suggests that by developing a standardised system of
community care across Australia would severely disrupt the provision of
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community services as the broader governments do not have local knowledge
and would increase duplication of services and increase waiting lists for older
people who urgently need care assistance. The council highlights the importance
of many local councils being situated throughout the entire nation and have
knowledge of the local area (Productivity Commission submission 50, 2010b).
Local Government Association of South Australia also supports this request and
further adds that local governments are “directly connected to the communities
that it services” (Productivity Commission submission 259, 2010b, p4), and is
usually the first place that people will call when they do not know where or whom
to call. This provides with them the advantage to provide personalised and a
broad range of aged care services that can be adapted to meet the needs of each
person. These submissions suggest that for their needs to be adequately met, a
partnership with the federal government is established and that this program is
funded solely by the federal government.
Local Government Association of South Australia also adds that by providing
increased community services also enables the management and delay of the
demand on accommodation in residential aged care facilities and reduced the
dependency on medical services (Productivity Commission submission 259,
2010b). Hobsons Bay City Council further adds that the system is “fragmented”
(Productivity Commission submission 97, 2010b, p2) as local aged care service
providers administer funding from both state and federal governments. This has
increased confusion in providing continuity of care and quality care services to
the elderly. Based on this, the councils call for the federal government to develop
and fund one regulatory framework for aged care service providers. Developing
a system that is easy to navigate will provide a seamless and consistent aged
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care service that is person centred and effective.
City of Salisbury Council also quotes the Productivity Commission’s (2010a)
report with its statement that: “Older Australians should receive high quality,
affordable health and aged care services that are appropriate to their needs and
enable choice and seamless, timely transitions within and across sectors”
(Productivity Commission submission 263, 2010b, p4). The council highlights that
there is little evidence that the health sector works collaboratively with the aged
care industry. It also supports the proposal for the shift for the federal government
to fund and be responsible for both sectors as this presents an opportunity to
integrate both sectors to ensure that the services that the elderly need and
receive are consistent and meets their needs.
The Victorian Government strengthens the above debates and emphasises the
importance of the role of the governments and notes that it has a “fundamental
role” (Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p5) in developing an
integrated, responsive and effective system that is “person centred” (Productivity
Commission submission 420, 2010b, p5) and supports older people. Issues that
the state and federal governments need to focus on include that increasing
numbers of people will live in good health which will result in increased chronic
health, dementia and frailty in older age. Hence it is important for governments to
focus on “maintaining wellness” (Productivity Commission submission 420,
2010b, p9) to allow people to remain independent as long as possible. Further,
there are positive broader community responses which demonstrate an interest
in and to have the responsibility to support older peoples’ needs and to help them
plan for their changing needs. Subsequently, these needs can be met by
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community services of government assistance. Essentially the Victorian
government states that an “effective system of services and supports for older
Australians should focus on, and be organised around, the needs of older
Australians” (Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p11). To achieve
this, the above governments suggest that services and support should be
organised and delivered in ways that people can find the “right types”
(Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p11) and aged care services
in the “right settings” (Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p11) as
they require them. By providing such a system reduces overlaps and duplication
in the provision of services; unnecessary hospital admissions and extended stays
away from home that may not be in their best interests. The system also needs
to flexible and streamlined to ensure that people can enter and exit specialised
service systems as their needs change. Finally, in order for older people to
maintain independence within the community, community based care would still
be at the core of this integrated system with links to health care services and
other community support that people require, and these will be delivered by local
governments.
Importantly, the Victorian Government argues that the current system restricts
the achievement of an integrated and effective system due to the absence of
“national leadership” and “a shared view about what needs to be achieved and
how to get there…the levers for reform rest with the Commonwealth Government”
(Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p21). This demonstrates that
also at the government levels, there is the recognition that the current approach
to the management of the system fails to recognise the need to deliver an
effective and integrated service provision. Strong relationships with aged care
263

service providers, local and state governments and other components of the
broader aged care and health care systems are critical to “driving effective
practice and service delivery” (Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b,
p21).
The Victorian Government further adds that the federal government can address
these issues in the short to medium term through policy and funding changes.
However better long term planning is imperative to develop a different model of
aged care program management which are based on clear objectives to address
the highlighted limitations and gaps, and improve the “quality, effectiveness,
efficiency and sustainability of the health and aged care system” (Productivity
Commission submission 420, 2010b, p21).
A critical problem, as discussed in the submissions in all of the above categories,
is the significant shortfall in federal government funding to the aged care sector.
The Victorian government notes in its submission that in 2009 The Aged Care
Association of Australia described the aged care industry to be “in crisis”
(Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p25), and warned that the
industry is “going broke…with 44 per cent of providers running at a loss”
(Productivity Commission submission 420, 2010b, p25). This demonstrates that
debate about the adequacy of funding levels focuses on community and
residential aged care and the continued inadequacy of recurrent funding to meet
current care costs and capital funding streams to maintain current high quality
care environments and to facilitate future expansion of aged care facilities. The
consequence of the lack of funding available is that it creates barriers for the
elderly to access appropriate services that they immediately require (such as
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palliative care) and advanced home care services.
In support of the Victorian Government, the Tasmanian State Government also
acknowledges that the Australian federal government ought to be fully
responsible for funding and policy development for the health and aged care
systems. The common argument for all government submissions that have been
reviewed is the desire for a reform of the system to be structured in such a way
that is effective rather than efficient. Their main aim of developing an effective
system is a contradiction to the federal government’s shifting aim to focus on an
efficient rather than an effective system. This demonstrates that the non-federal
governments’ main aims are to provide appropriate aged care services and to
look after the health and wellbeing of elderly Australians rather than focusing on
cost reduction and developing an efficient system.
The Tasmanian Government supports the comments noted in the other
government submissions and further suggests that aged care reforms are
necessary in order to maintain a “sustainable, equitable and quality aged care
system in the future” (Productivity Commission submission 458, 2010b, p2). Their
submission suggests that the current program, funding and regulatory
arrangements underpinning the aged care industry will not meet the needs of the
growing older population into the future. The Tasmanian Government exemplifies
this and demonstrates that in the 2010 round of funding for Tasmania that there
was “significant under-subscription for residential places and significant oversubscription for community places” (Productivity Commission submission 458,
2010b, p6). This significant disparity demonstrates that demand is growing and
changing, and that choice for consumers is limited and restrictive with
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unnecessary program boundaries. Based on these challenges, improvements
are requirement relating to the management of the ongoing interaction between
the demand and supply of services between the community, residential and
health care sectors.
The Tasmanian Government advocates that this review should occur in
conjunction through consultation by the federal government with the states and
territories which also shows that the federal government is still considered the
most accountable for the industry, with the state governments willing to work with
the federal government to develop an effective system. It further supports the
drive for the federal government to maintain full responsibility for funding and
aged care policy management, which were also part of the national health care
reforms.
Interestingly, the NSW Government’s submission also mirrors the submissions
forwarded by the state and local governments, as discussed above. The NSW
Government states in its submission that its fundamental principle is that “older
people are entitled to timely and equitable access to services which support their
ability to remain as independent and healthy as possible and to participate in
community life” (Productivity Commission submission 329, 2010b, p2). This
demonstrates that the state governments identify that the demographics across
Australia is changing which also drives a change in the types of services to be
provided in relation to health, community and residential aged care services.
The NSW Government suggests in its submission that the most important
aspects that need to be considered when deciding the most appropriate care
arrangements that are required include: remaining in one’s home as they age
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(also referred to as “ageing in place” (Productivity Commission submission 329,
2010b, p3); personal preferences relating to the services needed; affordability;
and equity of resource allocation. Finally, there also needs to be a smooth
transition, and better linkages between the health and aged care sectors as the
service needs of older people change over time. The NSW government further
emphasises that the federal and state governments need to work collaboratively
to: “promote well-being including independence, through a person centred
approach…emphasise prevention and early prevention…provide holistic and
seamless continuity of care across health and aged care service sectors”
(Productivity Commission submission 329, 2010b, p3).
A concern that the NSW Government highlights is that it has made a significant
investment in the New South Wales community to develop the capacity for the
provision of aged care services by the non-government not-for-profit sector. This
is important as local “community involvement and volunteer input make a
significant contribution” (Productivity Commission submission 329, 2010b, p13)
and any perceived threat to these longstanding local relationships could result in
“community disengagement and loss of community goodwill, with far reaching
and potentially expensive consequences” (Productivity Commission submission
329, 2010b, p13). The great strength of this diverse sector and the key role that
local service providers play shows its flexibility and capacity to respond. This
positive responsiveness provides a safety net for frail older people, which enables
them to live confidently in their home for longer.
A further recommendation provided by the NSW Government which enhances
the recommendations proposed by the abovementioned governments is for the
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federal government and Productivity Commission to avoid relying on the “tradition
cost-benefit or cost-utility” (Productivity Commission submission 329, 2010b,
p14) analysis. Rather, it should prepare a “Social Return on Investment (SROI)”
(Productivity Commission submission 329, 2010b, p14) analysis that considers
social capital and is utilised to complement the cost benefit analysis. Performing
an SROI would minimise the risk of losing social capital, which is considered to
be a significant investment by state and local governments. Social capital
incorporates the work undertaken by volunteers, local aged care initiatives and
small investments in the aged care sector and these are vital to ensuring that the
aged care services remain viable in the future.
Local Government Association of South Australia add to this request for the
government to develop programs and provide additional funding to assist older
people to “maintain and modify their homes and gardens” (Productivity
Commission submission 259, 2010b, p4), which enables their continued
independence as they age and they can remain at home for longer. Additional
funding provided by the government is also requested to develop adequate
community transport networks including adequate footpath and road construction
to safely accommodate wheelchairs and walking frames for the “more active
aged” (Productivity Commission submission 259, 2010b, p3) which is essential
for social inclusion of aged persons. It is also needed to fund the development of
aged housing which contains the required facilities need to meet the needs of the
growing elderly population. This will enable people to live in or near their
community, maximise social inclusion, promote active ageing, promotes
“independence and interdependence” (Productivity Commission submission 259,
2010b, p4) which will decrease demands for places in residential aged care
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facilities.
In addition, Swan Hill Rural City Council’s submission suggests that the federal
government’s calculations and mechanisms to demonstrate that the future growth
in costs for it to support to the aged care industry are a “political tool” (Productivity
Commission submission 180, 2010b, p3) to aid political decision making and lack
transparency. Rather than assisting all stakeholders with appropriate and
relevant information to make fully informed decisions regarding the direction and
future of the aged care industry, the use of the disguise of the elderly being a
financial problem to the future taxpayers increases the difficulty in performing
“long term strategic planning and budget development” (Productivity Commission
submission 180, 2010b, p3).
This enables the government to deflect its accountability to other stakeholders
such as local and state governments to determine the ideal system that ought to
be developed in aged care and who ought to be responsible for the funding and
provision of services. Finally, the Fairfield City Council thoughtfully prepared its
submission which looks at the “more human aspect of aged care” (Productivity
Commission submission 183, 2010b, p2) from the viewpoint of the elderly rather
than from a federal government perspective. It requests that the federal
government works with all governments to develop strategies to prevent the
elderly from experiencing the following emotions: “anger, anguish, pain, loss and
humiliation…and feel devalued by society” (Productivity Commission submission
183, 2010b, p2) which they currently experience due to the failings of the current
system. Fairfield Council particularly explains that older people feel that they have
the right to feel secure in retirement by the federal government as they have
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raised a family and paid their taxes, while many commenced working from when
they were teenagers and continued to work until their retirement. Based on this,
they feel that “they deserve better after a life of contribution to society”
(Productivity Commission submission 183, 2010b, p2). As such they call for the
federal government to develop a new system that is “too complex” (Productivity
Commission submission 183, 2010b, p8), with a lack of continuity and information
provided between community care, residential care, alternatives to care and
financial services.
This demonstrates that the federal government needs to shift its focus to not just
on efficiency but to consider the more important aspect of the provision of
services, and they need to maintain their accountability by working with other
governments across Australia to revert to this approach. Councils are
increasingly adopting ageing strategies or incorporating these within their
strategic plan objectives and plans to meet future challenges regarding growing
older populations. Through these submissions, it suggests that councils still seek
to collaborate with local organisations to provide community services, and to work
with governments for funding support and development of reforms to promote
“healthy active ageing” (Productivity Commission submission 259, 2010b, p5),
with a simpler system and access to support for older Australians. As such, they
still hold local and federal governments accountable to ensure that older
Australians’ needs are appropriately managed. Conclusively, the state and local
governments call for the federal government to “play a more significant role”
(Productivity Commission submission 183, 2010b, p9) in the industry rather than
just be the funder and gatekeeper.
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In contrast to the other categories discussed in this section, the aged care service
providers for-profit category centre their submissions predominantly surrounding
the costs associated with providing aged care services; the lack of financial return
achieved by aged care operators as below sustainable level; and the
disincentives to increase their capital investment into the industry. The topic of
accountability as a theme is a secondary theme which indicates that their main
concern is profitability and the financial viability of their operations, rather than
the provision of quality care services. These matters will be further discussed in
the next sections below.
6. Aged Care Service Providers (For-Profit) Submissions
Home Instead Senior Care Australia is a private home care services provider
which is critical of the federal government’s failure to develop a policy or enact
legislation which is “favourable to providing affordable home care services to
older Australians” (Productivity Commission submission 134, 2010b, p2).
Despite the government’s recognition that this is the most effective manner to
support older people to maintain their quality of life as they age, and prevents
unnecessary burdens on repeat hospitalisation or premature entry into residential
aged care. This submission calls for the government to take responsibility and
place the needs and interest of the elderly first as they argue that “older people,
their families, aged care workers…the federal and state governments are the
beneficiaries of an affordable and sustainable” (Productivity Commission
submission 134, 2010b, p2) aged care sector. The current deficiency in the
system is the continued increase in home care costs and increased reliance on
independent contractors which increases the “risks and uncertainty” (Productivity
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Commission submission 134, 2010b, p2) of a vulnerable population.
The federal government maintains a lack of accountability, with an apparent
deficiency in accountability and standards in home care services which increases
the risk that independent contractors could place the frail elderly at risk of abuse
and financial exploitation. Further, the for-profit providers call for the government
to consider that while government funding is important to support older people to
maintain their independence and remain living in their preferred environment for
longer, the government will not be able to “substantially increase funding”
(Productivity Commission submission 134, 2010b, p3) to this sector without a
significant increase in taxes to support the increased funding. This is the
challenge which affects sustainability of the aged care industry and requires the
taxpayer to contribute to the government’s solution.
Seasons Living Australia supports this view and argues that the government
needs to change its “philosophies of people centre care” (Productivity
Commission submission 136, 2010b, p2), where the government ought to be
more concerned about caring for people instead of beds. Further, they call for
care recipients to have a say in how their eligible funding is spent which allows
them to choose the type of care that suits them and when they need it, rather
than to be told where the funding is spent as the funding “after all” (Productivity
Commission submission 136, 2010b, p2) for them.
Finally, the private sector notes that it can also join the local and state
governments as noted in their submission by stating that it can take a leadership
role in “reshaping the care of older people” (Productivity Commission submission
134, 2010b, p5), and addressing the needs of other care service providers to
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develop an “efficient, effective and client focused industry” (Productivity
Commission submission 134, 2010b, p5). Seasons Living Australia further adds
that there needs to be one level of government responsible for aged care across
Australia and that it ought to be the federal government. It adds that by developing
a streamlined system would ensure consistency for aged care service providers
who operate across local and state governments, and enables the funds to be
“channelled directly” (Productivity Commission submission 136, 2010b, p3) into
the care for older Australians.
More specifically, Aegis Aged Care Group supports the above arguments that the
federal government should continue to pay for the costs of care. However, they
suggest that the elderly should pay for their “daily costs of living with their
pensions or equivalent” (Productivity Commission submission 206, 2010b, p2),
and to pay for any additional services that they request. The submission further
suggests that residents of aged care facilities “should be allowed to pay for the
standard of accommodation they want and can afford” (Productivity Commission
submission 206, 2010b, p2), however the government ought to continue to pay
supplements for concessional residents. The Care Group suggests this change
the current accommodation supplements that the government pays is
“inequitable and inappropriate” (Productivity Commission submission 206,
2010b, p3) to meet the demand for good quality accommodation requested by
residents. However, the difference noted in this submission which is in contrast
to the submissions discussed above, is that the government receives a constantly
increasing income tested fee from non -concessional residents with assets
entering a residential aged care facility. The Care Group estimates that the fees
collected were $60 million in 1998 and increased to $500 million in 2010 and are
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increasing annually (Productivity Commission submission 206, 2010b, p3). The
problem identified in this case is that the government collects the revenue and
fails to spend it in other ways in the aged care industry. The Care Group’s
submission suggests that the government ought to increase its accommodation
supplement which would increase the income of aged care providers, and redirect some of these funds by increasing ACFI funding, which provides them with
the financial incentive to build more facilities to accommodate for the growing
demand for residential care places.
Due to the government’s lack of assistance to meet the growing needs of the
elderly, the current funding system encourages providers to provide aged care
services in facilities that are more than 30 or 40 years old and “sit on their hands”
(Productivity Commission submission 206, 2010b, p3) as they cannot modernise
their facilities as additional funding is not generated to cover the costs of
refurbishment. This has also increased the difficulty in aged care providers to
obtain funding for a building upgrade through the Banks as there is an insufficient
business case to support their loan application. The Banks require evidence of
the ability to service the debt and to repay their loans which presently cannot be
met by many providers. This further stifles the ability for the federal government
to adequately meet the needs of the today’s elderly population and into the future.
Ageis Aged Care Group argues that for the entire 12 years that the Aged Care
Act has been functioning, that neither the government or the aged care industry
has been able to provide thorough benchmark results to determine the “true costs
of care” (Productivity Commission submission 206, 2010b, p10). The lack of
credible information allows the government to dispute all of the efforts made by
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the industry to demonstrate the ongoing decreased profitability of the sector.
However the government has not been able to provide financial information to
“disprove the industry’s assertions” (Productivity Commission submission 206,
2010b, p10), which has enabled the government to justify its cause that the
elderly a growing financial problem and by shifting the financial responsibility and
accountability to the elderly and to the industry. As such it is expected that the
federal government will “cherry pick” (Productivity Commission submission 206,
2010b, p12) suggestions posed in the submissions that were received by the
Productivity Commission, rather than adopt all suggestions made. To the
detriment of the industry, the government will provide it with a “piece meal
addition” (Productivity Commission submission 206, 2010b, p12) to a system that
is already complicated which will starve the elderly who will be in severe need of
adequate care over the next ten years. The federal government’s role in
accountability is to provide effective serves without wasting public resources.
Australian Unity supports the above argument that the government needs to shift
its focus to a tailored, individualised case management system which includes
aged care services and incorporates a broader wellbeing focus. This system
supports areas such as “health enhancement, socialisation, advocacy and
personal development services” (Productivity Commission submission 265,
2010b, p15). Australian Unity suggests that the current funding program creates
disincentives for effective program delivery. If aged care service providers
focused on improving the quality of life of the elderly, it results in reduced funding
to aged care service providers as they will need to provide fewer care services to
their clients. The government needs to effectively manage taxpayer resources,
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and Australian Unity suggest that the aged care service organisations who
provide approved quality of life programs ought to attract compensation to
providers who demonstrate a reduction in the ACFI score of their clients due to
the reduction in financial compensation payable by the government. Hence this
mechanism is better aligned to the desired outcomes of creating an effective
system which reduces the mismanagement of taxpayers’ resources.
KinCare compounds this debate and highlights the concern that older people
access health services at a “significantly higher rate” (Productivity Commission
submission 324, 2010b, p17) than younger people. The importance of this is that
aged care service providers have frequent contact with a larger number of older
people whilst they are in their care and simultaneously require health services.
Hence the government also ought to focus on valuing and promoting early
intervention in the prevention of hospitalisation and reducing the severity and cost
of hospital admissions. The facilitation of early intervention by the aged care
services would increase the costs of delivering these services. Further, the
difficulty in aligning these services is that the government’s current funding
mechanism concentrates on the “narrow cost per hour of service” (Productivity
Commission submission 324, 2010b, p17) rather than the “cost per outcome or
overall cost to the health and aged care system” (Productivity Commission
submission 324, 2010b, p17). These arguments demonstrate that aged care can
play an important role in maintaining functional abilities and restoring function,
which results in early discharge from hospital or avoidance in hospital admission.
The government ought to increase its focus on investing more in restoring
function and independence for older people, which reduces the ongoing need for
services. This will improve the overall wellbeing of Australian society. The
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government’s

present

system of

“rationing

and

funding”

(Productivity

Commission submission 324, 2010b, p17) increases the demand for services and
results in poorer health outcomes. Kincare (Productivity Commission submission
324, 2010b) further pinpoints that by utilising the market model of services the
rationing of services stimulates demand. This means that older Australians need
to access aged care services as soon as they require them, even though the
length of time that they will require these services cannot be estimated. The
consequence of this is that once they receive these services, they are
encouraged not to leave the system as it is difficult to re-enter it due to the
complexity of the accessibility of aged care services. This creates a cycle of rising
demand and costs with increases in age and a growing elderly population, and it
is clear that the government is not addressing this challenge for the long term
interests of social Australia.
These arguments are further contained in the not-for-profit aged care service
providers’ category, and its main themes are centred around the government’s
focus on increasing cost cutting and efficiencies; the current ACFI funding model
is inequitable and discriminatory, and government funding increases are
insufficient and unsustainable to support the growing aged care industry. The
submissions in this category also argue that the government ought to be more
responsible to appropriately manage and fund the industry which will be explored
in further detail in the next section.
7. Aged Care Service Providers (Not-for-profit) Submissions
Amaroo Care Services Inc is a not-for-profit aged care services provider, and
their submission includes comments regarding the government’s failure to
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maintain its accountability towards repairing the aged care industry. The
submission attributes the government’s lack of courage to reform the system due
to “fear of the polls” (Productivity Commission submission 98, 2010b, p4), as the
Rudd-Gillard government were afraid that they may lose their political position by
making “any wide sweeping changes” (Productivity Commission submission 98,
2010b, p4). In addition, Amaroo Care Services Inc also criticises that Department
of Health & Ageing, a government funded and managed institution, as also having
“vested interests” (Productivity Commission submission 98, 2010b, p4) to
maintain the status quo which had “severe cracks” (Productivity Commission
submission 98, 2010b, p4) that required repairing.
Due to the government’s fear of reprisals, its solution was to shift the
responsibility to the Productivity Commission to fix this “overdue repair job”
(Productivity Commission submission 98, 2010b, p4). Another concern is that the
recommendations provided by the Productivity Commission as a result of their
inquiry would not be implemented as it would be too difficult or politically costly
for the government to implement. In contrast to previous submissions, it asks that
the Productivity Commission considers all “sufficient material and evidence”
(Productivity Commission submission 98, 2010b, p15) received from everyone
involved in the consultation process and they are “courageous to make sound
recommendations for a better way forward” (Productivity Commission submission
98, 2010b, p15). Based on this submission the Productivity Commission has the
accountability to assess the problems facing the industry and to provide solutions
to the federal government. Finally, the submission calls for the federal
government to take full accountability and courage and bring the industry into the
future and to “continue to nurture the needs of Australia’s elderly” (Productivity
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Commission submission 98, 2010b, p15).
In its joint submission, ECH Inc, Eldercare Inc and Resthaven Inc add that the
government has been able to portray the ageing of the population as a
“burden…accompanied by rather apocalyptic predictions about soaring costs”
(Productivity Commission submission 100, 2010b, p7). The federal government
utilised its Intergenerational Report 2010 to include projections of significant
increases in government spending on health and aged care, which were
predicted to be driven mainly by population ageing and growth. The main
contributor to the increase in these costs was estimated to be by the residential
aged care sector. Ultimately, this has increased the risk of developing a “negative
image” (Productivity Commission submission 100, 2010b, p7) of older people and
has given the government a solid reason to justify the decision to shift its
accountability of the aged care industry to the elderly.
Contrastingly the submission suggests that government ought to focus improving
social factors such as: reducing the demand for residential care rather than
adopting the traditional market based, accountancy and efficiency approach of
reducing the total costs of government expenditure or increasing supply of places
which will unnecessarily increase costs. As suggested in submissions discussed
above, joint submission 100 quotes leading aged care academic, Professor Hal
Kendig of the University of Sydney, as reporting that cost increases will be due
to better utilisation of health services and improvements to the quality of health
for all Australians. Further, Professor Kendig attributes only 20% of the projected
increase in costs to the ageing population (Productivity Commission submission
100, 2010b, p7). As such these comments suggest that the government ought to
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maintain its accountability and focus on the provision of quality health and aged
care services, rather than focusing on reducing its costs, and expecting that the
elderly will be responsible for sustaining this industry.
ACH Group Inc also agrees with this argument and demonstrates that the
estimated rise in health and aged care costs in the long term can be attributed to
rising costs associated with professional services and referrals; pharmaceuticals
and medical technology “rather than the ageing process itself” (Productivity
Commission submission 111, 2010b, p3). Its submission suggests that the
government’s portrayal of an “impending crisis” (Productivity Commission
submission 111, 2010b, p3) is incorrect. It notes that the positive support of the
lives of older people is manageable if it is now appropriately planned; and that
the Productivity Commission provides a useful means of “forging the way ahead”
(Productivity Commission submission 111, 2010b, p3) for the federal
government, hence enabling the government to shift its responsibility to address
the issues stemming in the aged care industry as discussed above.
All relevant submissions in this category agree that the Australian Government
ought to assume full responsibility for aged care. It does not perceive any
“advantages” (Productivity Commission submission 100, 2010b, p20) in the
reallocation of responsibilities across Australian states, territories and local
governments. All submissions discussed above agree that it is more beneficial
having a single funder and policy maker to ensure that a clear and consistent
system

is

managed

throughout

Australia.

By

streamlining

regulatory

responsibilities across different levels of government (e.g. in areas such as
building and planning regulations, food safety, residential and health professional
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standards), will also improve social inclusion of marginalised groups such as the
elderly. National Presbyterian Aged Care Network suggests that these strategies
could be “severely compromised” (Productivity Commission submission 110,
2010b, p7) if the residential and community care systems are not “functioning
effectively” (Productivity Commission submission 110, 2010b, p7). This also
includes developing a “seamless” (Productivity Commission submission 111,
2010b, p8) aged care system that interfaces with the primary and restorative care,
and provides more community services (out of hospital services); health services
(such as palliative and preventative care); housing and disability services for
people who have special needs in aged care. The government has concentrated
on short term outcomes and results which have been more expensive and not
well linked (such as reducing the number of hospital admissions and placements
into residential care instead), rather than long term outcomes that are not
focussed on “broad health, wellness and lifestyle outcomes” (Productivity
Commission submission 111, 2010b, p8).
Catholic Health Australia agree with this argument and refer to this arrangement
as “an alternative and potentially more effective funding arrangement”
(Productivity Commission submission 217, 2010b, p20), by providing a more
client focussed approach enables the shift from the emphasis of inputs to client
outcomes by giving providers greater flexibility to tailor a range of services to
meet the assessed needs of each client. The providers give clients the choice to
decide which organisation which co-ordinate and deliver their services and make
the providers “more accountable in terms of client outcomes” (Productivity
Commission submission 217, 2010b, p20). More importantly, the increased
flexibility would enable community care providers to negotiate partnerships and
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arrangements with other primary care providers and hospitals. The government’s
budget would be more certain and enable greater flexibility which enables these
service providers to operate in a more timely and responsive manner.
Based on the arguments discussed above, the government needs to change
direction, and the future aged care industry needs to place the older person in
the centre. This means that the federal government needs to work with aged care
and community organisations to lead a strategy which appropriately responds to
the demands and challenges of an ageing population; develop a reliable,
comprehensive and flexible system of health and wellbeing promotion; care and
support services that adequately meets the individual preferences and needs;
can also adapt to the changes to individual and community needs; and maintain
distinct and appropriate accountability in order to achieve these outcomes. The
government’s role in this process is to reform the aged care system to support
the implementation of quality social services in an effective manner and utilising
outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of services provided. In
combination, these measures would be used to ensure that the quality of life is
increasing quality of life outcomes for citizens.
The community representatives category of submissions focus on improving the
aged care system with respect to the funding and how it ought to be funded, along
with developing a more equitable system which will be explored further in the
themes discussed in the next sections. Under the theme of accountability, the
submissions in this category argue that the government ought to develop long
term solutions with rapid responses and solutions developed to address the
problem of lack of community care packages or adequate residential placements
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to meet the needs of elderly. These issues will be further explored in the next
section below.
8. Community Representatives Submissions
The community representatives’ category of submissions supports the arguments
presented by other categories discussed above and suggest that the federal
government ought to be responsible for planning and service delivery of aged
care services to reduce the risk of ageing people falling into a crisis where they
cannot care for themselves or receive care support. The Futures Alliance
(Productivity Commission submission 44, 2010b) suggests that a sole
government agency is established and is responsible for the function to coordinate planning and service delivery. This will also reduce the unnecessary use
of more costly health interventions such as hospitalisation as the elderly can rely
on community support and age in their home or community while maintaining
independence. In return, resources are utilised more effectively through improved
assessments which target individual needs. Thus, this issue addresses the need
to develop an aged care system that is consistent “to ensure human rights and
accountability” (Productivity Commission submission 44, 2010b, p4). The
government’s outcome is the ideal of quality end of life care provided in a system
that is equitable where all peoples’ needs are met irrespective of their
circumstances. This then demonstrates that the government has achieved its
social goal of providing an effective aged care system and is meeting the
collective needs of the socially disadvantaged.
A contrasting issue to accountability is that the community representatives
category contains arguments where profit and not for profit service providers also
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ought to be accountable for their expenditure of the billions of dollars each year
they receive. Quality Aged Care Action Group Inc – Blue Mountains argue that
they receive funding from the federal government (which is revenue collected
from taxpayers), contributions from residents, and 85% of pensions received by
the elderly and additional fees received from the elderly who have assets. The
suggestion is that profit and not for profit service providers ought to be transparent
regarding the manner in which they spend their funds. It is a concern that this is
unknown as the government and society do not know if these organisations
require more funding; society does not have access to these funds and can’t see
how they are being spent and how they are allocated to the providers.
In the submissions that were reviewed, there are consistent arguments that funds
that are expended are “not reflected in staffing levels, equipment and food”
(Productivity Commission submission 81, 2010b, p4) to provide adequate service
levels to the elderly. As such, the quality of care cannot be improved unless the
staffing levels increase, and the workload of each care staff member is reduced.
National Foundation for Australian Women – Nowra noted in its submission
(Productivity Commission number 95, 2010b) that the federal government also
ought to develop and control a new system of aged care assessments which
includes case management of each person with managers who are responsible
to manage individual care budgets. This would include the development of a set
of “standardised budgets” (Productivity Commission submission 95, 2010b, p34),
which enables the provision of funds to eligible individuals. These service
packages would be managed by the case manager, who closely collaborates with
the care recipient. There also ought to be an allowance for direct control where
the individual or their carer can also manage their budgets efficiently. Such a
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system would also co-ordinate with acute and primary health care systems. As
such, there is a need to improve and integrate aged care policy and programs to
respond to the needs of ageing people.
The Retired Teachers’ Association (NSW) further adds to this argument and
suggests that the federal government ought to increase its funding for aged care
and abolish accommodation bonds that are imposed for residential care. People
who enter residential care are in need of care as they are ill or frail, and admission
requires the endorsement of a doctor (Productivity Commission submission 84,
2010b). The majority of the elderly do not spend a long time in residential care,
and it is “unjustifiable” (Productivity Commission submission 84, 2010b, p2) to
force people to sell homes to pay their bonds. On this basis, this submission
argues that “in no other area of the public health system are patients required to
pay a bond” (Productivity Commission submission 84, 2010b, p2). As such
submissions in this category suggest that the government increase its revenues
to adequately sustain the aged care industry by increasing the Medicare Levy.
However, as the taxpayer is the ultimate owner of these funds, the spending of
taxpayers’ money ought to always be independently audited, and the financial
reports of these service providers should be publicly available.
The lack of accountability by the government has been compounded by different
funding arrangements where the federal government is responsible for residential
care services; whilst the State governments manage community services. This
arrangement

creates

“bureaucratic

hurdles”

(Productivity

Commission

submission 127, 2010b, p4) with respect to coordination and information sharing,
and disagreements with respect to who is responsible for funding support
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services. Consequently, this has escalated the difficulty that federal and state
governments don’t have the incentive to take “ownership of issues” (Productivity
Commission submission 127, 2010b, p4) affecting the elderly, nor have they been
inclined to further develop or support the development of services appropriate for
a group of people whose needs are changing. As such, Victorian Deaf Society
recommends in its submission that “all levels of government work together to
achieve greater co-operation” (Productivity Commission submission 127, 2010b,
p5) in service provisions the aged care industry. Further, by having one “efficient,
quality system” (Productivity Commission submission 140, 2010b, p3) for
providing services; a data collection and reporting system for providers to adhere
also reduces costs for the government. Developing one cross system approach
will significantly reduce inefficiencies and costs into the provider system and will
reduce costs, improving the level of funds available to provide direct services to
the elderly.
Further, Aged and Community Services of NSW and ACT also support the
Victorian Deaf Society’s submission and recommends that the government
adopts a “holistic view” (Productivity Commission submission 140, 2010b, p1)
where all systems ought to fundamentally linked and treated as one whole
system. Presently there are many government funded and managed schemes
which result in a “great waste” (Productivity Commission submission 149, 2010b,
p2), duplication of administration and a lack of understanding of the schemes that
are managed. However, this submission suggests that regardless of whether the
aged care systems are funded by separate government jurisdictions, the
governments must ensure that they consider service provision of target client
groups due to “similar service, administration and transition requirements”
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(Productivity Commission submission 140, 2010b, p2) within the separate service
systems. As such it is important to consider the “whole of community approach”
(Productivity Commission submission 140, 2010b, p2) in planning the new aged
care system and adopt a “big picture attitude” (Productivity Commission
submission 149, 2010b, p2). Most importantly, under the new system, it is
anticipated that this will eliminate “buck passing” (Productivity Commission
submission 149, 2010b, p2).
Ultimately the changes in governments’ roles and responsibilities “should benefit
aged care users” (Productivity Commission submission 163, 2010b, p4), rather
than the governments’ political ideologies or own interests. Aged and Community
Services Australia (“ACSA”) is the ultimate governing body of not-for-profit aged
and community services in Australia. Its history of advocacy for improvements to
the aged care industry includes its contributions towards forwarding multiple
submissions; preparation of policies and statements on the challenges and
failings in the aged care industry (Productivity Commission submission 181,
2010b). ACSA’s submission describes the future of the aged care industry as
based on entitlement according to the individual’s assessed level of needs, where
the person can receive effective and consistent (Productivity Commission
submission 181, 2010b) assistance to live content, self-driven lives. They also
argue that in order to achieve this, the Commonwealth Government must have
full responsibility for aged care and funding to be distributed through a single
consolidated program. This would allow the consolidation of more than fifteen
separate community programs and the creation of one funding program. The
benefits of this include the development of a “single quality and accountability
regime” (Productivity Commission submission 181, 2010b, p15), which produces
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a stronger community care system along with savings in administrative costs
which could be invested to further support older Australians.
Finally, the increased demand by the submission reviewed in this study is for the
government to develop a “whole of government strategy” (Productivity
Commission submission 181, 2010b, p15) across many policies including ageing
and health, housing, planning and infrastructure to ensure that all policy settings
address and support Australia’s ageing population. ACSA suggests that the
government ought to create “aged friendly cities/environments” (Productivity
Commission submission 181, 2010b, p15), which includes universal building
standards; better lighting in public areas; seating for the elderly when they go for
a walk and need to rest. Addressing simple matters such as these further enables
people to continue to live in their home. However, this requires changes to ageing
policies relating to planning and infrastructure rather than blaming aged care
programs as the sole reason for the challenges facing this industry. Based on
this, a “whole of government approach” (Productivity Commission submission
181, 2010b, p16), requires the governments, including local governments, to
work together to prepare, plan and support the ageing and aged care services.
Based on these submissions, the government ought to assume full responsibility
to redesign an aged care system that is centred around people who require aged
care services; ensuring that they can access the services required in an
appropriate setting; and to include a range of health and aged care services
necessary to meet the needs of a rising older population and with chronic medical
needs. This would improve service delivery; reduce Commonwealth costs;
reduce business expenses and most importantly, improve patient outcomes,
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enhance independence and the feeling of social inclusion for older Australians. It
is the ultimate right of ageing Australians to have high standards of care and
service, which are tailored to meet individual needs and ensure quality of life. In
order to solve the issue of accountability and responsibility requires the
meaningful involvement of politicians and health ministers with consumers and
health professionals. Progression and re-design of the system further includes
reviewing the framework of aged care policy, aged care legislation and relevant
principles. Finally, it involves the government’s acknowledgement that the care
of people nearing the end of their life is a responsibility that also belongs to them.
7.5 Application of Regulatory Space Theory
Regulatory space theory refers to the development of regulation which is created
in a space that is occupied by regular actors such as private and state bodies.
Actors outside of this space enter it and attempt to determine a solution to a
constructed problem (Young 1994; Hancher & Moran 1989a) (refer to Chapter 5
for further discussion). Young (1994) explains that the regulatory space is a
“particular arena” (p85) of changes in policy setting in which the government is
expected to participate in order to alter the practices of the industry. Thus, the
aged care space is the space within which the aged care policy setting permits
and prescribes certain “accounting measurement methods and recognition
practices” (Young 1994, p85) enabling the production, recording and tracing of
such information for organisations.
Early in this chapter the questions and issues that were raised by the Productivity
Commission in its Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper (2010a) report were
explored. It included debates such as the adequacy of current fees schedule and
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subsidies; and the “efficiency, equity and sustainability of the aged care funding
arrangements” (p19). However, the report fails to explain who developed these
issues and questions and why these issues and questions were raised. Further,
the questions relating to accountability which were posed by the Productivity
Commission’s Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper and their invitation for
the public to suggest solutions to identify who ought to be accountable in the aged
care industry show that there is the deep emphasis that older Australians should
pay for their own costs of aged care services and be more accountable for their
own care.
This is highlighted by the need to incorporate elements of management
accounting techniques such as activity based costing to categorise aged care
services into separate cost drivers including personal care, health care and
accommodation. The incorporation of management accounting techniques
provides the government with the justification as to why there ought to be a shift
in funding responsibilities towards older Australians as they can categorise care
services costs into aged care services related costs that may continue to be
government funded. However, the remaining drivers of aged care costs, including
living expenses, personal care and accommodation expenses may be deemed
as unrelated to the provision of aged care services and enables the government
to argue that these expenses ought to be paid by older Australians as they are
separate to the provision of aged care services.
The Productivity Commission further suggests that means testing ought to be
applied to older Australians needing care services however with a gentle
emphasis that it ought to have a broader coverage of older Australians requiring
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them to contribute more towards the costs of their care. This enables the
government to recover their costs associated with subsidising home and
community care costs by penalising older Australians who may be not only asset
rich but are also now income rich. It further enables the government to distance
itself with respect to being accountable to the public by shifting the funding
responsibility towards to the individual.

Consequently, this means that the

providers of aged care services are ultimately responsible to the public and the
government is responsible for overseeing that the aged care legislative
requirements are met. This creates a distance where the government no longer
has a close connection with the public and creates a system which is based on
the privatised marked model.
The focus is no longer on the provision of effective services to meet social goals;
rather it is to create and enhance efficiencies and increase profits in the social
sector which contradicts the government’s traditional purpose of providing
effective and appropriate social services. This indicates that the question of who
ought to be accountable to sustain the aged care industry has been a problem
that has been constructed by the federal government along with the Productivity
Commission (a government organisation which is also federally funded).
Therefore, these organisations are not acting in the interests of the general public.
Rather they are acting in the interests of the government in order to reduce costs,
enhance efficiencies, adopting private sector mechanisms whilst shifting
accountability to the Australian public.
Through the analysis of the submissions identified in the eight categories above,
the discussion below also explains how their submissions demonstrate that they
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have entered the regulatory space and whether their arguments have
successfully influenced the Living Longer, Living Better reforms which were
announced in 2011. Firstly, the submissions from the categories of ageing
researchers, health education institutions and health care organisations are
traditionally not included in the regulatory space of the aged care industry. These
organisations are indirectly involved in the aged care industry as they do not
provide aged care services however they work in conjunction with the aged care
industry by generally providing health care services to older Australians or seek
to improve the aged care industry.
The Ageing Researchers; Health Education Institutions and Health Care
categories of submissions called for more government funding to be dedicated to
ageing research to support the development of the most effective services for the
elderly. The content of submissions also focuses on changing the attitudes
towards older Australians where they are not considered an escalating cost to the
public; that the government ought to continue to subsidise the aged care industry
given that it is ultimately responsible to manage and support this industry; and to
change the manner in which care plan services are development to create a
tailored, individualised approach.
This demonstrates that these categories of organisations have entered the
regulatory space, and traditionally would not enter this space (as they are not a
key stakeholder in the aged care industry). They have argued for improvements
to the aged care industry, which also contradicts the government’s focus on
shifting accountability to the public. As such, these categories of organisations
have entered the regulatory space to propose a contrasting solution which
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focuses on the qualitative aspects of the aged care industry and promotion of
better quality of life for older Australians. It also suggests that the federal
government ought to remain responsible for the funding of aged care services
and to enhance the effectiveness of quality care services provided.
Secondly, the submissions from the categories of community services providers,
councils and governments, aged care services (not for profit) and community
services providers are traditionally included in the regulatory space of the aged
care industry. These organisations are directly involved in the aged care industry
as they provide aged care services either in the community, at home or in
residential aged care. Therefore they have a vested interest in ensuring that the
industry is adequately funded to ensure their organisations have a sustainable
future in order for them to provide quality aged care services. Further, as these
are not-for-profit organisations, their overall goal is to provide quality care
services and to improve the lives and wellbeing of all recipients of their services.
The Community Service Providers and Councils and Governments categories
noted in their submissions concerns regarding the inadequate funding provided
by the federal government, and it ought to continue to fund the aged care industry
and advocates for the federal government to be solely responsible for funding the
aged care sector. While it appears that these submissions shift the responsibility
to the federal government, they also logically argue that there is the opportunity
for greater integration between the health and aged care sectors (given that the
federal government is also responsible to fund the health sector and the state
governments are responsible for health management). This results in providing
effective, quality aged and health care services which would improve the quality
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of life for older Australians.
The Aged Care Service providers (not-for-profit) category of submissions was
critical of the federal government’s heightened focuses on cost cutting and
efficiencies and do not support this shifting attitude by the government. They also
highlight the ineffectiveness of the current ACFI funding model and suggest that
the current mechanism is inequitable and discriminatory. Overall they seek that
the government is more responsible for managing and funding the industry; and
provides more funding as the current system is unsustainable and insufficient to
support the growing aged care industry. Further, the Community Representatives
category of submissions suggests that the federal government ought to be
responsible for planning and service delivery of aged care services. They also
highlight the inequitable and unethical mechanism of forcing older Australians to
sell their homes during the final stages of their life, and this does not occur in any
other health care sector in Australia. As such, they also suggest that the
government increases its funding to adequately sustain the aged care industry.
This demonstrates that these categories of organisations have entered the
regulatory space, and traditionally enter this space (as they are a key stakeholder
in the aged care industry). They have argued for improvements to the aged care
industry by highlighting that the government ought to remain responsible for
managing and funding the industry; and to improve the ACFI funding model to
ensure it is equitable and tailored to individual needs. As such these categories
of organisations have entered the regulatory space to propose a contrasting
solution which also focuses on the qualitative aspects of the aged care industry
and promotion of better quality of life for older Australians. Their focus is to also
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improve the wellbeing of older Australians and to develop an effective and
equitable aged care system.
Further, they have also entered the regulatory space as they are acting in their
own self interest where they have an interest to increasing funding to provide
more aged and health care services which will sustain the aged care industry;
and to undertake future research into ageing to identify areas that require
improvement in order to enhance the quality of life for the elderly. The above
categories of submissions demonstrate that their focus is on the delivery of an
effective aged care system which is beneficial to Australian society and to sustain
the aged care industry. This is to be managed by the Australian federal
government; hence this shows that these organisations still desire that the
government maintains its accountability towards the aged care industry.
In contrast, the final category of submissions was the Aged Care Service
providers (for profit) category. Submissions analysed in this category centre their
arguments regarding the increasing costs associated with providing aged care
services. The lack of return generated in this industry impacts on their financial
returns and increases the risk of operators managing their services at below
sustainable levels. They also highlight the disincentive to increase their capital
funding in the industry due to the restrictions regarding the manner in which they
are allowed to utilise the funds paid by residents entering an aged care facility.
Their arguments are vastly different to the arguments raised the remaining seven
categories of not-for-profit service providers. This demonstrates that the for-profit
sector maintains its traditional attitude where the elderly are a cost and must be
financially accounted for. The aim of these organisations is to increase their
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profits, increase the value of their investments and seek the opportunity to
continue to expand in the aged care industry.
This is in contrast to the purpose of the aged care industry, which has been to
provide care services to those who require it. It functions in a similar vein to the
health care industry and is not an industry that can be used to generate profits or
increase its capital investment. It is evident that in this category there is little
concern in providing quality care services or improving the lives of the elderly.
This category of organisations traditionally enters the regulatory space as it
provides direct aged care services. However, it has a different motive which is to
focus on the expansion of their investment portfolio through cost cutting,
increases in revenues and profits. The accounting calculus is most important in
achieving economic efficiency rather than focusing on improving quality care
services and the effectiveness of the industry.
The governments and organisations noted above which have entered the aged
care regulatory space demonstrates the “interconnectedness” (Young 1994, p86)
between these actors and how they have interpreted, constructed and
reconstructed their interests. At the same time, they have also constructed and
linked the problems identified along with providing actions and solutions (Young
1994). Young (1994) suggests that such actors behave based on existing
expectations about their role and purpose. The problems that have emerged are
“not seen to be simply there” (p86), rather they must be constructed as problems
by the participants in the regulatory space. As such the arguments presented
above could be constructed in a manner that is expected of the governments and
organisations in this specific situation and it is also their obligation to behave in
296

this manner.
The federal government has chosen to ignore the majority of the arguments
explained above as the changes included in their Living Longer, Living Better
reforms (Productivity Commission 2011) are: increasing the requirements in the
newly developed combined means and asset tests to older Australians (Lane &
Whittaker 2014). Previously the care subsidy was calculated solely on the
assessable income of the care recipient for residential and community care
services. The federal government now assesses whether it can reduce the
subsidy it pays to each person by reviewing their assessable income and means
testable assets (which now includes the person’s share of their residential home
and their Age Pension) (Lane & Whittaker 2014; KPMG 2013). This demonstrates
that the government has ignored the organisations which have entered the
regulatory space and argued for increases in government funding to the industry
and for the government to remain responsible for funding the industry by
increasingly shifting this responsibility to older Australians.
In contrast, the federal government has listened to the arguments presented in
the submissions to simplify the ACFI classification and funding mechanism by
reducing the classifications from 64 to 4 classifications. However, the reduction
of these classifications has also permitted the government to introduce new
expenses that it can charge to the care recipient and claim that these expenses
are not compulsory for the care recipient and should not be subsidised by the
government. This includes expenses such as meals, accommodation, personal
care and laundry assistance. As such there are additional expenses that were
traditionally subsidised by the government are now paid by the care services
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recipient. This shows that in both of the above aspects the government has
tailored its changes in such a manner to appear that it cares for the older
Australians however its hidden agenda can be seen through the use of
accountancy principles with its focus on economic rationality, cost reduction and
improved profitability.
Additionally, the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older Australians Issues
Paper report notes that the “commentators” (does not specify who these
commentators are) have questioned the “appropriateness” (Productivity
Commission 2010a, p19) of requiring current taxpayers to subsidise the costs of
caring for older Australians under a “pay as you go system” (Productivity
Commission 2010a, p19) with more support to this transition as aged care needs
to be projected to increase over the next 40 years. The Commission was asked
to develop funding options to ensure a fiscally sustainable industry and ensures
access to appropriate quality aged care services, and they note that “many have
argued that fundamental changes are needed (report doesn’t specify who made
this comment) to address some of the problems with the current funding system
and to effectively manage emerging challenges” (Productivity Commission
2010a, p19). The concern with this report is that it does not specify the
commentators who were asked to respond to the following questions: whether it
is appropriate that the taxpayers continue to subsidise the costs of aged care
services; and whether changes to the funding mechanisms are required.
It is without doubt that changes to the funding mechanism are required; however,
in whose interests has this study been performed? While the Productivity
Commission has invited the Australian public to provide comments in response
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to these questions, are they acting in the interests of the public or in the Australian
government’s interests? As discussed above, the government requested that the
Productivity Commission prepare this study on its behalf. As such, it is more likely
that the study’s findings will respond more favourably to the government’s
concerns rather than addressing the public’s concerns. The dominant taxpayer
approach is no longer the preferred mechanism with greater reliance on private
contributions, and private savings indicates that the Productivity Commission’s
report aims to persuade stakeholders to also adopt this approach.
Australia’s experience over the past thirty years has shown that the 65 years and
over demographic grew by 50% from 1981 to 1996, and the proportion of older
population increased from 10% to 12% (which is only 2% of the population)
(Howe 2002). Refer to Figure 7.1, which shows how government expenditure on
aged care services is in contrast to the argument presented that the older
population is a growing financial burden to the Australian economy.
The diagram below (Figure 7.1) demonstrates how expenditure on aged care
services has decreased as the older population has increased.
Figure 7.1 Trends in expenditure on Aged Care Services in Australia

1981-1996
Demographic 65+ increase by 50%
Demographic 70+ Increase by 2%
1975-1976
Aged Care Services Expenditure total
1995-1996
GDP 4.8%
Aged Care Services Expenditure
5.1% of GDP
Only 0.03% GDP increase
1995-1996
Only 13.2% of total government
Aged Care Services
expenditure
Expenditure is $22 billion

2011-2012
Aged Care Services Expenditure is
$11.3 billion
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It is argued that Australia’s population is ageing and that projections show “dire
consequences” (Kendig & Duckett 2001, p16) in relation to government and
public expenditure, however, the above results do not show significant increases
in expenditure on aged care services. This is in contrast to the manner in which
this issue has been projected in the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older
Australians Issues Paper (2010a) report. However, projections are accompanied
by examples of the above statistics as proposed solutions to cut expenditure on
this industry. These results indicate that social outlays on aged care, health and
income support during this period have remained relatively stable (Howe 2002).
KPMG (2013) suggests that the largest amount of federal government funding
was expended in 2011-2012 at $8.7 billion on the residential care sector and $2.6
billion on home and community care packages. However, the funding growth
rates on average have grown more in community care packages than for
residential care which is a result of increased demand and supply for higher levels
of care services required in the home and community. KPMG’s Report on the
Residential Aged Care Sector (2013) contains projections which indicated that
there will be an increase in Refundable Accommodation Deposits (“RAD” or
Accommodation Bonds) of approximately $3 billion in 2014-2015, which will
provide additional capital for residential aged care facilities to invest in expanding
existing facilities and construct new facilities. The assumption is that this
additional “investment” by the entering resident will provide benefits to the
resident, the aged care facility, the aged care industry and favours increases in
investment growth (KPMG 2013). The common focus of capital and are
investment growth stem from the private sector principles and have now been
incorporated into the new public management regime.
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Expenditure on aged care services has been relatively stable; however, the shift
of the balance of care towards community care continues to progress “more
unevenly” (Howe 2002, p114). The expansion of community care as part of the
Living Longer Living Better reforms is due to the commitment of increased funds
to this sector with anticipated savings in government expenditure in residential
care (KPMG 2013). Whilst releasing funds from residential care to community
care packages, the packages are generally funded “at a rate equivalent to the
lowest level of care benefit” (Howe 2002, p114). This is a beneficial strategy for
the government as its expenditure is projected to soften by increasing user
charges through the introduction of new means testing processes and a new
assets test.
While care services provided for each person are more costly due to the use of
the classification of care for incoming residents of aged care facilities, this is
compounded by the rising costs of providing rising demand for services regarding
age related illnesses such as dementia. However, the subsidies payable by the
government for residents entering aged care facilities is dependent upon the
assessed care needs of the resident and their capacity to financially contribute
towards their care costs (KPMG 2013). Clearly, Australia’s aged care policy
development substantially focuses on rational planning and considerably relies
on empirical data which is based on the accounting principles, including income
and expenses, assets and liabilities.
The aged care policy is also developed on the findings from monitoring,
evaluating and reviewing aged care services. The involvement of federal and
state governments, the not for profit or traditional voluntary sector, for profit
organisations, community organisations, consumer groups and professional
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bodies shows that there are competing interests in Australian aged care policy
development. Policy making is a political process where the balance of care
reflects “the balance of power among interest groups” (Howe 2002, p115). The
changes in the balance of power determine the shifts in the balance of care,
accountability and rational policy development in aged care.
Young (1994) notes that the government as the actor responsible for making
policy setting decisions ought to, evaluate the benefits and assess the
consequences of, alternative actions when reaching a decision (described as the
“logic of consequences”, p104). However it appears that in assessing the
situation, the government has interpreted its obligation and selected solutions
which are deemed as appropriate and are based on their expected behavior in
this situation (Young (1994) describes this behavior as the “logic of
appropriateness”, p104). This suggests that the process of policy and regulation
development cannot be separated from the understanding of the role of
accounting and accountability, the expectations of the government and the
construction of a regulatory space for changes to the aged care policy. Based on
this Hughes (2011) argues that the Living Longer Living Better reforms contradict
the Federal Government’s role of being accountable to citizens as it “continues
to advance the neoliberal restructuring of Australia’s health and welfare systems”
(p526). This government is shifting the financial burden of ageing from the public
to the private sector, and the changes to the funding of the aged care system are
also designed to increase efficiencies in delivering aged care services (Guest
2008).
In addition, the Productivity Commission (2011) emphasises that the Australian
Government has the “principal responsibility for planning, funding and regulation”
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(p27). In contrast, the government’s focus has shifted from the concept of being
publicly and financially accountable to incorporate the new form of public
governance, being new public management.

Essentially the use of the

accounting technology is assisting in the devolution of shifting funding
responsibilities to older Australians which is increasing “inequities as to who gets
what, how and why” (Healy 2002, p17). The debate over the social justice and
cost implications will continue as to whether individuals or society, current and
future taxpayers ought to be responsible for financing long term care and the
aged care industry and represents further reduction in the universal provision of
public services (Aulich 2011; Healy 2002; Productivity Commission 2011, p27).

7.6 Changing Regimes of Accountability
The development of welfare over the twentieth century has had primary concern
regarding the management of the public’s life and health risks. However, social
policies; the associated programs and the governments’ responses and
interventions regarding the public and private responsibility in managing these
risks have changed over time (Marston et al 2014). The metamorphosis of the
aged care sector to the adoption of the new public management regime has
resulted from the perceived strengths of the ideologies and resource structure of
the private sector. However, firms which survive in the private sector are able to
withstand the magnitude of competition and eliminate inefficient and poorly
managed firms (Funnell et al 2012). The philosophy in the private sector is of selfinterest and individualism which are characteristics that are harnessed in the
public sector to older Australians who depend upon government services such
as aged care services.
Traditionally government services relate to the principles of social equity and
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social justice which are based on collective rights and public support. Whilst the
market states that restrictions on resource allocation indicates that higher levels
of services will be achieved at lower cost. This means is achievable through the
introduction of competition however this is difficult to exist in public services such
as the aged care industry. The reason for this is due to the care fees, and daily
fees that are charged by service providers are generally determined by the
federal government. These cannot be changed by aged care services providers
which restricts competition and creates a monopolistic industry where the
government ultimately has the power to determine the prices charged for these
services.
In addition, the Productivity Commission (2011) advocates that the implemented
reforms to the aged care industry was made by the government on behalf of the
Australian citizens and has further exacerbated the issue of adopting the private
sector model by promoting the ideology of shifting accountabilities to the older
Australia by placing the choices in their hands as to the levels and types of aged
care services they require. The government asserts that this decision and by
providing consumers with this right will encourage competition amongst service
providers and will result in an increase in the quality of services provided.
However, the government’s “crusade” (Funnell et al 2012, p12) to successfully
implement competition and choice in the aged care sector is difficult to measure
and assess due to the importance of providing value for money when delivering
these services.
The main feature of the Australian government’s process in adopting
neoliberalism is to reallocate the disadvantage risks, including the rising costs of
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health and aged care, from the “state to individuals, households or charities”
(Marston et al 2014, p127). The issue of changing the aged care user pays policy
and labelling it as “consumer choice in the market” illustrates how the Australian
government has redefined life’s risks as an individual responsibility.
The aged care user pays system formerly was a system where the federal
government introduced mandatory financial contributions by the elderly. The
adoption of the new term “consumer choice in the market” masks the previous
user pays system with the same system as older Australians are still required to
contribute towards the costs of their care. However, under the new system, this
is promoted as elderly Australians having the choice as to the types of services
they receive; the right to choose their service provider and how the government
subsidy is spent if they receive community services. This decision has been
vindicated by the Australian government in the name of giving people choice in
the Australian liberal market economy (Marston et al 2014). Therefore by
adopting this method of rationalism benefits the government by: excluding as
many persons as possible and limiting their access to social support will save
public costs. This safety net approach also enhances the government’s ideology
to encourage people to increasingly rely on themselves rather than rely on social
support which would otherwise increase public expenditure (Minichiello 1995).
In contrast to the safety net approach there is the perception that society is
responsible to maintain an equitable level of “well-being” (Minichiello 1995, p465)
to all members of society and not just to the elderly. The aim of this is to shift
society’s priorities from the economic to social criteria and provides a more equal
share of national resources. Traditionally the government is obliged to treat the
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provision of aged care in the manner of a public good such as public education
and public health services. Thus access to aged care services ought to be
provided to a larger proportion of families based on broader eligibility criteria of
the need for aged care services rather than the individuals’ ability to financially
contribute towards their costs of care (Minichiello 1995).
The Federal Government promotes the Living Longer Living Better aged care
reforms as aiming to promote the independence and wellbeing of elderly citizens
and to have support and access to services as their needs change. However the
government also contradicts itself by noting that it is moving towards a consumer
directed market providing elderly Australians with increased choice and control
over their lives; along with ensuring that there is an efficient use to resources
dedicated to caring for the elderly, resulting in equitable distributions of resources
amongst generations (Productivity Commission 2011).
Aulich (2011) argues that the problem with this arrangement is that Australia is
one of a few nations in the world that has transformed from being a public
enterprise to adopting a “public-private mix” (p199) and is increasingly moving
towards being a private enterprise. As a consequence, it is losing its “publicness”
(Aulich 2011, p199). The government’s continuous shifts in aged care policy has
led to increasing uncertainty and insecurity for older people who are “faced with
the responsibility” (Gray & Heinsch 2009, p112) of planning and funding their
retirement needs. The shifting of responsibility is intensified by the compulsory
superannuation scheme introduced in 1992; employer linked benefit schemes
and economic policies (Gray & Heinsch 2009, p112). Combining these factors
increasingly emphasises the focus from the wellbeing of older Australians to
encourage private savings; and transferring the burden of funding to the elderly
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by increasingly charging fees for services whilst reducing costs to the government
(Gray & Heinsch 2009, p112). The increased reliance on private organisations,
private actors, market forces, user pays systems shifts the balance of the public
and private mix more towards adopting private market and individual values in
order to pursue social goals (Aulich 2011).
This argument is asserted by Funnell et al (2012) who highlight that reforms
relating to public sector management are informed by the principles of economic
rationalism and free market advocates which in conjunction have influenced the
government as considering this as the most suitable manner to repair this social
problem and to achieve the government’s social goal. The economic rationalist
approach considers that the policy making process primarily ought to base
resource allocation decisions on “financial costs and benefits” (Funnell et al 2012,
p111). Although the economic benefits are promoted as the primary reason for
the need for social reform, the government instead identifies and promotes the
social impacts as the priority reason for the need for reform. This is in contrast to
the government’s traditional policies that economic and political effects are the
outcomes of the social goals for these reforms.
The adoption of outsourcing aged care services which are increasingly provided
by privately owned organisations which were previously delivered by public
agencies substitutes the public provision of aged care services. Further, the use
of a user pays system and increased contributions by the elderly as part of the
Living Longer Living Better Reforms includes the substitution of public funding (by
using public taxes) with private fees, user contributions and investments (in some
cases) which reflects the government’s increased “unwillingness” (Aulich 2011,
p202) to pay for the full cost of aged care services. The increased use of user
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pays systems also increases the risk that the required services to the elderly could
be denied if they are unwilling or have no ability to pay for these costs. Hence the
government strives to implement the optimal combination of public and private
organisations and services delivered to achieve the outcomes typically required
in the private sector whilst adhering to the mandates of a capitalist and democratic
government (Moulton & Wise 2010).

7.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided an explanation of the data that was collected for the
purposes of this research. The Productivity Commission released its Caring for
Older Australians Issues Paper in 2010(a), which was used as a basis to demand
change in the structure of the Australian aged care system. This chapter provides
an overview of the contents of the report to demonstrate how it shaped the
submissions that the public provided in response to this report. Further, the
sample of submissions that will be analysed for this research have been
categorised into eight key groups. The purposes and aims of these categories of
organisations were explained to demonstrate its significance as this shapes the
content of their submissions. The arguments posed in their submissions also
shows whether they are based on their interests or the interests of the Australian
elderly. Finally, an analysis of the government’s shift in accountability has been
explored through the application of the regulatory space theory lens to the content
analysed in the submissions.
Chapter 8 provides an overview of each chapter from this thesis. It also provides
an explanation of the meaning of the findings, the limitations of this research
study and recommendations for future research relating to the aged care industry
in Australia.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to explore the Australian federal government’s
attitude towards accountability and how it is shifting its accountability to Australian
citizens. The government incorporates aspects of new public management to
justify its focus on enhancing efficiencies and reduce expenditure in the
Australian aged care industry. As a consequence, the government requires older
Australians to contribute more towards the costs of their care services. Through
the lens of accountability and management accounting, this thesis explores how
the government is adopting accounting techniques to justify its decision to contain
expenditure and shift its accountability to the Australian public. It also explains
how this impacts the stakeholders involved in responding to these changes,
which also influenced the development of new aged care policies which resulted
in the Living Longer Living Better Reforms. This chapter provides an overview of
each chapter from this thesis and a summary of the results of the qualitative
content analysis that was applied to the collected data. Finally, it provides an
explanation of the meaning of the findings, the limitations of this research study
and recommendations for future research relating to the aged care industry in
Australia.
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8.2 Overview of Thesis Chapters
In summary, in order to answer the research question, this study firstly provides
a research background in Chapter 1. This Chapter also highlights the
significance, aims, scope and contribution of this study. Chapter 2 then places
this study in the Australian context by critically providing a historical review of the
development of the Australian aged care industry to demonstrate how the
industry has evolved during the 1900s through to the 21 st century. This Chapter
also provides the legal framework which governs the Australian aged care
industry to demonstrate how this legislation has evolved over the decades.

Chapter 3 then provides an overview of the origins of accountability, the two main
categories of accountability and the accountability framework before concluding
on the definition of accountability which has been adopted in this thesis. It also
provides an overview of the regulators and key stakeholders in the Australian
aged care industry to explain the accountability relationship between these
stakeholders and how influential they are in the development of regulation within
this industry. Refer to Figure 8.1 for the concept map of the accountability
relationship between the key actors in the Australian aged care industry that was
explained in Chapter 3. Further, this chapter explores the concept of the adoption
of new public management in the Australian government sector; its adoption of
private market practices for the purpose of enhancing efficiencies; and the
changing nature of accountability in the Australian aged sector to the detriment
of achieving effective outcomes and meeting social goals.
Chapter 4 forms an introduction to the relationship between accountability and
the accounting regime, which is explored in this chapter. The focus is on the use
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of the accounting calculus and how it has been used by the Australian
government to increase social inequity. The government has utilised
management accounting practices and its budget to argue that the older
Australians will financially impact on the Australian budget and taxpayers in future
generations. This response enables the government to shift its focus on
accountability where its former purpose was to provide effective services to the
older population and the current purpose is to develop an efficient system which
relies on reductions in government expenditure and forces the elderly to
contribute significantly more towards the costs of their own care. This thesis then
critically reviews prior studies that have examined the changing accountabilities
within the aged care sector in Australia and the United Kingdom (in Chapter 5).
Due to little research having been undertaken regarding accounting and
accountability within the aged care industry, this chapter also provides an insight
into previously identified issues regarding the impact of the accounting function
within other Australian social areas such as the hospital and medical sectors. This
critical exploration demonstrates the use of accounting’s function to justify the
shifting attitude in accountability from effectiveness to efficiency and economic
rationalism.
Chapter 5 also describes the theoretical lens of the regulatory space theory,
which has been used in this study. The research framework adopted to examine
the underlying issues is then discussed in Chapter 6. The design of this study is
based on the qualitative research method. As this thesis is qualitative based,
sociological based analysis is frequently qualitative as the research aims involve
the understanding of phenomena which do not require quantification or
phenomena which cannot be precisely measured (Morrow & Brown 1994). Thus
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the qualitative research method, including content analysis combined with the
application of the lens of the regulatory space theory has been used. The analysis
is based on primary sources such as parliamentary hearings, federal government
releases and public submissions in response to the development of new aged
care policies in Australia and the shifting perception of accountability by the
Australian government. Using the information presented in Chapter 6 and the
theoretical lens provided by the regulatory space theory described in Chapter 5,
Chapter 7 provides an explanation of the data collected for this study and how
the data has been categorised. The data has been collected from public
government websites, in particular, the submission received by the Productivity
Commission. The data identified in the submissions was then categorised
according to key themes identified during the review of the data collected. It was
then categorised into eight categories of organisations which operate in the
Australian aged care industry. In the first step, the study examines the
submissions forwarded by the public to the Productivity Commission in response
to the Caring for Older Australians Issues Paper. Using the content analysis
framework, as proposed by Krippendorff (2013), key themes were identified when
analysing the selected submissions. The main theme that was identified during
the analysis and is explored in this thesis is the accountability theme. The theme
of accountability was examined using the regulatory space theory framework
proposed by Hancher and Moran (1989b). In the second step, this study reviewed
the changes to Australian aged care legislation to examine how the stakeholders
in the aged care industry impacted on these changes and the government’s shift
in attitude towards accountability.
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Thus for the purposes of this thesis, these theories have been linked to the aged
care industry reforms with particular focus on the use of the accounting
technology to influence the process and development of public policy regarding
the Living Longer, Living Better reforms. They were utilised to explore how the
actors were involved and how this has resulted in the shift in the Australian
government’s notion of its accountability to Australian society (including the
elderly citizens). Further, the key themes of efficiency, effectiveness, and new
public management were explored throughout this thesis in order to address the
research question. Finally, this chapter provides findings and conclusions of the
study and identifies its contributions, implications and limitations.
Figure 8.1 Concept map of the accountability relationships between actors in the
Australian aged care industry:

Federal & State Governments
(provide funds to aged care service providers)
Government Agencies
- Productivity Commission
- Treasury

Elderly Australians

Regulators
- Department of Health
- Aged Care Quality Agency
- Aged Care Complaints
Commissioner

Federal & State
Governments
(provide funds to aged care
service providers)

General Public
(taxpayers
provide funds)

Aged Care Service Providers

Community
and Families

Residential , Home and Community Care services
provided to the elderly (community and family rely on
their services to support elderly)

Government agencies monitor and report behaviour
Legend: Indicates the direction of accountability:

8.3 The Findings of the Analysis of Submissions
Following the application of qualitative content analysis of the data collected in
the submissions, the theme of accountability was analysed according to eight
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categories of organisations that operate in the aged care industry in Australia
(refer to Table 8.1 for a summary of the analysis of submission from each
category). This analysis explains the arguments presented by these
organisations as to whether they support the traditional notion that the Australian
government ought to remain accountable to the aged care industry in Australia,
or whether this responsibility should shift to the Australian public.
Table 8.1 Summary of analysis of submissions
Category of Submissions

Summary of Analysis

1.Ageing Researchers

• Increase in government funding to dedicated ageing
research and to identify changing social attitudes towards
elderly;
• Increase in government funding to provide adequate care
and support to older Australians;
• Government to change focus from cost reduction and
developing an efficient system. Focus ought to shift to
meeting collective needs of the elderly; and
• Government ought to remain ultimately responsible to
aged care industry and the public.
• Aged care ACFI funding model ought to change to a
universal system such as Medicare;
• Government’s focus on fiscal sustainability and adoption
of private sector practices reduces the visibility of aged
care services. Increases pressure on service providers to
find other means to cover costs at expense of providing
quality care services;
• Unlikely that people can pay for the costs of their care as
they cannot afford to do so or choose not to pay. People
are also living longer with diminishing capacity to contribute
towards costs; and
• Government ought to remain ultimately responsible to
aged care industry and the public.
• Government to increase funding for subsidies due to
deficiencies in current ACFI model;
• Government ought to develop more individualised
services rather than standard services;
• Current emphasis is on delivering care efficiently and at
minimum cost, rather than providing effective care services
that meet the needs of the elderly; and
• Government to take complete responsibility in the
management of aged care industry. Current system of comanagement between federal and state governments has
resulted in increased blaming and cost shifting which
impacts on providing adequate care services.
•Government to take responsibility to take action in
promoting healthy ageing; and
• Government is responsible to preserve legislative
requirement for older citizens to age in their home and
have the capacity to make unrestrictive choices to achieve
a quality of life.

2.Health Education Institutions

3. Health Care Institutions

4. Health Organisations
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5. Community Service
Providers

6. Councils and Governments

7. Aged Care Service
Providers (for-profit)

8. Aged Care Service
Providers (not-for-profit)

• Government to review current ACFI model as it provides
minimal funding relating to challenging and behavioural
issues such as dementia. This requires more labour
intensive than providing care to the elderly with physical
challenges;
• Government ought to continue to fund aged care
services;
• Government to shift its focus from measuring outputs to
measuring outcomes. Current funding provide for care
services which may not represent the client’s best
interests; and
• Lack of funding provided by government to encourage the
elderly to improve their health and wellbeing, and maintain
their independence.
• Government ought to be solely responsible to fund aged
care services and develop and integrated system with
aged and health care services;
• Government ought to focus on maintaining the wellness
to enable older people to remain healthy and independent
which also improves their quality of life; and
• Government ought to have a more significant role rather
than solely being the funder and gatekeeper of the aged
care industry, and to be proactive as it was in the
developing years of the industry.
• Concerns regarding profitability and financial viability of
their operations;
• Government maintains lack of accountability due to
deficiency in aged care service standards, placing the
elderly at risk of abuse and financial exploitation;
• Government funding continues to be important to support
older people to maintain their independence and to live at
home for longer;
• Government cannot continue to increase funding unless it
raises taxes. Recommend that elderly pay for daily costs
of living rather than wasting taxpayers’ resources to cover
these costs; and
• Government’s present market model of services by
rationing and funding increases demand for services and
results in poorer health outcomes.
• Government ought to be accountable to assess the
problems facing the aged care industry, to provide
solutions to bring the industry into the future, and to
continue to nurture the needs of the elderly;
• Government to improve social factors such as reducing
demand for residential aged care rather than focusing on
reducing total costs of government expenditure or increase
the supply of places (which will unnecessarily increase
costs); and
• Government ought to focus on provision of quality care
services rather than provide predictions regarding soaring
costs to the taxpayer and creating a negative image of
older people.

Given that in the private sector the larger organisations are inclined to lobbying
behaviour (Palmer 2013; Andrew & Cortese 2013; Georgiou and Roberts 2004);
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it is encouraging to note that the majority of submissions examined in this study
represent a broad range of not-for-profit entities (small and large); and from a
range of sectors (i.e. health, social services, education) and from a wide range of
different geographical locations around Australia. It is noted that although there
are different categories of respondents and are predominantly consistent in their
responses and attitudes to the key theme of accountability identified in this study
suggests that the findings in this research may also apply to non-respondents to
identify their thoughts on this issue (Palmer 2013).

8.4 Conclusion of Analysis
Overall the government must assume full responsibility to redesigning an aged
care system that is centred on people who require quality aged care services and
to improve health outcomes, enhance independence and a feeling of social
inclusion for older Australians. The incorporation of management accounting
techniques provides the government with the justification as to why there should
be a shift in funding responsibilities towards older Australians as they create
visibilities by categorising care costs. This provides the government with the
opportunity to reduce these by cost shifting these to the elderly and improves the
government’s fiscal sustainability. As such, the current system acts as a mask,
while it provides funding for aged care services provided; however, the
government’s intent is not to improve the overall health and wellbeing of older
citizens. The government needs to be responsible for developing aged care
policies and fund the sector. However, it needs to significantly improve the means
by which care assessments are performed and the quality of care provided. It
also needs to provide more funding to services and promote positive health
outcomes rather than focusing on providing standardised and efficient services.
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In addition, the Productivity Commission’s Caring for Older Australians Issues
Paper (2010a) explains their key focus areas relate to the supply and demand of
aged care services, the quantification of the number of places that the
government ought to fund and who ought to be responsible for funding the system
in the future. The government claims that it cares for the older Australians’ long
term care however this is clearly not represented in the paper as the
Commission’s common theme is the government’s interest is to improve the
health and wellbeing of the elderly which allows them to stay at home for longer.
However by maintaining this position provides an advantage to the government
as the elderly stay at home for longer, reducing the government’s expenses paid
to the aged care industry as it has less aged care places to fund.
Further, the Productivity Commission recommended that means testing ought to
be applied to older Australians, and they should be required to contribute more
financially which enables the government to recover its costs associated with
subsidising the industry with home and community care costs by penalising older
Australians who are asset rich and now income rich. While the submissions
analysed did not support this suggestion, the government then chose to increase
the asset and means tests which means that more are assets and income are
incorporated into wealth tests, resulting in the elderly paying more for their care
costs and the government reduce its subsidies paid. This has created a distance
with the government as it no longer has a close connection with the public, and it
has created a privatised marked model. The focus is not to provide effective
services to meet social goals; rather, it is to create efficiencies and enhance the
government’s supply. Thus through the Living Longer Living Better reforms, the
government has maintained full accountability to be the main funder and
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developer of aged care policies. However, it has also developed a new means
test to shift the funding responsibility to the elderly in a manner that is invisible to
the public.

The aged care reforms show the extent to which the Australian government has
reduced the visibility field as it is reinforcing the corporate and private view of the
funding and provision of aged care services. Accounting has succeeded in
positioning itself as a central role in debates regarding “economic efficiency and
capitalist rationality” (Morgan and Wilmott 1993, p16). The need for change and
most recent changes to the aged care policy were further driven by the
Productivity Commission’s (2011) Caring for Older Australians Report which was
submitted to the Australian Government on 28 June 2011. The Productivity
Commission (2011) estimated that the federal government’s expenditure relating
to aged care services would increase to $60 billion by 2050. Additionally, in 2011
each Australian aged 65 years or over was supported by five working people (i.e.
aged 15-64 years), and this figure is expected to decrease by 2050 to 2.7 working
people which will result in a significant decline in taxpayer revenues generated
(Productivity Commission 2011). The main concern raised by the Productivity
Commission (2011) is the projected ratio of the number of older people in the
population compared to the number of working age people which raised
questions of “intergenerational (in)equity” (Hughes 2011, p528). This relates to
the degree that the costs of supporting older generations must be met by the
younger generations and was an issue that the Productivity Commission
emphasised needed to be addressed (Hughes 2011; Productivity Commission
2011).
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Since 2015 the Liberal Government’s agenda regarding aged care policies
progressively aims to shift from the welfare based system to the market based
system which provides older Australians with the capacity to choose their own
services and care providers (My Aged Care 2016a). Further, it is anticipated that
this will increase competition between care service providers, increased care
quality and innovations in services provided. Overall the target is to maintain a
market system that is consumer driven and less government regulated (My Aged
Care 2016a). This can be seen in the pyramid in Figure A.2 (refer to Appendix)
which shows how the government’s push towards an increased reliance on Home
Care Packages will result in a change in demand for higher levels of home care.
The purpose of this strategy is to encourage a higher number of older Australians
to remain at home for longer; to increase reliance on community and family care
and to increase financial contributions by the care services recipient.
Correspondingly it is anticipated that the demand for residential aged care
services will decrease and will reduce the subsidies payable by the government
to the residential aged care services provider. Consequently, there will be an
increase in the hidden financial, social, emotional, economic impacts to
permanent carers of older Australians along with increased contributions by older
Australians and increases in savings in government expenditure through this shift
in accountability.
The government is promoting the objectives such as improving the quality of care
and strengthening the alternatives to nursing home care including home care; and
the rationale for the funding mechanisms. However the Living Longer, Living
Better Reforms are driven predominantly as justification for requiring a greater
319

contribution from the recipients of aged care services (through increased means
testing and higher fees charged for having too many assets). If residential care
accommodation is promoted as a substitute for home based accommodation, the
government argues that why should the recipient not pay more for the service
received. Although there is now the option to pay an accommodation bond or an
additional daily fee, this is still perceived as penalising the elderly with larger asset
pools and income through the harsher means testing environment. Hence the
main objective of this policy is to reduce the burden on the government’s budget
despite all of its claims supporting greater public expenditure.

The experience now in aged care homes is the promotion of the greater
application of the user pays principle. There is an increased threat to the quality
of life and care in residential care facilities with these impacts experienced more
in the for profit sector. This sector experiences greater revenues and increased
pressures for profit maximisation; however, there is also a lesser emphasis on
providing increased quality of care and treatment. The traditional function of the
government is to provide effective aged care services however this role now is of
lesser importance as the focus is to enhance efficiencies, reduce costs and
mandates the older Australian to pay more for the costs of their aged care
services when this once was a publicly funded service.

Australia has long maintained the attitude that social services are equitable to all
of its citizens. However evaluating the government’s actions solely on the basis
of efficiency and economic criteria risks exclusion of qualitative value
considerations such as “fairness and equity” (Funnell et al 2012, p67). In a private
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sector market, the shareholders’ key concern is the level of profit achieved each
year and is based on the result recorded on the Income Statement and Balance
Sheet. As such, the shareholders expect the management of a company to
manage its resources efficiently, which enhance the company’s profitability. The
most important indicators in the private sector are when profits rise or fall, which
relates to good or poor management of financial resources. Consequently, the
concerns relating to the management of public sector services is that the
dominant feature is increasingly based on the private sector principle of favouring
financial criteria and efficiency. The traditional preference for assessing
performance and effectiveness is based on equitable and ethical criteria which
increases the risk of detracting from the government’s interests of meeting the
fundamental goal of being “cost effective” (Funnell et al 2012, p67) rather than
focus on effectively providing social services to older Australians.
Hence there is a qualitative component in accounting which highlights the crucial
feature of accounting as a sophisticated social tool in determining the changing
attitudes of the government’s accountability towards society. The profit motive of
the private sector has been absorbed into the public sector and has been
distorted into the solution to the future economic and social problems as claimed
to be due to the increasing ageing demographic. Thus the concept of efficiency
is an input and output relationship which focuses on cost-benefit analysis that is
supported by these accounting techniques. Ultimately this enhances the
government’s powers to exert action and influence from a distance and in its
desired directions. The accounting technology is associated with the relationship
of programmes of government reform and social change and enables this to
occur. Throughout this process and across a range of organisational and
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institutional settings the boundary of what is subject to calculation and what is
excluded highlights the “social acceptability of calculation” (Mennicken et al 2008,
p5) and reinforces the calculative practice. The economic calculus has
progressively become the link to the infiltration into the public consciousness by
reinventing the identity of the older Australia where, the older population is a
financial and social burden which ought to be punished for the perceived lack of
monetary contribution to society. Therefore the practice of accounting in society
is significant and is sensitive to the ability to reform practices, recreate identities,
reshape interests and express new forms of economic and social action which
may not necessarily result in positive outcomes (Mennicken et al 2008).

8.5 Research Contribution
This study uses Krippendorff’s (2013) qualitative content analysis research
method and Hancher and Moran’s (1989b) regulatory space theory framework as
a lens to analyse and describe the submissions received from the Productivity
Commission which were in response to the Productivity Commission’s Caring for
Older Australians Issues Paper (2010a). This study makes a contribution to the
accounting literature by providing a rich description of accountancy and
accountability practices of the Australian government with respect to the
Australian aged care industry, which has not previously been a subject matter of
a comprehensive study. In this regard, this research contributes to the area of
accounting with respect to the Australian aged care industry and confirms the
validity of the application of qualitative content analysis and regulatory space
theory as a lens to examine public responses towards the Australian
government’s proposed changes to the Australian aged care industry. This study
includes a specific focus on accountability and the transition to the new public
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management adopted by the Australian government which has occurred within
the context of the Australian aged care industry where such a study has not
previously occurred.

One of the major strengths of this study is that it has attempted to answer the
‘how’ question through an interpretative case study. This study also contributes
to fill the gap in the literature highlighted by Healy (2011) and Howe (2008) who
argue that there is a lack of qualitative research in examining aged care issues
through an accounting context. It must be explained that a number of other
studies which have examined changes to the aged care industry have only
addressed the “what” question (for example Healy (2002); Kendig & Duckett
(2001), however, the matter of “how” previously has not been addressed. The
fact that this study adopts a qualitative case study approach and considers the
views of multiple stakeholders across the Australian aged care industry; and uses
a variety of sources for data collection also enhances the validity to the findings
of this study.
The findings from the research shows that through the Living Longer Living Better
reforms there has been a shift in accountability where accounting practices are
utilised as a form of social control and to enhance efficiencies within the
Australian government. The secondary contribution of this study is to look through
the lens of new public management through an under researched area of aged
care in Australia. The Australian government’s increased focus on financial
accountability indicates that decisions made are based on costs rather than the
benefits where access to aged services should be based on need. As a
consequence, it is increasingly becoming a service available to elderly citizens
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who can most afford it.
This study also utilised regulatory space theory as a lens to explore whose
interests are being served in the policy making process through the quantification
of elderly citizens as a rational method of financial management. Further, this
theory also assisted to reveal how the shift in public policy development is utilised
as a mechanism to legitimise the government’s decisions and actions.

8.6 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Based on the above findings, further research is required to address areas such
as how the federal government and states could be designed to provide sufficient
financial security so that individuals are supported if they are to be accountable
for their social and economic risks; and to analyse the risks that are created by
shifting accountability of aged care to the individuals and aged care providers.
Funding the aged care industry will remain a major occupier of policy makers as
demographic trends are projected to place upward pressure on the aged care
budgets in the future. However, the benefits which are anticipated to be
generated include: improvements to government efficiencies due to increased
consumer focused care which is centred on choice and the adoption of market
practices; encouraging older Australians to remain at home longer and rely on
community care will place downward pressure on the demand for the more costly
residential care and will decrease subsidies payable by the government, and
increased focus on independence models of care by encouraging the elderly to
continue with their own lives through prevention programs will reduce pressure
on the care system and reduce health care costs (CEPAR 2014). As the Living
Longer Living Better reforms are still in the infancy stages, further research will
be required to assess whether the Australian Federal government has indeed
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met the public’s growing dissatisfaction with the aged care system; whether it has
addressed the growing inequity of user contributions towards funding aged care
costs and addressing the growing public costs in relation to an ageing
demographic.

Further, the Australian Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety
commenced on 8 October 2018 by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth
of Australia. An interim report was released on 31 October 2019 by the Royal
Commission, and a final report will be released on 12 November 2020 (Royal
Commission 2019a). The Royal Commission is also seeking public submissions
in response to its interim report which was released on 31 October 2019. The
Aged Care Quality and Safety’s Interim report has identified that the aged care
system “fails to meet the needs of its older, vulnerable citizens” (Royal
Commission Interim Report 2019b, p1). The report also stated that the aged care
services provided are lacking in its uniform delivery of quality and safe services
to the elderly. Consequently, the aged care industry increasingly provides
uncaring, unkind services resulting in neglect of the elderly. It is important to note
that the interim report describes the system as “a sad and shocking system that
diminishes Australia as a nation” (Royal Commission Interim Report 2019b, p1).

Given that the Living Longer, Living Better reforms were designed to overhaul the
Australian aged care system and to address the rising concerns of the
government’s reduction in funding, the requirement for the elderly to contribute
more towards the costs of their care whilst the expectation was that the quality of
care services would improve. However, it can be seen that the aged care system
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in Australia has regressed, and the recommendation in the Royal Commission’s
Interim report is that the aged care system requires a “fundamental overhaul of
the design, objectives, regulation and funding of aged care” (Royal Commission
2019b, p1). This demonstrates the design of the Living Longer, Living Better
reforms have failed the older Australians and demonstrates that the government’s
shift in its accountability towards older Australians is incompatible with the
government’s traditional purpose of being accountable and primarily responsible
to take care of Australia’s elderly citizens. The adoption of new management
principles and the increased privatisation of the aged care industry, heightened
focus on increasing revenues and reduction in expenditure has resulted in the
de-volution of the aged care industry and the Australian government is required
to re-assess its position on the concept of accountability and its role towards older
Australians. In this capacity, further research will be required to assess the impact
of the Royal Commission into the aged care industry on older Australians and
whether there is a shift in the government’s role to manage aged care.

8.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the research framework and a summary of
the chapters included in this thesis. It also summarised the analysis results of the
accountability theme, which was a key theme in the submissions analysed in the
eight categories of organisations that were reviewed. A discussion of the findings
was also presented from an accounting and accountability context, which was
followed by the research contribution of this study. This chapter concluded with
suggestions for areas of future research.
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Appendix
Figure A.1 Types of care in aged care system pre 1 July 2012 reforms
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Figure A.2 Types of care in aged care system post 1 July 2012 reforms
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